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SUMMARY
Two features of true history must be reconciled:
objectivity and the historian's individuality. History
is defined as the story of man's past in its particular
aspect. Historical knowledge has a straightforward
inferential basis, made clearer by an examination of
source-materials. Relativist arguments are not
successful, but value-judgments have a place in history.
There cannot be a common interpretation, and committed
history can be objective. General history is an ideal,
giving scope for the historian's individuality.
Generalizations have a restricted function; history is
not a social science but should have a useful
relationship with the social sciences. Various types
of explanation are valid in history and are connected
with selection and the concept of significance.
Historical understanding has some special features:
intuition is especially important. Understanding,
interpretation and the historian's thesis are
significantly related. Much written history has a
literary character, contributing to genuine knowledge
and understanding, notably through the historian's
conception of his work and his relationship with his
readers. Objectivity in history has limits, and
interpretation has a character of its own. There is a
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1. Individuality and objectivity in history
The aim of this dissertation is simply stated: it is
to reconcile the individuality of the historian with the
necessity for historical objectivity. In the past many
thinkers have held that the individuality of the historian
is a paramount consideration in the writing of history; but
in their efforts to promote the significance of the
historian they have allowed, explicitly or implicitly,
that because of this paramountcy of the historian's
individuality, the achievement of complete objectivity in
historical work must be seen as impossible. For some
thinkers, it is true, the loss to history of objectivity
is to the general benefit of the consideration of past
events; for others, however, it is thought of as a
regrettable but inevitable consequence of their theories
of history.
Of course, there is no universal agreement that if
there really is a conflict between the individual historian
and historical objectivity in historical work, then the
maintenance of the historian's individuality must be held
to be superior to the attainment of objectivity. As I have
already said, many people- decide the apparently irresoluble
conflict between individuality and objectivity by putting
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individuality first; but perhaps equally as many wish to
maintain objectivity at the expense of the historian's
individuality: in the historical consideration of past
events it is claimed by these people that objectivity is
of the first importance, and in order to attain this
objectivity, individuality in approach and method together
with the personality of the historical worker, however
manifested, must be eradicated from (or better, not even
be permitted to enter into) any true historical account.
The absence of individuality is to be ensured either by
doing history through a group of which the members will
have a certain anonymity (for example, through a committee
or through collaborative work), or by applying well-proved
general principles to history (since such general
principles would allow objective theoretical criticism
from other workers on a sound, universally accepted,
scientific basis). The question, therefore, that I wish
to answer in the following pages is: Can the historian's
individuality be reconciled with objectivity in historical
work? Or, can the historian with no unfair restraint to
his individuality give us a sound objective account of
the past?
Indeed, I hope to go further than simply to answer
these questions in the affirmative. My intention is to
indicate the scope of objectivity in historical work and
its interaction with the historian's individuality, and in
addition to show the special importance for historical
understanding of the historian as a particular individual.
S
Before ray intention as I have stated it here can be
examined and argued closely and directly, some preliminary
problems connected with history must be looked at and dealt
with. I propose in this dissertation, therefore, to
establish first a definition of history, for it is
indisputably, and unfortunately, the case that the way in
which history has been defined has changed in a significant
way several times in the past; and it is true too that at
the present time working historians themselves have one of
several current definitions of history in mind (perhaps not
very consciously) when they are engaged in their studies.
Most definitions of history, when their ramifications and
implications are developed and realized, are not fully
compatible with each other. Consequently, it is necessary,
at the beginning of any discussion which is going to be
centred on the nature of history, to make it very clear
how "history" is to be defined for that discussion.
However, I do not intend that my definition of
history shall be an arbitrary one; while allowing that
there may be a need for some of the potentially separate
disciplines which today compete for the name of history
to have an existence in their own right -- and they are
"disciplines" at least in sketched outlines — I am
confident, and intend to show, that our concept of the
past entails that there be some sort of discipline,
complete in itself, which shall correspond to "history"
according to the definition that I accept and argue for,
and for historical reasons this discipline has the best
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claim to the name of "history". It will be this definition
of history with which I shall be concerned in my examination
of the problems connected with the individual historian
and historical objectivity.
Once a concept of "history" has been satisfactorily
defined, the historian's purposes must be looked at; and
after this I intend to attempt a clarification of the
nature of the historian's knowledge and the materials
through which he comes by that knowledge. It will be seen
that the purposes of historical work are actually determined
by its nature; and the methods of a particular historian
will be decided to an important extent (although by no
means exclusively) by his beliefs about the purpose of his
work.
Nature, purpose, and methodology are all closely
connected; and the purpose of any particular instance of
historical work, as that is conceived by the historian,
has a close and important bearing on the objectivity of
the work. In a significant number of instances it can be
shown that when we reject a work of history because its
lack of objectivity mars its description and explanation
of the facts, this rejection can be more or less direct¬
ly attributed to a faulty conception of the purpose of
history on the part of its author.
The question of the relation of purpose and
objectivity is, however, a very extensive one. A faulty
conception- of purpose will sometimes give rise to a
narrative that is obviously incorrect and on that account
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historically unacceptable. More importantly, a historian's
conception of historiographical purpose is both a product
of the whole complex of problems connected with historical
relativism and itself a causal factor in that complex. The
historian's ideas about the possibility of historical
objectivity will have a significant effect on his ideas
about his own purpose in writing history; likewise, his
conception of the purpose, or function, or value of a
historical account will reinforce his belief in the
objectivity of historical work or confirm his convictions
that historiography must be relative to its age and the
value of its results no more than ephemeral. The complexity
of relativist problems necessitates a reasonably full
treatment of relativism and historical objectivity; it is
here that the main topic of this work, that is to say, the
importance of the individual historian in historical work,
together with an examination of the relationship between
his individuality and objectivity, is first treated, for
it is in the context of relativism that many of the
arguments against the primacy of the individual historian
in historical work are to be found.
Thoughts that historical work is somehow inherently
counter-objective are produced by many factors present in
the methods that historians must use in dealing with the
past, and by essential characteristics of the historical
past itself and the subject-matter of history. There are
two main clusters of problems centring on features which
seem to militate against objectivity in history: there are
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problems arising on the one hand from the individuality of
the historical worker and the psychological and social
conditioning of his personality as he expresses it in his
work, and on the other hand from the non-scientific, non-
generalizing character of history. So it is that the
characteristics of the historian have to be examined; and
it will be necessary to look at some of the problems of
objectivity which originate in one of the aspects of the
way in which historical work is done. History is still
largely researched and written by.the individual historian.
Although at the more "basic" historical levels a large
amount of work is done by various working-groups and
similar impersonal bodies, the "terminal" historical work,
the full-fledged historical narrative, is still the almost
exclusive province of the individual historian, with all
the abundant problems of personal bias, psychological and
social conditioning, and other apparently counter-objective
factors apparently necessarily attendant on this state of
affairs. It is the very personal side of the finished
historical narrative which for many philosophers and
historians ensures that the historical work of an
individual historian cannot be objective but must be
inevitably coloured, and irremediably so, by the individual's
point of view.
Some thinkers find the relativist's objections in
respect of the individual historian to be well founded, but
they believe that these objections can be overcome by the
propagation of methods of "group" history, that is to say,
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historical work carried out completely through comprehen¬
sive collaboration or by some sort of historiographical
committee. Other thinkers, however, have come to the
conclusion that, for group history, any objections to
historical work carried out by an individual can be
paralleled by similar objections for any sort of "committee
history": the group as a whole has relativist features
created for it by its orientation to a particular period
of,time (to a particular era), and by the assumptions
underlying the social and cultural milieu in which the
individuals of the historiographical group have been
brought up, assumptions which must determine the basic
conceptual structure of the group's work, even in so far
as its members may consciously strive to work against these
assumptions. Objections to historical objectivity founded
on relativism still remain after those objections based on
the psychologically conditioned individuality of historical
workers have been refuted; and so they too must be
subjected to an examination. I intend to look at these
problems of relativism, and I hope to show that some of the
relativist's assertions about history are unacceptable, while
those which are acceptable do not necessarily compromise
historical objectivity.
The relativist's argument against objectivity is
founded on one limitation of the historian's vision, that
limitation created by the historian's location in some
society at some point in time. Another limitation provides
a basis for a different argument against the individual
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historian, that is, the inability of a single individual
to cope with the sheer mass of the material relevant to
the general consideration of almost any historical topic.
In support.of this argument, and as an alternative to the
general history that is thought to be impossible, some
writers advocate the development of specialized forms of
history. Against this I shall assert that any particular
historical topic, for the deepest understanding, must be
looked at in its totality; thus, the term "general history"
has to be defined and shown to be the genuine and most
complete objective of historical work, while an examination
of some of the forms of specialized history should demon¬
strate that these specialized forms are subsidiary to
history pure and simple. On the other hand, what might be
thought of as the "extreme" of general history, that is,
universal history, will be seen on account of its inade¬
quacy to be an invalid form of complete history. The
necessity for the use of the divisions of period and
region within general history is in this way made evident.
An ideal of a type of historical work which moves
away from the particular and towards generalized statements
is a fully tenable concept. But in the consideration of
problems of relativism and objectivity in historical work,
references will have been made to the fact that history,
unlike both the physical sciences and the social sciences,
is not orientated towards the general. The fundamental
importance' of the individual and particular in history has
also been emphasized in the discussion of the nature of
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history. This characteristic of history is so important
that, although it can hardly be treated exhaustively, it
must be dealt with at some length. It is an important
characteristic with regard both to historical objectivity
and to the individual historian, and therefore I shall
have to spend some time in an examination of aspects of
the particular and the general in connection with their
significance for historical work. Because of this
significance, it has to be stressed, and elaborated pre¬
cisely, how the individual and particular is the primary
topic of historical work. Therefore, the relationship
between history and the social sciences has to be made
explicit, and the place and form of generalizing in history
need to be explained. In particular, the conception of
general laws for historical work has to be looked at in
some detail.
From the lack of general laws in history there arise,
as it is claimed, certain well-known problems of historical
methodology. On the one hand it has been asserted that,
for the most part, there are no general laws in history,
that history is largely a matter of dealing with unique
events in what is basically, in the absence of a generally
accepted theoretical system, a rough-and-ready, common-
sense way: such a treatment of historical material will be
largely determined by the individual personality of each
historian; thus, the argument runs, history cannot possibly
» be an objective discipline. On the other hand, it has been
claimed, as a refutation of this position, that historians,
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however implicit it may be in their apparent method, do
make use of general laws, that history is in significant
respects scientific, and that consequently a claim of true
objectivity can be made for historical work which has been
carried out in a proper and acceptable way. For my part,
I shall set out to show that the justifications of his¬
torical objectivity cannot be those of scientific objectiv¬
ity, for scientific objectivity partly rests in the con¬
formity of the explanation and interpretation of various
particulars in terms of general principles which, as
established, have somehow been cut free from the individual
case. While there are a large number of general laws
applying to history in fact, and not all of them truisms,
history does not and cannot have that body of generaliza¬
tions, and general laws and principles, which is essential
for a scientifically justified objectivity; nor does
history have that orientation towards the general xfhich
characterizes the true sciences. My intention is to
demonstrate that history is concerned fundamentally with
the unique and particular, and also to show that the con¬
sequences usually thought to be derived from the particular
character of history do not follow; that is to say, quite
simply, that facts about the particular provide both
information that is objective and information that is
worthwhile in terms of enduring human knowledge.
Once it has been established that history is the
domain of the particular, the importance of the particular
as such in the completed historical narrative must be
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shown, together with what follows from this. Because
history deals with the uniquely particular, explanation in
history will be found to have a special character: in
short, explanation has several markedly different and
logically unrelated meanings in historical work. Because
of the frequent absence of general laws of a universal, or
even a probable, application, explanation is often not at
all of the same kind as explanation in the physical and
social sciences; the true relation between the general and
the particular in history must be stated explicitly. In
any case, for history analytic explanation is not the last
stage in saying "why" events happened in the way that they
did; full historical knowledge comes with the deeper
understanding of events and their explanation. It must be
shown that because of the special character of historical
understanding, its effectiveness will depend very much on
the individuality of the historical narrative and
consequently on the personality of the historian who puts
forward various statements as satisfactory explanations of
historical events.
I intend too to examine at some length the nature of
"insight" and "intuition" in their connection with
historical work, the conception of history as an activity
to which literary qualities are necessary, and the basis
of historical understanding. When these ideas have been
explored in some depth, the importance of the individual
*
historian must be looked at once again, and this topic of
the historian's individuality will then be developed and
17
expanded. It is the existence of individuality in histori¬
ography which ensures the presence of that style which
constitutes such an important medium of historical work.
The significance of literary style in history will there¬
fore need to be examined; and the importance of literary
qualities in developed historical narratives must be
emphasized.
Historical objectivity is not necessarily compromised
by the individuality of the historian who carries out his
work conscientiously. I intend to show in detail -- con¬
vincingly, I hope -- how this can actually prove to be the
case; and, more, I shall set out to demonstrate how the
concept of historical knowledge essentially contains the
idea of a deeply held point of view, and how individuality
in historical authorship and historical understanding is
in fact very largely indispensable, perhaps not for the
entire conception of history, but certainly for a very
great number of instances of written history. It is through
individual insight and the developed historical experience
of the historian that we finally come to understand the
events of man's past with a fullness of meaning.
2. History and philosophy
%
One fundamental objection that might be advanced
against the development of my argument in the pages to
come is that in some cases where it touches on philosophical
problems it passes them by without going into them in
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sufficient depth. Certainly from the viewpoint of "pure"
philosophy this objection would seem to possess some
justification. And so it must be stressed that in this
dissertation I am not concerned with certain problems of
philosophy that may possess a logical connection with
history but with problems in the philosophy of history as
it deals with history proper. These latter problems, I
should wish to hold, are in some way either peculiarly
historical or very closely related with history as it is
practised. For the most part I shall not be giving much
attention to those problems which, while they can be found
in history, also pervade our whole experience; these
problems originate in our metaphysical presuppositions
about experience as a whole, and are thus more properly
considered in the full context of that experience.
To illustrate more clearly the distinction I wish to
make between philosophical problems which are present in
history and philosophical problems presented _by history
(by our concept of history and the past), I shall give in
the following pages five examples of problems that are
quite often discussed by philosophers of history but which
I choose not to discuss at length because I do not find
them to be exactly historiographical problems.
Three important problems are connected with time.
Problems of time obviously have some connection with
history; but they do not of necessity have any special
relationship with history. As a first example we may
examine the familiar sceptical argument regarding the
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real existence of the past. In Chapter V of his book
Analytical philosophy of history^" Danto gives a detailed
discussion of certain temporal scepticisms, with an
especial consideration of the argument that, for all we
know, the world might have been created _ex nihilo five
minutes ago. Now, such an argument is not relevant to
anything within history but is a problem of our whole
experience. The philosophical puzzle can leave the
historian quite unmoved, for as historian he quite legiti¬
mately takes the accepted structure of our experience for
granted. The historian studies past events and not the
past as such (the concept of "the past") in some strict
philosophical sense. The historian is interested in those
events which we already claim to be past events; but it
should not be thought that he must therefore be interested
in the concept of "pastness" or in establishing that past
events are "really" past. To prove that purportedly
historical events had no real existence, that the world
really had been created an instant ago, would not simply
leave the historian destitute of historical material, or
destroy the discipline of history (and a few other studies
as well), while at the same time the rest of our world and
our interpretation of it remained comparatively unscathed.
It would not be history alone that would be destroyed but
our whole world and the conceptual scheme by which we
understand it. The historian makes no conscious philo¬
sophical assertion about the nature of the past when he
1. (Cambridge, 1968).
talks of past events: that past events are past can be
taken as given as easily in history as in everyday life.
Our knowledge of the past and our belief about its real
existence do not present us with a problem in the philos¬
ophy of history but with a general epistemological
problem. And it is not a problem that occurs within the
concept of history but one that only arises about the
concept itself of history..
With reference to a second problem, it needs to be
emphasized that not everything that is ordinarily sig¬
nificant with regard to the past is necessarily signifi¬
cant in history (as a discipline). Memory has an important
relation with the past in everyday experience; but,
although when the historical tradition was an oral one it
was important for history, it now has little historical
significance for the historian. Of course, the historian
needs memory in his work just as anyone else does, perhaps
to remember the references he looked up yesterday, the
problems he dealt with when he wrote the previous chapter
of his book, his plans for the future development of his
narrative, and. so forth. And it is true that memory
occasionally does play a part directly in historical
studies, in, for example, the direct testimony of eye¬
witnesses; and in some topics, such as the interpretation
and verification of certain popular traditions, the nature
and reliability of memory will play a very large part.
But, in the historical field as a whole, the directly
historiographical use of memory by the historian is very
21
limited. Meiland's concern, therefore, about the position
of the sceptic regarding memory is strictly a philosophical
concern and not one that belongs properly to history or to
the philosophy of history. Memory is certainly not the
historian's principal type of evidence about the past; nor
indeed, as Meiland suggests, does the historian observe
in any way cause and effect (for which memory is required).
In his historiographical capacity the working historian
may make no essential use of memory at all; he comes to
know about the past in other ways. Historical knowledge
of the past is by no means the same as personal knowledge
of the past, a distinction which a concentration on the
2
historian's use of memory comes to obscure.
Although the concept of history is intimately bound
up with time, the historian never comes to worry about the
concept of time itself. Thus, in the pages that follow,
I am not interested directly in purely philosophical
3
problems about our concept of time. It is true that
discussions of such problems can be found in connection
with history; but in whatever way such an issue as the
distinction between McTaggart's A-series and B-series may
be applicable to history, it is not itself historical in
character and does not need to be argued about in the
context of history. They are problems that have their
being in our general picture of the world, and form a part
2. For the historian and memory, see Scepticism and
historical knowledge (New York, 1965Ti especially
Chapter 7.
3. Cf. L. Susan Stebbing: "Some ambiguities in discus¬
sions concerning time", in Philosophy and history, ed.
Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton (Oxford, 1936).
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of epistemology as a whole. Obviously any change in our
concepts of time would affect those concepts as we make
use of them in history; but such problems must be seen and
discussed in their general, and primary, setting. Their
function in history is in no way a peculiar one: it is
entirely determined by the position of history in relation
to our human knowledge, and our theory of knowledge, as a
whole.
A fourth example of a problem discussed in the
philosophy of history is the problem of the nature of
covering-lav; explanation. Two objections are often made
to the covering-law theory: that laws and principles should
not be considered premises of an explanatory argument but
rather as rules of inference, rules by which the expli-
candum is deduced from the explicans; and that laws are
not part of an explanation but provide the justification
of an explanation. A discussion of problems like these,
which are very much problems within the covering-lav; theory
of explanation, would obviously have to be considered
worthwhile and even necessary for history if covering-law
theory provided a complete account of historical explana¬
tion, although they would strictly still not be problems
belonging to philosophy of history proper. It will be my
contention that covering-law theory does not provide such
a complete account, although there are many instances of
a covering-law type of explanation in history. However,
since I make no exclusive claims about any sort of expla¬
nation as valid for history, there can be no implied
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obligation to attempt any clarification of the structure
of a particular type of explanation with a full degree of
internal comprehensiveness. Explanation in history, as I
shall show, is to be judged on its own terms; and. what I
say later about the various structures of explanation is
intended only to serve the rest of my argument. The bases
of different sorts of explanation need not be thought
peculiar to history; consequently, a detailed and exhaus¬
tive examination of them properly belongs to a discussion
of the concept of explanation in its own right.
Lastly, although I shall mention it, I do not dis¬
cuss as part of the development of my argument the conten¬
tious problem of individualism and holism in history. This
is very much a central problem in the logic of historical
discourse, but it is also one that has a much wider basis,
and it does not have a significance for history different
to that which it has for the social sciences, or, indeed,
for the conceptual basis of our thought in general. Al¬
though it is of enormous significance and interest in
itself, it is not a problem with a special interest which
is in some important way exclusive to the philosophy of
history. Indeed, even if the problem were resolved — no
matter how it might be so resolved — the historian's
researches and methods, his thinking and writing could
continue unchecked and unchanged, to the same degree that
ordinary language could do. Historians certainly have
their own philosophical assumptions regarding "motive
forces" in history and their individual or holistic nature.
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Nevertheless, these assumptions are not necessarily mani¬
fested by the language of the historian, for holistic
language is freely used by adherents of both sides of the
logical argument. Thus, in whatever way logical problems
might ultimately be resolved, the historian could continue
to "speak with the common people".
To cover so lightly such philosophical problems in
these few paragraphs above may give a very false impres¬
sion of my own attitude to them. In other contexts,
indeed, I have found these problems of immense interest
and importance. My omission of any really substantial
discussion of them in this dissertation is decidedly not
intended to represent any kind of absolute judgment
regarding their philosophical consequence, or their
consequence for other kinds of discussion about history.
All that I have wished to show is how I intend to concen¬
trate here on the problems that I believe to matter pecu¬
liarly for the philosophy of history and especially for my
own argument about individuality and objectivity in
history. Most certainly I do not wish it to be thought
that I have omitted a discussion of some problems fre¬
quently found in connection with the philosophy of history
out of either ignorance or lack of interest.
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II
A DEFINITION OF HISTORY
1. History-as-actuality and history-as-record
History is concerned with the past. Once this is
said, however, we are immediately compelled, at the be¬
ginning of any discussion of history, to differentiate
the two ways in which we use the word "history" in con¬
nection with the past.
"History" may refer to the past events themselves;
or it may refer to the record, written or spoken, of those
events. The distinction to be drawn is made clear by a
consideration of the differing etymologies of the Ger¬
manic word and the Romance word for "history". In German
the word "Geschichte" is derived from "geschehen", that
is, "to take place", "to happen". The Romance languages
(and English too) take their word from the Latin "his-
toria", deriving ultimately from the Greek "terrOyDCtx.",
which meant originally "research", "exploration", "in¬
formation"; the verb "Icrrcyoeco" had as its primary meaning
"learn or know by inquiry", and in later Greek (although
not in early, Classical Greek) it came to mean "give a
written account of what one has learnt", "narrate in
detail". The sources of the words "Geschichte" and "his-
toria" show clearly the important distinction to be made
between history as the past events themselves and history
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as the study of past events. This distinction may seem
too obvious to deserve mention; but even today it may
be found that a supposed problem has its foundation in
a confusion of written history and history-as-actuality,
and occasional reference will be made to this confusion
in the chapters that follow*.
History-as-actuality, that is, history as the past
events themselves, can only come to be known through what
may loosely and generally be called records of the past --
through written materials or artefacts, through documen¬
tary or oral evidence, through archaeological discoveries,
through surviving material of one sort or another. The
past comes to be known through evidence of a direct sort,
or through a special type of record that has made use of
evidence -- the historical account. Because of this it
could only be expected that in any language one word should
come to do duty for what are seen to be two distinct con¬
cepts when they are examined in a philosophical way, but
wrhich, for the layman at least, are concepts that are in¬
extricably bound together. In this thesis the two concepts
of history will be understood to be quite separate, and
when I use the ivord "history", I shall usually be referring
to "written history": when my use of "history" refers to
the actual past this special reference will be quite clear
from the context.
In considering the objectivity of history in the
light of the separateness of written history and history-
as-actuality, one is presented immediately with a paradox.
27
Historical objectivity requires that written history
should give us a truthful account of history-as-actual-
ity, yet with the latter we can never be directly ac¬
quainted: as actuality we only know it, or we only have
known it, as the present, and as the present, of course,
it has not yet become history. In our efforts to estab¬
lish objectivity, presented as we are only with various
accounts based on the historical evidence, it would seem
that we can only set about comparing one piece of history,
and the techniques behind it, with another piece of his¬
tory and with the primary evidence available in the pres¬
ent for our examination. This notion of the comparison
of different narratives as the basis of an objective un¬
derstanding of the past is inadequate, but it has been
advanced as a solution to the problem of historical ob¬
jectivity."*" It is partly because of the difficulties
inherent in connecting history-as-record with history-as-
actuality that the idea that a historical statement is
logically a special sort of statement about present facts
can be so alluring: among other problems, the problem of
objectivity can be much more easily dealt with.
The problem of objectivity has only to be given a
passing mention here, in order to show its connections
with the question what the nature of history is. I shall
deal with objectivity more fully at later points. My im¬
mediate concern, now that the two main concepts of history
1. Cf. Jack V/. Meiland's concept of "triangulation" in
his Scepticism and historical knowledge (New York,
1965~n This is also discussed below, chap. IV, sect. 7.
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have been satisfactorily differentiated, is to establish
the exact functions of a written historical account. One
of these functions, as I have already pointed out, is to
provide an account of history-as-actuality; but, of course,
this is not all. The historian does not attempt to copy
the past but tries to convey it to the present meaning¬
fully. Written history is the story of the past, and a
story is more than a mere "mirror" of events. History is
fact, explanation, and understanding: even a selective
"copy" of history-as-actuality would be no more than a
simple chronicle, or at best an account of past events as
they were understood by their contemporaries. However,
before we can look more fully at how history presents a
meaningful story, it is necessary to make clear what his¬
tory is a story of, that is to say, we need to define the
subject-matter of history.
2. The subject of history
Written accounts may present the past in many ways,
and may be about many different sorts of subject-matter.
Written history is about past events, but it is an account
that is much more than a straightforward reconstruction
and also is about a \^ell-defined type of subject. It is
still necessary to make clear in a positive way what the
subject-matter of history is, what methods the historian
should use in his treatment of the past, and what purpose
the historian should believe his account is ultimately to
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serve. If we are to understand exactly how it is that
history can be objective, we have to make a detailed defi¬
nition of history, clarify the proper nature of the his¬
torian's approach to his subject-matter, elucidate what
the historian's business really is, and mark off those
parts of any historical narratives as they commonly occur,
or of any accounts of historical research, that are extra¬
neous to history as such.
A historical narrative tells us of past events; but
it is immediately obvious that history is not concerned
with all or any kinds of past events. True, there are
various sorts of natural histories, biological histories,
geological histories, and so forth. The occurrence of the
word "history" and related words in such phrases is the
result of perfectly valid linguistic usage. There is no
linguistic or conceptual error to be identified when one
talks of a "history of the earth" from its beginnings or
even a "history of the universe". No detailed examination
of this use of the word "history" is required for it to
be understood that such a use is derived from the primary
sense of "history". It is with the primary sense of the
word that I am concerned here; and, indeed, the problems
connected with the central meaning of "history" have al¬
ways been found, as a source of discussion and argument,
to be ample enough.
A preliminary definition of history must make clear
that it is concerned with the development of mankind
through the past. While this initial statement may seem
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to be clear and simple, it is still not defined with an
exactness adequate to form the basis, or part of the basis,
of the definition of "history". History proper is not
concerned with the development of mankind in "pre-historic"
times; and this is not simply the result of the lack of
historically acceptable materials. Indeed, with the de¬
velopment of modern scientifically-based research, we now
have accounts -- "histories" -- of prehistoric periods, so
that it could be said prehistoric times are no longer
literally pre-historic: the term is now divorced from its
etymology, as it seems, although it remains a valid and
useful word in that it marks off a certain period in the
development of mankind. In a strict sense, however, for
the most part prehistoric times are still literally so.
History deals with the progress of mankind since man first
became socially organized. While there are many examples
of a type of group-cohesion to be found in prehistory, the
picture is still overwhelmingly one of either social dis¬
organization or of forms of organization that are pre-
social and pre-political. Prehistory is not history: his¬
tory is the story of men living in society, and true
society is characterized by a form of political conscious¬
ness. As Henri Pirenne is reported to have said: TL'his-
toire est le recit des faits et gestes des hommes en tant
que vivant en societe.' It is in this way that history
proper is immediately distinguished from historical anthro¬
pology: the historian studies the acts of men in society.
2. Quoted by G. J. Renier: History: its uuroose and
method (London, 1950), 35, from unpublished lecture-notes.
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The subject-matter of history is clear, although the prob¬
lem of the historian's method of approach to his subject
2a
has still not been resolved.
3. Selective definitions of historical facts
History deals with man in society. I have pointed
out that it must not be thought of as dealing with some¬
thing more than that. In this section I wish to argue
for the counterpart of that position, that is to say, that
history is nothing less than the story of man in society.
If it is this story, it is the whole of it. In making
this point, consideration of selectivity first enters into
a discussion of history.
Two sorts of selectivity are relevant here: the
first, that simple recorded facts are not historical un¬
less they are interpreted, that is, unless they are the
subject of historical judgment; the second, that simple
recorded facts are not historical unless they are signif¬
icant. The second sort may seem initially to be quite
different from the first sort; but clearly it can be con¬
sidered as a more specific variant of the first sort,
namely that historical facts are only those facts that
are judged to be significant.
Of the first sort of selectivity regarding the defi¬
nition of history and historical facts, we may cite as one
example Oakeshott's thinking on history. In Experience
and its modes Oakeshott writes that 'because an event is
2a. See also Appendix A.
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(in some sense) recorded, it does not imply that it is
historical'; and that 'before a "recorded" event becomes
a historical event, a judgment must have been interposed'.^
A more wide-ranging and explicitly relativist viewpoint
is shown by Carl Becker in his article "What are historical
facts?" in which he maintains that the historian deals
not with the event, but a statement which affirms the
fact that the event occurred. When we really get down
to the hard facts, what the historian is always dealing
with is an affirmation -- an affirmation of the fact
that something is true. ... For all practical purposes
it is this affirmation about the event that constitutes
for us the historical fact. If so the historical fact
is not the past event, but a symbol which enables us
to recreate it imaginatively. ^
Becker's position obviates the difficulty supposedly cre¬
ated by the historian's lack of access to past events by
defining historical facts not as about the events them¬
selves but as about the testimonial records of those events.
Again, the record of an event must be analysed as an inter¬
pretation of the event by someone. In speculative philos¬
ophy of history it is worthwhile considering as relevant
such a contrast as Spengler makes between the world-as-
nature and the world-as-history, where the latter
reviews once again the forms and movements of the world
in their depths and final significance, but this time
according to an entirely different ordering which
groups them not in an ensemble picture of everything
known, but in a picture of life, and presents them not
as things become, but as things becoming.5
3. (Cambridge, 1933), 90, 91.
4. In The philosophy of history in our time, ed. Hans
Meyerhoff' (Garden City, N.I., 1959), 124.
5. "The world-as-history" (reprinted from The decline
of the West), in Theories of history, ed. Patrick Gar-
diner (New York, 1959), 191.
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In each case the statement of the fact that a past event
occurred becomes "historical" as a result of the histori¬
an's activity as such. When I talk of "selectivity" being
present here, therefore, I am not referring to a selectiv¬
ity that takes place within a particular scheme, but rather
to one that is created and determined by one scheme, in
contrast to others, of interpretation and judgment.
Regarding the second sort of selectivity mentioned
above, it is with a more pragmatic bent that E. H. Carr
allows the term "historical" only to an elite body of
facts about the past. Garr distinguishes between facts
as such and facts of history: facts about the past are
transformed into facts of history by being mentioned by
historians, and it is this that gives them a historical
significance. As an illustration Carr cites a rather ob¬
scure fact (that a vendor of gingerbread was kicked to
death by a mob in 1E50), first mentioned in a series of
lectures at Oxford.
Does this make it into a historical fact? Not, I
think, yet. Its present status, I suggest, is that it
has been proposed for membership of the select club of
historical facts. It now awaits a seconder and spon¬
sors."
This notion of a historical fact is a possible one; yet,
stated as simply as it is here, it seems rather bizarre.
Its origin is to be found in a confusion of history, his¬
toriography, and individual historical narratives. If we
are going to say that facts about the past become histor¬
ical through their use by historians, our criteria for
6. E. H. Carr: What is history? (Harmondsworth, 196k),
12.
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this will be extrinsic rather than intrinsic; with regard
to the historicity of the facts as it inheres in the facts
themselves, which is what should be important here, we
shall find ourselves placed in an untenable position.
Carr's position determines the way in which it comes to
predicate historicity of facts in a very arbitrary manner.
If we follow Carr's thought we ultimately judge historical
facts to be historical on what are logically non-histori¬
cal grounds, since the significance of being mentioned by
historians is not properly determined in all cases by any
intrinsic historical qualities.
However, it is difficult to understand why the term
"facts of history" should be given the meaning which Carr
assigns to it. Facts about the past are facts of history
if they have a bearing on man and his relations towards
and within society, and likewise a fact of history is
simply no more and no less than this type of fact about
the past. It is immaterial to the status of the fact as
such that it should be known to a historian and be used
by him in his analysis of a problem. The upshot .of Carr1s
position would seem to be that the historical quality of a
fact is dependent on its significance, for it will often
be felt that the use by a historian, or simply his cita¬
tion, of a fact will indicate that that fact is of sig¬
nificance in the historical course of events. This is
very frequently the case; but in no way should it be
thought of'as a logical connection. The citation of some
famous event or the adoption of some patently obvious
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explanation may turn out in the end to have been histori¬
cally wrong, if its historicity depends on its genuine
significance regarding the other facts of a historical
account. It is also -worth noting that the choice by a
historian of a particular event for inclusion in his nar¬
rative may be made for illustrative purposes only, on
grounds of convenience, and on grounds, therefore, which
are historically arbitrary. The frequent mentioning of
the same event by different historians will often be a
result of convention: the example used is well-known and
consequently is always cited in a particular connection
because of its familiarity; it should never be taken that
this necessarily means that other examples would be less
satisfactory if they were used for the same purpose.
The claim that historicity depends on significance
is not an uncommon one. Certainly, significance is very
important in history, and some problems connected with
significance and the historian's evaluation of events will
have to be looked at in a later chapter. Nevertheless, I
believe that it can be directly asserted that the defini¬
tion of a fact as "historical" does not entail its defi¬
nition as "significant"; nor need a fact be claimed as
significant before it can be considered as historical.
History is the whole of the story of the past of man in
society. A "historical" fact is simply to be defined as
a fact about man in society in the past.
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4. The problem of a complete history
The maintenance of the position that only selected
facts about the past are facts of history may in part be
an attempt to avoid the consequences of a statement that
the facts of history include all the facts about the past
of social man. Nevertheless, it must be asserted that
7
history is everything in the past of man. For the his¬
torian everything in this past is worthy of consideration:
■» G
'dans I'histoire le detail c'est tout.' Therefore it must
be realized that historical facts are infinite in number,
and so a numerically complete history of the world can
never be achieved.
For some of those persons wiio think about history
the idea that historical facts are infinite in number may
be a source of anxiety; but, indeed, that historical facts
are infinite is the case. The past can never be recon¬
structed in its entirety either in practice or in theory;
but these limitations can scarcely be cause for alarm. It
is true that
because of such limitations no historical account can
cover the past fully: it is a reasonable inference,
therefore, that the events themselves are always richer
and more varied and complicated than any account can
possibly be.9
Nevertheless, the limitations necessarily imposed by the
7. Cf. Boyd G. Shafer: "History, not art, not science,
but history", Pacific Historical Review, 29 (I960).
G. M. Giry, in his preface to F. Lot: Les derniers
carolingiens; quoted by J. B. Black: The art of history
(London, 1926), L.
9. G. J. Tapp: "Knowing the past", Journal of Philosophy,
55 (1956), 465.
37
finiteness of human thought are not exclusive to histori¬
cal work; they are characteristic of our thoughts about
all the different varieties of our experience. Indeed,
from a pragmatic point of view, it is essential for his¬
tory to be selective, in order that the results of the
historian's work should be both comprehensible and worth¬
while for his readers.
The necessity of ensuring that history somehow be
"complete" is behind one kind of criticism of the notion
that the facts of history are infinite. Behind a second
kind of criticism of the same notion is the suggestion
that the historian, if he is potentially concerned with
everything about the past, in some way lacks discrimina¬
tion, that history for some is, as Oakeshott has put it,
'a mere exhumation of past events'. (Many historians
might wish that their task was as easy as this phrase
implies, that the course of past events could quite simply
be exhumed.) However historical facts are defined, the
historian has still to select his facts and order his
work; to say that the historian is concerned with every¬
thing about the past of man is only to say that he must
hold every fact to be prima facie worthy of consideration.
Therefore, the basis of a definition of history and
the first guiding principle of the historian in his work
is that history is concerned with the whole of the past of
mankind in society. All true historical accounts are con¬
cerned to relate with a certain fulness (according to the
10. On. cit., 93.
level of detail of the narrative) an account of a partic¬
ular section of man's past.
Since history is the whole of the story of man's
past, it must include not only an accumulation of the
facts of the past but also a presentation of a synthesized
account that will integrate the fields of man's activities
as man himself is an integrated whole. Historians, that
is to say, must write general history as well as special¬
ized historical accounts; only general history ultimately
presents a true and complete historical synthesis. How¬
ever general history is such an important topic that I
have devoted a whole chapter to it rather than give it a
cursory treatment here.
The idea of a "complete" history is one that pre¬
sents us with complexities not only through rather sim¬
plistic quantitative problems like those I have just
mentioned, but also in regard to the qualitative problem
of completeness and its relationship with the representa¬
tiveness of a historical account. I have already said
that it is not the historian's task to "copy" the past but
to convey it to us meaningfully; therefore the "complete
history" is not to be judged by the literal completeness
with which it reconstructs or re-creates the past.
Since history is not a "copy" of past events, it is
mistaken to assert that it is the sole or principal task
of the historian to re-create the past. Re-creation of
the past is only one of his tasks, and even so, it is not
essential for historical completeness (as a fair and full
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representation)in an account of past events that the his¬
torian should re-create entirely those past events. The
historian has not only to be selective; he must also pro¬
vide an understanding of the past that is not to be found
in a reconstruction of the events themselves. And to do
this he must frquently avoid reconstructing in a simple
way that contemporaneous understanding of past events
which may often be historically faulty, although it may
occasionally be to the point, or serve his purpose, to do
so.
To define the historian's task as reconstruction is
too simple: to define it solely as reconstruction is frank
ly misleading and dangerous. Such a view of historical
work ignores one of the substantive characteristics of
history -- the historian's use of hindsight (and this is
one characteristic which, despite its importance, is not
often examined in its own right. Hindsight is central to
the structure of written history. It is precisely the
historian's hindsight which ensures that the account he
gives of past events is both more and less than a recon¬
struction, or re-creation, or reliving of those events.
It is less than a reconstruction, because the historian
is obliged to omit, in their subjective aspect — that is,
as part of his own individual reconstruction -- the atti¬
tudes of contemporaries of past events to those events in
which they participated; he is obliged to omit them in so
far as the sort of understanding of events engendered by
those attitudes is inadequate or erroneous for historical
purposes. The historical account is also more than a
reconstruction, because the historian's understanding
aspires to be superior to the understanding of the con¬
temporaries of the events. Again, it is more than a re¬
construction, because the historian understands and ex¬
plains, not only in terms of the past and present of the
events examined (as indeed contemporaries might well have
done), but also in terms of the future of those events.
Thus it is that a complete narrative history is
something much more sophisticated than a simple record or
reconstruction of history-as-actuality. We can see that
the problem of objectivity in the historian's relation to
both his working material and his finished narrative is
going to prove to be a more complex one than we might at
first have imagined. The objectivity of a historical
record of events has to be judged in the context of a
complexity of fact and explanation, past and present, and
the historian's dealings with his material. It will be
seen that some of the justification of a historical "story"
is to be found within that story itself, in terms of the
historian's understanding of his subject.
5. History as a story
It has been said that history is the story of man
in his social life. It must be shown now exactly what is
intended by the use of the word "story". To talk of a
historical narrative as a story is to claim that it must
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be more than a mere recital of facts. It must be a de¬
veloped and cohesive account: in sum, it will, freouently,
be a "story", in the fullest literary sense of that word.
A discussion of the nature of a cohesive historical
account involves the well-known and much-discussed dis¬
tinction between history and chronicle, between plain nar¬
rative and significant narrative. The idea that the his¬
torian must give more than what is in effect only a bare
list of events has given rise to much recent argument both
over whether it is the case that the historian should do
this, and over what the precise difference is (if indeed
a distinction can be made) between a plain narrative and
a significant one.
It is interesting to note that the idea that the
historian must do more than give a bare recital of events
is a very old one, with its sources in antiquity. For
example, it was basically in terms of history and chroni¬
cle that Lucian, in the second century, criticized the
historians of the Parthian Wars; in his comments on these
writers he says:
Another of them has compiled a bare record of the
events and set it down on paper, completely prosaic and
ordinary, such as a soldier or artisan or pedlar
following the army might have put together as a diary
of daily events.12
Indeed, Lucian, nearly two thousand years ago, saw where
the difference between history and chronicle, between
11. In most western European languages the words for "his¬
tory" and "story" are the same. Gf. German Geschichte,
French histoire, Italian storia, Spanish historia; and
one archaic sense of English story.
12. Lucian: "How to write history", in Works (London,
1913-67), VI, 2$, 27.
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plainness and significance, lay as clearly as any recent
thinker. The difference is to be found in the competence
of the historian, in the sophistication of his technique
(and also, sometimes, in the adequacy of his working ma¬
terial), and not in the possibility of any so-called plain
narrative of simple fact. However, nothing I may say in
this section is calculated to exclude the possibility of
fully competent compendia of historical facts, such as
dictionaries of dates; I wish to show below that it is the
case just that there cannot be a plain narrative of facts.
The common suggestion is that there can be two sorts
13
of narratives of past events. To put the matter very
simply: plain narratives are those which list historical
facts in the plainest way, with the intervention of a mini¬
mum of interpretation (ideally, of none at all) and of cer¬
tainly no historical judgment. Significant narratives, on
the other hand, take their evidence, including plain narra¬
tives and the facts contained in them, set the events they
describe -- or whatever can be deduced from them — in an
explanatory context, and interpret these events using judg¬
ment and discrimination; and it is this latter, significant
13- The putative distinction between history and chronicle
is treated at length by Arthur G. Danto in his Analyt¬
ical philosophy of history (Cambridge, 196$), 115-142;
this passage involves criticism chiefly of Professor
W. H. Walsh's views as they were put forward by him in
An introduction to philosophy of history (London, 1951).
I do not discuss the main problem here because I concur
with Danto's argument, except in so far as he believes
his conclusions about history and chronicle to compel an
acceptance of relativism; he says that 'the imposition
of a narrative organization logically involves us with
an inexpungable [sic 1 subjective factor' and 'the rela¬
tivists are accordingly right'(142).
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narrative which the historian proper is supposed to provide
us with.
In theory at least, then, plain narratives should
tell us what happened, and significant narratives tell us
what happened, how, and why. This simple theoretical dis¬
tinction implies that at a fundamental logical level history,
that is to say, actual historical accounts, can be divided
into fact and explanation (including interpretation and
evaluation). Plain narratives, however, are quite impos¬
sible, for lack of explanation alone does not make a narra¬
tive plain. Even before the task of explicit interpreta¬
tion and explanation begins, the historian, as he seeks to
construct his story from the relevant material at his dis¬
posal, is concerned to give his narrative significance: he
must make use of a framework, decide the focal point of the
story, see the structural importance and determine the
values, with respect to the external form of his work, of
what he is to tell his audience. Such evaluation will
usually take place simultaneously with explanation: evalu¬
ation and explanation in the development of a historical
narrative will usually form a single activity. The literary
evaluation of the elements of a narrative can take place on
its own, though. If evaluation of this kind is any part
of a narrative, it must be part of the "plain" narrative,
if this can be truly a narrative. There can be evaluation
without explanation, but the following example illustrates
what this sort of narrative might involve: a historian could
tell the story of past events in a way that would puzzle
the reader as much as, perhaps, the evidence puzzled the
historian, with no explanation offered. Clearly, an ac¬
count of past events of this nature is not really what is
meant when a "plain" narrative is talked of. At a more
purely academic level, at the level of scholarly research,
the researcher may often give an account of his findings
about a particular historical event, or personage, or
document, as plainly as he can. But the more this suc¬
ceeds with its plainness, the less applicable to it will
be the term "narrative". It will be a narrative according
as it is an integrated account; and if it is an integrated
account, its structure must involve evaluation. Plain
narratives exclude interpretation and explanation in the¬
ory at least, but the ascription of the term "narrative"
to any historical account presupposes an evaluation of
its material. It is no objection that literary evaluation,
as opposed to more obviously historical evaluation, should
be discounted since it is somehow non-historical. In the
logic of history the literary ability of the historian is
as essential to the development of a historical narrative,
and affects the historical content of that narrative, as
more directly historical types of judgment and interpre¬
tation. In the end, therefore, whether we are talking of
"plain" narratives or "significant" narratives, it has to
be conceded that as the historian begins to write, plain
facts quickly disappear. Any belief that plain narratives
(bare historical reports) are actually possible must be
abandoned.
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6. A definition of narrative
In discussions about history the term "narrative"
is most often used to refer to a substantial piece of
written history about the progress through time of certain
individuals, or events, or institutions, which are given
by the historian a development roughly in accord with
their actual chronology. It should be understood that I
mean nothing as specific as this by my use of the term.
Logically considered, the conventional term is arbitrarily
applied; the long narrative about development through time
is only one special instance of a general type of his¬
torical treatment. Through an examination of its size,
subject-matter, and treatment I shall endeavour to make
clear that kind of account to which the term "historical
narrative" should be understood properly to apply.
With regard to its size a narrative is generally
thought of as something of book-length, the length, per¬
haps, of an average novel. Nevertheless, there is no
logical reason deriving from the nature or treatment of
a historical subject for historical narratives to be of
that length: their size and scope will be determined by
the subject chosen. A limited subject and a consequent
brevity will not change the nature of a historical account
in the way that it changes the nature of a fictional
account, so that the difference between a novel and a
short story is more than one of size. Practically con¬
sidered, a historical narrative may be of any length.
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It is sometimes claimed, but more often implied by
the manner in which the term "narrative" enters into dis¬
cussion, that the subject-matter of a narrative involves a
degree of temporal succession, of movement through time
by its subjects; and the counterpart to this is that situ¬
ational accounts of history -- those accounts which, for
example, present a static picture of a society at a given
point in time, which set the scene, or are devoted to
structural analysis (and there are undeniably many exam¬
ples of accounts like these in history) -- are not narra¬
tives in anything like the same way. A narrative, that
is to say, relates the story of such-and-such a particular
through time from T-l to T-2.
Initially this appears to be an attractive position.
However, I believe that there are several arguments to
be brought against it. First, I would hold that this
position is an example of the confusion of history-as-
record with history-as-actuality. The historical account
relates the past, but it does not copy the past, and, most
importantly, it does not copy time: there is no temporal
succession in the historical account that concerns devel¬
opment through time; there is only the report of it. We
may be deceived by the fact that we have to start on page
1 and read through to, say, page 300; but the historian
in his description can and frequently does move backwards
and forwards in the time-scheme of his subject; and we too
may leaf through the book as we choose. Being in the
middle of a historical narrative does not resemble being
in the middle of the events narrated. Page 1 is not a
memory for us as last year is necessarily a memory for
us: the whole book is always and completely available to
us, and so are all of its statements of fact, regardless
of the original temporal succession of those facts in
actuality. For this reason the historical narrative that
relates a temporal succession could usefully be thought of
as a four-dimensional picture. A picture of a period of
development is the equivalent of a picture of a situation
because for the historian as he writes his account the one
is as complete and as determinate and as fixed as the
other. For the purposes of his narrative he can manoeuvre
at will through the time of his temporal narrative as he
can through the space of his situational account.
The narrative of development can be conceived as
presenting a picture significantly like that of the situa¬
tional narrative: similarly the latter contains an impor¬
tant element thought to belong only to the narrative of
temporal development. Development concerns change; and
change as such is at the very root of history just as it
is one of the characteristics of man as man. Nov/, the
description of change is present in the developmental
narrative in an explicit way; and I would wish to say that
in the situational narrative it is present too, but is
implicitly there. The historian's picture-narrative, the
description, for example, of the state of a society at
such-and-such a date, is not about a subject in vacuo, but
about a subject that has developed to a certain stage and
will develop from that stage. The "static" story not only
presupposes but to a notable degree is about the develop¬
ment and changes that gave rise to the situation described.
The situational account does not have a subject that is
timeless but one that is very much in time and involved
with time. In many descriptive accounts the historian is
committed to explaining how particular features of the
situation developed; in those accounts in which he is not
so involved, the fact of change and development is there
for us as we read the story, and essentially there for us
just because of its subject, man in society. Temporal
development lies in any truly historical description:
the hackneyed adage that every picture tells a story has
an applicability to history that is less than trite. And
when the historian describes the state of a fixed and rigid
society such as Sparta, I do not believe that the point
that I have made is refuted: true, there is no change to
be described either implicitly or explicitly; but that
the Spartans suffered no change in their society is a fact
that is very much bound up with time, for a description of
such a changeless society has behind it very strongly the
idea of a perverted development through time that is no
development at all -- the development of a society into an
ever greater rigidity. The very concept of a static
society presupposes developed ideas of time and historical
change; and to emphasize that society's rigidity and lack
of change is nothing less than to draw attention to the
temporal dimension.
Finally, we must look at the nature of the treatment
that goes to make a "narrative". By no means do all the
written accounts that are found in historical journals
present us with a narrative treatment of their subject:
many pages are given over to what are generally called
"notes and discussions" (besides, of course, reviews),
and such a phrase adequately conveys an impression of
their nature and purpose. These notes should be thought
of, and I imagine most historians think of them in this
way, as in some sense preliminary or preparatory to history
proper, the writing of a cohesive historical account.
Notes and document-reports are one stage in the develop¬
ment from source-material to the historical synthesis.
However, it is true that most major examples of historical
essays are examples of narrative. "That is the treatment
that makes a piece of history a narrative?
The lexical definition of "narrative" is "tale",
"story", "recital of facts"; and. a "story" is defined as
an "account of incidents or events", "statement regarding
the facts pertinent to a situation in question". In this
last definition is to be found the cohesiveness that
generally makes a historical account a true story. A his¬
torical narrative is such because the data of the historian
go to form an account that is centred on some focal point,
that is, on a situation, on a problem, on an idea, on the
historian's own special thesis; and this account, in one
way or another, makes continual reference to that focal
point. Almost all historical accounts present the reader
with a cohesion and unity \\rhich are given to them by their
relation to their subject as it is conceived and set down
by the historian. It is this treatment that ensures that
historical accounts are true examples of "stories" or
"narratives".
The literary form of a narrative, \\rhether situational
or temporal, is such that differences in the fundamental
nature of the subject-matter are subordinated to the
contingent needs of writing an account. I mean here that
the historian has in some way to unfold his narrative.
In unfolding it he will not necessarily keep intact even
the general time-scheme present in events, and will often
show little regard for the retention of the temporal order
of details. In arranging the elements of his story, the
historian will hold the temporal factor to be only one
among others, although, naturally, the very nature of
historical development and our own understanding of time
will result in the predominance of the original temporal
order in any temporal narrative. The succession of facts
in a narrative will be determined by the historian's
conception of its structure. It will not therefore be
an essentially temporal succession; and it will be a
succession that is as necessary in the relating of facts
contemporaneous with one another as in the relating of
successive events. The historian cannot describe a static
situation in one immediate whole, but is obliged to impose
an order on its elements. From the point of view of the
logic of a narrative, the structural conception and the
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artistic expression will be in their essence the same for
the arrangement of simultaneous events as for that of
successive events. Narrative succession, therefore, is
not to be confused with the temporal succession of the
events narrated; and narrative succession is of the same
logical order in the account of a historical situation as
in the account of a historical development.
For my purposes it can be seen that a historical
"narrative" is intended to be a broad concept, but cer¬
tainly not one that I should believe to be capriciously
defined. Logically, I would hold, our initial idea of a
narrative, as a rather lengthy, almost conversational book
with a fairly large-scale topic, is an arbitrary one: this
notion of a large-scale narrative does not differ intrin¬
sically from other historical narratives, nor does it
present any philosophical problems that are uniquely its
own. Henceforward the definition of "historical narrative"
that I shall be using will be of an account of the past of
any length, whether of a situation or some temporal pro¬
cess, that is given factual cohesion by a central subject
or theme.
7. Particular and general in history
I have said that history is the story of man in his
social life, or the story of man in society. What exactly
does the use of the phrases "man in his social life" and
"man in society" entail in relation to history?
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The story of man in his social life cannot be said
to be exclusively history. It is true that "history"
includes no more than "man in his social life", but "man
in his social life" is a subject that is covered by more
disciplines than history alone. The past of social man
is also the province of, for example, sociology and anthro¬
pology. The subject-matter of history would also seem to
be encroached on in a significant way by many other disci¬
plines. What is it that makes the treatment of the subject
of man in the past by the discipline of history peculiarly
historical? In what way precisely does history deal with
its subject-matter?
The social life of mankind may be examined in two
fundamentally distinct ways. It may be looked at from a
point of view that is concerned with the individual or
from a point of view that is concerned with the general.
The difference between history and the many social sciences
(into which group many historians and philosophers would
wish to assimilate history) is to be found in the fact
that history in its choice of subject-matter, in its meth¬
odology, and, in practice, in its results is (whatever the
theory of the historian who is responsible) primarily and
indisputably concerned with the individual and particular.
Whatever the present state of the social sciences, they
intend ultimately (and hopelessly, perhaps) to develop a
body of general laws which in their perfection will have
left behind the individual instances on which they were
based. The social sciences seek to make statements which,
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while applicable to individual instances, will in them¬
selves be divorced from time and space, in so far as any
statement of a general law will not itself of necessity
contain a specific spatial or temporal reference."^ The
ultimate state of any social science, because of its
divorce from particular relations to time and space, must
be non-historical. If any statements of the social sci¬
ences appear now to be historical in content, from the
standpoint of theory this historical quality must be
regarded as an imperfection. I shall develop some aspects
of the theme of the individual and the general, of history
and the social sciences, in a later chapter. It need only
be said that if history were considered to be a social
science, its ultimate aim could only be its own annihila¬
tion. Its laws, in their generality, would have severed
any connection with history-as-actuality, and in themselves,
they could not form a separate disciplinary body of general
laws, for some laws would be laws of psychology, others
la"ws of sociology, or of anthropology, or of economics,
and so on; that is to say, there cannot logically be any
general laws of history as such, although there may be
laws which can only be applied to historical development
(because they involve time), or which can only be derived
from historical studies (because, for their formulation,
they require an examination of the particular in time).
14- I am aware that many social scientists do not believe
that regarding general lavrs the social sciences have the
same aims as the physical sciences. Even so, their ar¬
guments seem to be based on practical not theoretical
grounds; and their studies require a certain degree of
generality.
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Even if for no other reason, history must concern itself
with what is individual in order to survive as an indepen¬
dent discipline. History, as Elton has written,
is concerned with all those human sayings, thoughts,
deeds and sufferings which occurred in the past and
have left present deposit; and it deals with them from
the point of view of happening, change, and the par¬
ticular . 15
History is the story of man in his social life in its
individual and particular aspect: it is the story of indi¬
vidual men, or groups, or institutions, and particular
events, in separate societies.
This emphasis on a historical concern with the par¬
ticular must not be misconstrued. It is in an attempt to
prevent any such misunderstanding, as, chiefly, that his¬
tory is only concerned with individuals in a very concrete
sense, that in the closing sentence of the last paragraph
I included with "individual men" "groups" and "institu¬
tions", and countries, societies and movements may also
be included here. It can be argued that for the historian
to be able to talk easily of, say, "Germany" in a narra¬
tive is evidence that considerable generalizing has taken
place for this concept ever to have been formed; and of
course this is the case. But this is proper historical
generalization, and it is proper so long as its end result
is still a particular concept existing in its own histori¬
cal right, and not an abstract general concept derived from
individual instances. This sort of generalizing, in order
to talk of-, for example, daily life in ancient Rome, or
1$. G. R. Elton: The practice of history (London, 1969), 24.
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cultural values in the late Renascence, or relations
between Balkan states before the First World War, is very-
much part of historical work; and logically, its subjects
are still individual and particular. The general in the
social sciences is not the same sort of concept at all
as the particular collective entity that results from
generalizing work in history. This must hold as an ade¬
quate statement for the present; the arguments on this
point will be developed later.^
What exactly written history is should now have
been satisfactorily and clearly defined, at least with
regard to my own purposes in the chapters that follow.
It is the story of man in his social life in its existence
as individual and particular: as the story of man, history
is concerned with solely the human aspect of the world.
And in its interest in man in his social life, history is
not bothered with everything there is to know about man:
it is, for example, not•concerned with human physiology as
a topic in itself, nor is it concerned with pre-social man,
for it deals with how men react with each other in their
social life, and with how men develop socially and politi¬
cally. History deals with the individual aspect, for
history is about the past, and it is only in its individ¬
uality that the past ultimately remains the past. And,
lastly, history is a story; that is to say, the historical
narrative does not simply report or mirror history-as-
actuality -- it also interprets and explains it. We must
16. The nature and importance of holistic particulars in
history are given a full treatment in chap. VIII, sect.
2.
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now look briefly at what the purpose of history may be,
and then, with the definition and purpose of history clear,
go on to examine the historian's position regarding his
material and his work.
&♦ The purpose of history
The nature of history cannot be fully understood
unless we know x-rtiy it is that we study the past, for it is
only wThen wTe know this that we shall be able to state more
certainly with what aims the historian should undertake
his work. It is fundamentally important to any considera¬
tion of history that there should be an examination and
clarification of the historian's basic attitude to the
purpose of his work. At the outset the conclusion must be
that the historian's work in history is quite simply a
study of the past for its own sake. But perhaps this
strictly is incorrect: it may suggest that the study of
history can be made out to be a gratuitous activity. The
principle of doing something for its own sake is all too
easily brought into disrepute: we should say, more subtly,
that history should be studied as if it were being studied
for its own sake, for the knowledge that results from a
study of the past unarguably has its legitimate uses.
Since historical study endeavours to discover and
relate the truth about the past, immediate preoccupations
other than with the past,, especially when they lay claim
to be of prime importance, can only be a hindrance in the
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establishment of historical truth. The historian must
study the past in the first instance in its own right,
with regard neither to the present nor to the future, and
with no deference to extra-historical considerations.
Others may study the past for their own reasons; or they
may make use of the historian's finished work in the
pursuit of their own ends. The historian himself may
progress, in his discussion of the past, beyond doing what
counts as purely historical work (although, as he does
this, he will logically no longer be simply a historian,
and his historical work will no longer be simply history).
Work that is only partly historical is valid in itself,
but in order not to prejudice some of its own claims, or
any claims that may be made to truth and objectivity by
the historical part, it should be carried out only when
the "pure" historical work is complete.
Historical work is most efficiently carried out when
the study of the past is pursued single-mindedly, that is,
when the historian limits himself to discovering the truth
about the past. G. R. Elton has said:
Like all rational activities, the study of history,
regarded as an autonomous enterprise, contributes to
the improvement of man, and it does so by seeking the
truth within the confines of its particular province,
which happens to be the rational reconstruction of
the past.17
It is not difficult to understand that there must be a
study of the past in its own right and for its own sake,
or else our knowledge of our world would be incomplete;
and since historians aim at the goal of true knowledge of
17. Op. cit. , 60.
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the past, clearly this is what the discipline of "history"
should be considered to be.
The study of history is legitimate in itself: that
is to say, the study of the past in its own right is an
acceptable and worthwhile pursuit, and moreover, one that
is an essential part of the whole corpus of knowledge.
Any use of history for another purpose must be thought of
by the historian as secondary to that use which finds that
history has a value in itself. Previously to the passage
just quoted above, Elton makes the following point:
The task of history is to understand the past, and if
the past is to be understood it must be given full res¬
pect in its own right. And unless it is properly under¬
stood, use of it in the present must be suspect and can
be dangerous.1$
The serious work of historical study 'involves, above all,
the deliberate abandonment of the present'. The historian
Pieter Geyl also states that history must exist in its own
right when he discusses Toynbee's attitude to history; he
writes:
The historian should take an interest in his subject
for its own sake, he should try to get into contact
with things as they were, the men and their vicissitudes
should mean something to him in themselves. I do not
mean that the historian should not have a point of view,
that he should be indifferent to the problems of his
own time; nor that he, having a point of view, end¬
earing about the present and the future, should try to
tell about past events as if they bore no relation to
either.19
Herbert Butterfield provides a third example of a historian
with similar ideas in this regard. In the following pas¬
sage he makes the same point as Geyl and Elton above.
13. Ibid., 66.
19. Debates with historians (London, 1962), 201.
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[T]he true historical fervour is the love of the past
for the sake of the past. It is the fervour that was
awakened in Gibbon and Gregorovius by the sight of the
ruins of ancient Rome. And behind it is the very pas¬
sion to understand men in their diversity, the desire
to study a bygone age in the things in which it differs
from the present.20
It may be that this last quotation takes us too close
to the position that the only safe grounding for the study
of history is that it be studied solely for its own sake.
This would be an unnecessarily rigid attitude to adopt.
Obviously if we wish to work towards true objectivity in
historical studies, we must see history as an end, or
possible end, in itself and not simply as a means to some
other end. To approach the past simply for material that
may be used to bolster up some argument in a topic quite
unrelated to history as such is an important source of
many of the abuses commonly associated with history. But
equally, talk of a love of the past for the sake of the
past, while it may be eagerly agreed with by not a few
historians and philosophers, can easily lead a large number
of people to question the value of history and to suggest
that the study of the past must surely in the end be
nothing more than a vain and sterile activity. We must
avoid any implicit suggestion that approaching history as
an end in itself precludes a realization of its value and
utility both in other academic disciplines and even in
many areas of practical life. For history to be a valuable
study it is necessary that in the historian the conception
of history as an end in itself somehow co-exists with the
20. The Whig interoretation of history (Harmondsworth,
1973), 72.
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conception of history as a possible means to other ends,
as an activity of which the results may have many kinds of
theoretical and practical uses.
It can generally be said that for the results of
work in one area of knowledge to be useful to those in¬
volved in another area, those results must have been seen,
by the person who arrived at them, as valuable in them¬
selves, or, to put it somewhat more abstractly, that truth
as such has its own worth. To see a study as an end in
itself is to be able to work towards concrete achievement
in a particular area unhampered by any considerations
extraneous to the matter in hand and limited only by the
internal logic of the study itself. Only solid results
achieved in this way will be genuinely useful to others.
Only a historian's single-minded establishment of histori¬
cal facts will ensure his work a permanent value as a
source of knowledge. Nevertheless, to say that the his¬
torian must work single-mindedly towards the establishment
of any facts about the past is not quite the same thing as
to say that the historian must study the past for its own
sake. It is because history, rightly, has its practical
uses that I believe it correct to say, not that history
should be studied for its own sake, but that the historian
must approach and work on his subject as if he were study¬
ing it for its own sake.
61
Ill
THE HISTORIAN, HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST, AND
HISTORICAL MATERIAL
1. Introduction
A clarification of the nature of the historian's
knowledge of the past is necessary before there can be a
discussion of some of the problems of historical relati¬
vism and objectivity. With a better grasp of the concept
of historical knowledge and a clearer idea of the material
evidence of the past which is the means whereby the his¬
torian acquires that knowledge, some of the problems that
I intend to consider later will be more easily dealt with.
In directing our attention away from a definition of his¬
tory and towards the historian we shall have as our main
concern, in the context of the problems of objectivity,
the determination of the proper relationship between the
historian and his work. We must attempt to answer such
questions as the following: What d.o we mean exactly vlien
we say that the historian knows the facts of the past?
What is the status of the statements of fact contained in
vrritten history? And how does the historian come to know
the past in practice? Before any conclusions can be made
about the problems raised by these questions, there must
be a full consideration of several different aspects of
written history. The relationship between the historian
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and his writing of history is something that raises both
theoretical philosophical problems connected v,rith history,
problems which arise from epistemological difficulties
about the historian's knowledge of the past, and practical
problems regarding the historian's methods of dealing with
his material. The theoretical and the practical cannot be
easily separated; and it is clear that the nature of our
knowledge of past facts and the way in which we can come
to have knowledge of those past facts are matters that are
very closely connected.
The true definition of history, a proper conception
of its purpose, and a drawing of an outline of the histor¬
ian's methods in his work form a web of interwoven problems.
Through an examination of these areas in their own right it
would be realized that a very large number of topics need
to be given a thorough consideration; here I shall largely
have to confine myself to a discussion of those problems of
historical knowledge and method which have a clear bearing
on the subject I have chosen, that is, the character of
written history which shows a treatment of its subject-
matter that is at once both objective and individual.
Once it is agreed that history may be defined as the
story of man in his social life, and that the immediate
working principle of the historian in his studies can be
said to be to treat the truth about the past as something
that is worth discovering for its own sake, we must ask
how it is that the historian executes his task. In other
words, we must answer several questions: What is it exactly
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that the historian studies? What is the material that the
historian makes use of in his work? And how does he make
use of this historical material that is the object of his
study, first, to establish historical facts and describe
historical events, and, second, to explain these events
individually and give an integrated understanding to that
part of history which he has selected for treatment?
Problems that are more or less wholly concerned with
explanation will be left for discussion in a later chapter,
for I intend to consider in detail several aspects of expla¬
nation and understanding in history. In this chapter I
shall limit myself to an examination of what takes place
when a historian uses historical material and comes to
conclusions about certain historical facts. To this end
it is necessary to make clear first what is to be understood
when we talk of a historian knowing certain things about the
past; thus it will be best to look now at some philosophical
aspects of the problem of the historianTs knowledge of the
past and the meaning of historical statements.
Several auite distinct ohilosophical theories have
been put forward as solutions to the problems presented by
an analysis of the historian's knowledge of the past and
the logical nature of written history. To a considerable
degree these theories of historical knowledge may be tied
to more general epistemological theories: in this context,
therefore, only the specific historical relevance of any
theories of knowledge will be considered. Some theories
are especially significant with respect to the problem of
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objectivity and the individual historian since they may
be seen as providing a ready foundation for a point of
view that stresses the necessity in written history of
the historian's individuality. Unfortunately, they will
be found unacceptable if history is defined as I think it
should and must be.
It may be pointed out that theories like Oakeshott's
and Collingwood's, the two which are discussed in the fol¬
lowing pages, solve successfully problems of scepticism
and objectivity. However, Oakeshott overcomes some
/
sceptical objections to the claims of historical know¬
ledge only at the cost of an extensive redefinition of
the nature of historical knowledge and. an unacceptable
interpretation of "what historical statements mean. And
Collingwood solves any problems of objectivity only by
altogether dispensing with any distinction between the
subjective and the objective in historical knowledge: by
re-thinking the thoughts of a historical character the
historian makes those thoughts his own, with the result
that subjective and objective are fused. Since Colling¬
wood's theory would seem to provide one effective solution
to the basic problem with -which I am concerned — the
reconciliation of historical objectivity and the individ¬
uality of the historian — it needs to be criticized at
some length and shown finally to be unacceptable. Once
Collingwood's ideas have been looked at, a more straight¬
forward conception of historical knowledge, and the his¬
torian's acquisition of it, can be put forward.
2. OakeshottTs theory of historical knowledge
The first philosophical theory of historical know¬
ledge to be considered is an early theory of Oakeshott's.
It appears as probably the strangest of any theories about
the nature of historical knowledge, at least from the
standpoint of common-sense notions of history. This
theory denies that there is knowledge of the past, if,
that is, a phrase like "knowledge of the past" is under¬
stood as simply as the historian seems usually to think
of it. It should be mentioned that in his more recent
writings Oakeshott talks about historical topics in terms
that do not entail the extreme position that he adopts in
Experience and Its Modes, but the views about the nature
of historical experience put forward in this book are ones
that could still be thought tenable.
Oakeshott first argues that 'history is concerned
only with that which appears in or is constructed from
record of some kind'."'" Such a statement is deceptively
acceptable in its candour, for beyond this basic premise
the theory quickly diverges from any common-sense views
about history: as a result of idealist influences, Oake¬
shott maintains that knowledge relates to ideas and to
experiences, wrhich, in the case of historical knowledge,
means the ideas and experiences of the historian.
The distinction between history as it happened (the
course of events) and history as it is thought, the
distinction between history itself and merely experienced
1. Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge, 1933), 90.
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history, must go; it is not merely false, it is meaning¬
less. The historian's business is not to discover, to
recapture, or even to interpret; it is to create and to
construct. ... There is no history independent of
experience; the course of events, as such, is not his¬
tory because it is nothing at all. History is experi¬
ence, the historian's world of experience* it is a world
of ideas, the historian's world of ideas.
So it is that Oakeshott continually emphasizes that history
is a matter of present experience, and does not deal with
any past events as such that must be independent of present
experience. Oakeshott's statements to this effect are not
to be understood simply as making some sort of logical
point about the historian's derivation of his "facts" from
the material that constitutes his historical evidence. The
theory is not to be understood in anything less than its
full, extreme meaning: history is experience
and not a course of events independent of experience.
There is, indeed, no course of events independent of
experience. History is not the correspondence of an
idea with an event, for there is no event which is not
an idea. History is the historian's experience. Tt is
"made" by nobody save the historian; to write history
is the only way of making it. It is a world, and a
world of ideas.3
By saying that history is a world of ideas, Oakeshott means
to say that history is not really a part of knowledge, that
is to say, it is not to be defined as that part of our
knowledge which deals with the past. History is rather a
way of knowing; and it is a way of knowing not simply a
part of reality but the whole of reality. It may be known
from a limited standpoint, but it is still, despite any




part of reality'. f Historical knowledge is a form of
present knowledge, of experience in and of the present.
Historical experience is not a knowledge of a 'fixed and
finished past, a past independent of present experience,
which is to be considered for its own sake', but an ex¬
perience that is really present. 'If the historical past
be knowable, it must belong to the present world of ex¬
perience. ' Oakeshott develops this point further to say
that 'the past in history varies with the present, rests
5
upon the present, is the present'.
It must be fully understood that Oakeshott is not
offering us nothing more than a mere redefinition of words.
He is not saying that the real past is the present evidence
seen in and through its interpretation. Oakeshott still
wishes to distinguish between the past as known by the
historian and the actual past as such. In laying down the
proposition that for the historian the phrase 'what really
happened' must be replaced by 'what the evidence obliges
us to believe', he concedes that the first phrase does
have a reference: that there was a past that really existed,
even if what was real is somehow beyond the evidence and
therefore actually unknowable. Oakeshott does not deny
that there is (or rather was) a past as such which the
historian can never reach. Nevertheless, despite the im¬
possibility of coming to know the real past, the historian




the real subject of history -- that is the knowable his¬
torical past. The nature of the historical past entails
that the object of the historian's knowledge is 'the
product of judgment and consequently belongs to the his¬
torian's present world of experience'.^
Oakeshott admits that we are presented here v:ith a
paradox, that
the historical past is not past at all. And it is
a paradox which must be taken absolutely. It is not
merely that the past must survive into the present in
order to become the historical past; the past must be
the present before it is historical.7
In short, it may be said that Oakeshott has formulated a
theory of history for which historical knowledge consists
in a special present experience of historical evidence.
The historical past is a particular organization of the
present world of experience. 'The historical past is al¬
ways present; and yet historical experience is aTways in
g
the form of the past.'
If we wish to follow Oakeshott in his development
of a theory of history, then we must allow that history
tells us nothing about the past as such and, more impor¬
tantly, properly does not intend to discover anything about
the "real" past. Although Oakeshott states that history
is what the evidence obliges us to believe, he points out
that this is not merely a sceptical point. And indeed, if





encourages us to do, the evidence can only oblige us to
formulate and believe propositions about the present.
Yet if history is understood to do no more than give to
us a different organization of our present experience,
then it must surely be considered redundant. Historians
themselves certainly do not believe that their historical
statements are in any way about a present world of experi¬
ence; and it is hard to conceive what they would believe
their function to be if they did, and \%rhether they could
seriously continue with historical work. Historians be¬
lieve that they are genuinely trying to find out about the
past as it really was.
Oakeshott has attempted to place the historian in a
relation with his material by denying the possibility of
actual knowledge of the past and asserting that the his¬
torian, with history, is in relationship with present
facts through his present world of experience. In his
general scheme of knowledge OakeshottTs interpretation of
historical experience is a viable one, yet, although it
is unknowable, the "past" as such still has a reference.
So long as it is the case that the "past" really does have
some meaning, it seems that we should attempt to describe
how the historian sets about gaining knowledge of that
past and relating the past to the present, even if it
turns out that the past, at least practically, really is
unknowable, and that, in consequence, the doubts of the
sceptical realist about historical truth must be seen as
warranted.
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It is by means of a theory like Oakeshott's that we
can, if we wish, solve the problem of the relationship of
the historian to his subject-matter by a redefinition of
the very subject of history. However, this sort of redefi¬
nition of "history" in no way refutes scepticism: it merely
suppresses any sceptical doubts about the truth of the
historian's conclusions from his evidence, in so far as
those conclusions may be taken to refer to real past facts,
by denying that historical knowledge is about the past at
all. Certainly, if the basis of our concept of historical
truth were what the evidence obliged us to believe, then
doubtless historical objectivity would in many cases be
easily established and maintained.
I cannot discuss here the fundamental philosophical
position of such a view of history, with all its idealist
tendencies. What I do hope to show is that, when a realist
position is adopted, the past can be allowed to be knowable
by the individual historian, scepticism is unnecessary, and
historical objectivity can be attained.
3. Collingwood's theory of historical re-enactment
A second theory, which also will have to be rejected
in the end as a basis for an account of historical know¬
ledge, centres on the idea of "re-enactment". The impor¬
tance of the historian as an individual has often been
stressed in theories involving a description of historical
knowledge, particularly in the context of a view of the
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historian's work as a re-creation or re-enactment of past
thought. The individuality of the historian as such is
an essential part of this view of historical work, and
yet, if this view were indeed correct, an inevitable con¬
clusion would be that for the historian to be successful
in his re-creation of thought, he would have to suppress
his own personality entirely. In other ways, however, a
conception of historical work as the re-enactment of the
past and, in essence, nothing other than re-enactment is
a faulty one. The theory of historical re-enactment and
O
the arguments against it generally are well known. All
that is necessary here is a short general survey of the
whole subject, together with a more detailed account of
any points that I believe to be significant for my own
argument.
In The Idea of History Collingwood writes:
The historian, investigating any event in the past,
makes a distinction between what may be called the
outside and the inside of an event. ... The historian
is never concerned with either of these to the exclu¬
sion of the other. He is investigating not mere
events (where by a mere event I mean one which has
9. For comprehensive treatment of Collingwood's position
see especially: Alan Donagan: The Later Philosophy of
R. G. Collingwood (Oxford, 1962); William Dray: Laws and
explanation in history (Oxford, 1957); Patrick Gardi¬
ner: The nature of historical explanation (Oxford,
1952); and Jack W. Meiland: Scepticism and historical
knowledge (New York, 1965); and, in addition, the fol¬
lowing articles: Arthur N. Child: "History as imita¬
tion", Philosophical Quarterly, 2 (1952); Errol E.
Harris: "Collingwood's theory of history", Philosophi¬
cal Quarterly, 7 (1957); Nathan Rotenstreich: "From
facts to thoughts: Collingwood's views on the nature
of history", Philosophy, 35 (I960); W. H. Walsh: "R. G.
Collingwood's philosophy of history", Philosophy, 22
(1947).
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only an outside and no inside) but actions, and an
action is the unity of the outside and inside of an
event. ... His work may begin by discovering the
outside of an event, but it can never end there; he
must always remember that the event was an action,
and that his main task is to think himself into this
action, to discern the thought of its agent.10
Although Collingwood concedes that the historian is con¬
cerned with both the "outside" and the "inside" of an
event, it quickly becomes clear which of these two aspects
is the more important. Collingwood's true intent and the
direction of his thought are clear, for he states shortly
after the passage above that the processes of history
are not processes of mere events but processes of ac¬
tions, which have an inner side, consisting of processes
of thought; and what the historian is looking for is
these processes of thought. All history is the history
of thought.11
The consequence of this way of thinking about the interests
of the historian is that history must be about only some
human actions; and certainly, if this restricted view of
history were correct, history would be severely debili¬
tated as the discipline concerned with man's social past:
it would mean, for example, that reports of thoughtless or
unthinking actions, which occur frequently with important
consequences in written history as we know it, would in
the strictest sense be non-historical. In fact there is
no need for this point to be laboured, for Collingwood
openly declares the restrictedness of history (and, inci¬
dentally, quite unfoundedly assumes the widespread support
of historians themselves for a restricted view of actions
10. The Idea of History (Oxford, 1946), 213.
11. Ibid., 215
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that may be described as truly "historical"). He writes:
It does not follow that all human actions are subject-
matter for history; and indeed historians are agreed
that they are not. But when they are asked how the dis¬
tinction is to be made between historical and non-his¬
torical human actions, they are somewhat at a loss how
to reply. From our present point of view we can offer
an answer: so far as man's conduct is determined by what
may be called his animal nature, his impulses and appe¬
tites, it is non-historical; the process of those activ¬
ities is a natural process. Thus, the historian is not
interested in the fact that men eat and sleep and make
love and thus satisfy their natural appetites; but he is
interested in the social customs which they create by
their thought as a framework x\Tithin which these appe¬
tites find satisfaction in ways sanctioned by convention
and morality.12
From this point Collingwood's thinking becomes increasingly
unacceptable as an effort to elucidate the character of
history as it is actually written. At first Collingwood
was occupied with describing how the historian regarded
his material: that is to say, he pointed out that the his¬
torian is concerned with both the outside and the inside
of events. Although in the passage above he brushes the
position that history has important connections with soci¬
ology and anthropology (in his reference to the historian's
interest in the framework of social customs), he moves on
to a more deeply philosophical theory of history, and in
the words he uses he suggests implicitly that "historical"
is almost a metaphysical term admitting only a very clearly
defined type of human thought. If at the outset Colling¬
wood seemed to be genuinely concerned equally with the
outside and with the inside of human actions, actions, that
is, real actions in the world, are soon forgotten, as they
12. Ibid., 216.
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must be in a theory that concentrates on the re-creation
of thought. A confinement of historical interest to ac¬
tions that are bound up with thought, and then only with
reflective thought, inevitably leads to a position where,
it is reflective thought itself that matters above every¬
thing else. Thus Collingwood's conception of the histori¬
cal narrows still further, and a large part of written
history with which everyone is familiar is no longer even
alluded to:
Historical knowledge, then, has for its proper object
thought: not things thought about, but the act of
thinking itself. This principle has served us to dis¬
tinguish history from natural science on the one hand,
as the study of a given or objective world distinct
from the act of thinking it, and on the other from
psychology as the study of immediate experience, sensa¬
tion and feeling, which, though the activity of a mind,
is not the activity of thinking.13
Collingwood goes on to elucidate that type of thought which
is properly the subject-matter of history:
In order, therefore, that any particular act of
thought should become subject-matter for history, it
must be an act not only of thought but of reflective
thought, that is, one which is performed in the con¬
sciousness that it is being performed, and is consti¬
tuted what it is by that consciousness.14
Collingwood's development of his conception of his¬
tory has carried us a long way from many of the common and
central references of the term "history". It can be seen
to what extent the discussion has shifted from talk about
history as that is commonly understood when Collingwood




categorical restriction of the subject of historical study-
is explicitly made:
Reflective acts may be roughly described as the acts
which we do on purpose, and these are the only acts
which can become the subject-matter of history.15
If it is held that the subject-matter of history can only
be reflective thought, then the initial conclusion could
be that history proper is to be defined as political his¬
tory, in which the emphasis is on the consciously expressed
thoughts and rational actions of individuals. If Colling-
wood's line of thinking is pursued, however, the outcome
is inevitably that history is to be defined as the history
of ideas. In the end, indeed, this seems to be what Col-
lingwood is saying — that history is the history of ideas:
The scientist, the historian, and the philosopher
are thus, no less than the practical man, proceeding
in their activities according to plans, thinking on
purpose, and thus arriving at results that can be
judged according to criteria that can be derived from
the plans themselves. Consequently there can be his¬
tories of these things. All that is necessary is
that there should be evidence of how such thinking
has been done and that the historian should be able
to interpret it, that is, should be able to re-enact
in his own mind the thought he is studying, envisaging
the problem from which it started and reconstructing
the steps by which its solution was attempted. In
practice, the common difficulty for the historian is
to identify the problem. ... It is the historian's
endeavour to discover this problem that gives impor¬
tance to the study of "influences", which is so futile
when influences are conceived as the decanting of
ready-made thoughts out of one mind into another.
An intelligent inquiry into the influence of Socrates
on Plato, or Descartes on Newton, seeks to discover
not the points of agreement, but the way in which






Once his argument has been properly developed, Col¬
lingwood's theory can be seen to be narrowly prescriptive
with regard both to the subject-matter of history and to
the way in which the historian approaches and deals with
his subject-matter. Since its conclusions are so directly
contrary to the actual present nature of a historical ac¬
count and its content, Collingwood's theory must be re¬
jected completely as a generally complete description of
history. In any case, history of ideas, as a discipline
in its own right, adequately carries out the task that
Collingwood would wish to assign to history proper.
However, anyone who holds strictly to a theory of
re-enactment of thought as providing a full description of
what the historian does must concur with Collingwood's
conclusions. If the historian is to re-enact history, it
is evident that he can only re-enact thought; and if he is
going to re-enact thought, then it can only be conscious
thought that will provide a subject for his re-enactment —
the unconscious workings of the mind cannot be re-enacted,
for, in the historian's re-creation of them, they would be¬
come conscious thought, and, as such, would be quite dif¬
ferent from their "original". Only conscious reflective
thought would be a subject for history, because only 'a
reflective activity is one in which we know -what it _is
that we are trying to do', which, if the historian is re-
enacting thought, he must know too.
When-a theory of.re-enactment is held as the sole
theory which can give an account of historical procedure
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the result, absurdly, will be that such passages as the
following, which unquestionably are passages of history,
must be discounted as examples of history. It is in such
a consideration of some possible practical consequences
of a theory like Collingwoodfs that one is able to realize
some of the wide variety of written history. The first
passage is a typical example of how a historian describes
the effect of natural events on the course of history;
such descriptions are undoubtedly a legitimate and neces¬
sary part of history.
The most terrible plague which the world ever wit¬
nessed advanced at this juncture from the East, and
after devastating Europe from the shores of the Medi¬
terranean to the Baltic, swooped at the close of 134$
upon Britain. The traditions of its destructiveness,
and the panic-struck words of the statutes which fol¬
lowed it, have been more than justified by modern re¬
search. Of the three or four millions who then formed
the population of England more than one-half were swept
away in its repeated visitations. Its ravages were
fiercest in the greater towns, where filthy and un-
drained streets afforded a constant haunt to leprosy
and fever.17
This is clearly history; but there is no evidence here of
any thought to be re-enacted. Of course, the historian in
his researches might have experienced anew a little of the
fear which the inhabitants of England would undoubtedly
have felt (unreflectively) at the time of the Black Death;
but this cannot be what Collingwood means in his talk of
re-enactment.
The second passage is again clearly a typical piece
of history. It is about an institution, histories of which
cannot be accounted for by theories like Collingwood's,
17. J. R. Green: A short history of the English people
(London, 1915), I, 233.
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unless we are to indulge in elaborate techniques of reduc¬
tion; at the least, such techniques would seem to be un¬
profitable, and in any case they do not describe how the
historian actually thinks about historical particulars
like institutions.
The Senate, on the other hand, never utterly disap¬
peared, though its heyday in Constantinople was in the
Sixth and Seventh Centuries. The Senate of Constan¬
tinople was never like the old Roman Senate. Even when
in 359 it was given the privileges that the Roman Senate
enjoyed -- thus becoming an official elector -- it
remained different in composition and devoid of the
other's tradition. Its very name was less venerable;
in the Greek language it was translated not gerousia
but sugkletos, the assembly. The Senate of Constan¬
tinople consisted of all present and past holders of
offices and rank above a certain level and their des¬
cendants. It was thus a vast amorphous body comprising
everyone of prominence, qf wealth and of a responsible
position in the Empire.1°
The third passage contains an example of the sort of
thought that Collingwood's theory should refuse to admit as
"historical" thought. Yet such thought is often of the
greatest interest historically, for it may result in ac¬
tions which have important and lasting effects or which,
for the historian's own purposes, provide a significant
typification of character. Actions are frequently moti¬
vated by unreflective fear or anger; but even more proble¬
matical for a theory of re-enactment are those actions
that are obviously associated with the fully reflective
thought of an insane or irrational person. Can such in¬
sane thought really be a suitable subject for a historian's
re-enactment? And are we even to expect that the historian
should re-enact it? In the following passage, for example,
1$. Steven Runciman: Byzantine civilization (London,
1961), 72.
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Suetonius is writing of Caligula; and a demand that the
"inside" of Caligula's actions be re-enacted and under¬
stood would seem quite out of place for the purposes of
history.
The day before the Circensian games, he used to send
his soldiers to enjoin silence in the neighbourhood,
that the repose of his horse Incitatus might not be
disturbed. For this favourite animal, besides a mar¬
ble stable, an ivory manger, purple housings, and a
jewelled frontlet, he appointed a house, with a reti¬
nue of slaves, and fine furniture, for the reception
of such as were invited in the horse's name to sup
•with him. It is even said that he intended to make
him consul.19
Three incidental points could be made here with regard to
this passage: first, as an example of biography it is still
an example of history -- the historian writes about par¬
ticulars in the past, and there is no sound reason of logic
or of method for the historian to make a distinction be¬
tween particular individuals and particular events or par¬
ticular institutions; second, for many philosophical points,
whatever the historiographical quality of an illustration
may be, it can still be a passage that demonstrates satis¬
factorily certain features of history -- good history and
bad history, true history and false history, the historical
and the non-historical are not parallel terms; third, while
Suetonius, despite his many faults as a historian, is fre¬
quently used as a source of ancient history by modern his¬
torians, his writings are not an example of a source-work
(in the logical sense) -- Suetonius is logically the writer
19. Suetonius: The Lives of the Twelve Caesars, translated
by Alexander Thomson, revised by T. Forester (London,
1926), 2SS-S9 (IV, 55).
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of a secondary work, for we have only to remember that
he was born over thirty years after the death of Caligula,
and his history was written almost certainly at some time
after the year 121.
The fourth and fifth passages to be cited here exem¬
plify events that bear witness to serious reflective thought
on the part of the individuals involved; that is to say,
the historian could straightforwardly think himself into
the historical position if he chose to do so. Yet both
examples show, I believe, precisely how history goes —
and must go -- beyond re-enactment. In the first case the
historian could busy himself with an extensive re-creation
of the thinking of the protagonists; but what would be the
point of concentrating on a re-enactment of thought that
failed catastrophically to deal with the problems involved?
Clearly it is important to grasp what it was that certain
individuals Intended in their solution, as they believed,
of an important problem; but CollingwoodTs theory appears
to be oriented only towards that thinking which may be des¬
cribed as successful, or at least partially successful, in
the actual situation of the problem. Some re-enactment
theorists would say that the historian sees what went wrong
and the right solution too; but to say that the historian
should describe a successful solution to the problem as
well as the unsuccessful approaches actually made is in
many cases an unnecessary proposal. It is enough for him
to say why the actions that did take place failed to have
the effect intended.
Si
The object of the Schlieffen Plan, which the German
High Command put into operation as soon as war began,
was the rapid and total defeat of France by the seizure
of Paris and the northern industrial provinces. ...
The explanation for this failure of Germany's first
war aim, the collapse of France, was complex. The
younger von Moltke, German chief of staff, possibly
foredoomed it to failure when he decided to weaken the
hammer head in order to strengthen the hinge. He was
anxious to prevent a French invasion of Lorraine. The
initial resistance of the Belgian army probably delayed
the German timetable by two or three days, which had
some importance. ...
There was a technical reason, too, for this early con¬
version of what had been expected to be a war of rapid
movement into one of immobility. Warfare had entered
upon a phase when defence had caught up with offence.
The machine gun and heavy artillery came into use, while
motor transport and aviation was sic"] still in their
infancy and the tank had not yet been invented.20
In the second case, contemporary thought would be
interesting and historically important in other contexts of
written history; but in the passage cited below a re-crea¬
tion of thought would only be misleading. It is with this
type of historical understanding that historical hindsight
is seen to be of great significance, for what the historian
thinks about certain events always claims a wider and deeper
meaning and reference than the ideas of the contemporaries
of the events in question. The passage below relates the
arrangements under which the Germanic invaders finally set¬
tled permanently in the lands of the failing Roman Empire
of the west.
[T]he principle of these arrangements was directly
derived from the old Roman system of quartering sol¬
diers on the owners of land. On that system, which
dated from the days of the Republic, and was known as
hospitalitas, the owner was bound to give one-third of
the produce of his property to the guests whom he re¬
luctantly harboured. This principle was now applied
20. David Thomson: Europe since Napoleon (Harmondsworth,
1966), 554-55.
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to the land itself, and the same term was used; the
proprietor and the barbarian with whom he was com¬
pelled to share his estate were designated as host
and guest (hosuites).
This fact illustrates the gradual nature of the
process by which western Europe passed from the power
of the Roman into that of the Teuton. Transactions
which virtually meant the surrender of provinces to
invaders, were, in their immediate aspect, merely
the application of an old Roman principle, adapted
indeed to changed conditions. Thus the process of
the dismemberment of the Empire was eased; the tran¬
sition to an entirely new order of things was masked;
a system of federate states within the Empire pre¬
pared the way for the system of independent states
which was to replace the Empire. The change was not
accomplished without much violence and continuous
warfare, but it was not cataclysmic.21
In the five examples of historical passages that I
have given above re-enactment by the historian of the
thought underlying action can be seen to be impossible,
or absurd, or historically unsatisfactory (because the
"original" thought is, for the purposes of historical
understanding, either wrong or misleading). The examples
are not by their nature in any way exceptional or rare;
they are very typical of passages that frequently occur
in the work of historians whatever their explicit theories
of history may be. From a consideration of passages like
those cited above it is to be concluded that re-enactment
must be rejected as the whole basis of the historian's
procedure. Certainly re-enactment can be a useful aid to
the historian in his work, providing him with insights
and suggesting to him, where they are appropriate, rational
explanations of action. Like its wider and less demanding
counterpart, empathy, it frequently provides the historian
21. J. B. Bury: History of the Later Roman Empire (New
York, 1952), I, 206'.
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with a "way in" to the particular problem he is studying.
Nevertheless, even where re-enactment is clearly relevant,
it must always be remembered that it is in no way a pro¬
cedure that is self-justifying in that it seems to offer
a satisfactory description and explanation of some action.
Here is found the weakest point of any theory which gives
the re-enactment of thought a central position in the his¬
torian's work: any relation of empathy with a historical
subject suggests hypotheses to the historian, but conclu¬
sions must still be substantiated and confirmed through
the material evidence available to him. I shall be re¬
turning to this point when I discuss the historian's under¬
standing of the past.
The theory of re-enactment brings to the fore one
very important feature of the historian's subject-matter:
this is that a very large part of history does directly
concern both reflective thought and -- more widely —
thought and feeling in general. What Collingwood calls
the inside of actions is not to be forgotten by the his¬
torian: he must always remember the essential difference
that there is
between a paper flying before the wind and a man flying
from a pursuing crowd. The paper knows no fear and the
wind no hate, but without fear and hate the man would
not fly nor the crowd pursue. If we try to reduce fear
to its bodily concomitants we merely substitute the
concomitants for the reality expressed as fear. We
denude the world of meanings for the sake of a theory,
itself a false meaning which deprives us of all the
rest. We can interpret experience only on the level of
experience.22
22. R. M. Maclver: Society, quoted by Ernest Nagel: "The
subjective nature of social subject matter", in Readings
in the philosophy of the social sciences, edited by May
Brodbeck (New York, 1968), 41.
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Before we leave a consideration of Collingwoodfs
theory, one other point should be made here about re-
enactment and explanation. For Collingwood, one conse¬
quence of re-enacting past thought is that to discover the
thought behind an action and re-create it for oneself is
to understand it.
For science, the event is discovered by perceiving
it, and the further search for its cause is conducted
by assigning it to its class and determining the rela¬
tion between that class and others. For history, the
object to be discovered is not the mere event, but the
thought expressed in it. To discover that thought is
already to understand it. After the historian has
ascertained the facts, there is no further process of
inquiring into their causes. Y/hen he knows what hap¬
pened, he already knows why it happened.
This does not mean that words like "cause" are neces¬
sarily out of place in reference to history; it only
means that they are used there in a special sense.
When a scientist asks "Why did that piece of litmus
paper turn pink?" he means "On what kinds of occasions
do pieces of litmus paper turn pink?" Y/hen an histor¬
ian asks "Why did Brutus stab Caesar?" he means "What
did Brutus think, which made him decide to stab Caesar?"
The cause of the event, for him, means the thought in
the mind of the person by whose agency the event came
about: and this is not something other than the event,
it is the inside of the event itself.23
This passage is chiefly relevant to problems in historical
explanation, and I intend to look at some of those problems
in a later chapter. It may be mentioned here, however,
that seeing historical work as the re-enactment of past
thought leads directly to an incorrect conception of how
an explanation is appropriate or inappropriate to a his¬
torical context. What an agent thinks often has no bearing
at all on an explanation of his action, although it may
show his reasons for acting. The passage is also impor¬
tant because it brings up other problems: first, it points
23. R. G. Collingwood: op. cit., 214-15-
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out that history, unlike science, is concerned with the
particular not with the general; second, it does suggest
that there is a rather special sort of historical under¬
standing, a concept I hope to develop later, for it must
be stressed that there is more to history than simple
explanation alone.
4. The inferential basis of historical knowledge
Both Oakeshott's and Collingwood's theories must be
rejected as analyses of historical knowledge in its entire¬
ty or in its essence. Oakeshott's "history" tells us no¬
thing about the past, and, as has been made clear, goes
so far as to say that knowledge of the past is impossible;
of course, a theory like this has certain attractions from
a logical point of view, although Oakeshott's version is
not intended to make a logical point. Collingwood's
theory is unacceptable because it is unequivocally sub¬
jective, and because it too -- in a strange way — denies
the "pastness" of the subject-matter of history. An im¬
portant consequence of Collingwood's conception of the
"thought" that a historian re-enacts must be not that a
thought endures through time but that it exists outside
time. In any case, since it is the thought itself that
matters, its original ownership by a particular historical
agent seems to be largely a side issue: the actual his¬
torical features of any thought, by implication, seem to
count for little in Collingwood's theory. Additionally,
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thought itself, as actually re-enacted, and as the real
subject of the historian's work and immediately his, must
be considered to be something that is present. The use¬
fulness of Collingwood's idea of re-enactment is that it
provides a description of one way in which historical work
goes on, so long as the more rigorous demands of the theory
are not met; and it will be helpful to keep re-enactment
in mind when rational explanation and intuition are dis¬
cussed later.
The nature of historical knowledge, and the relation
between the historian and his material, can be accounted
for on the basis of inference. The answers to how the
historian comes about his knowledge, and what the nature
of that knowledge is, are fairly simple ones. It may seem
that there are many problems to be resolved, but if there
are, these are problems that belong to discussions within
a general theory of epistemology — for example, problems
about the concepts of knowledge and belief, or about the
justification of knowledge statements — and they are in
no way exclusive to history. They are not to be discussed
here because my present concern is with how historical
knowledge may sometimes seem inferior or different to
knowledge in other empirical fields.
We come by our knowledge of historical facts in the
same way as that in which we come by knowledge of other
facts about the past and the present in everyday life.
In some respects, obviously, the study of history will in¬
volve more developed or more logical techniques -- it is
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one characteristic of the historian that he is able to
use ordinary techniques more carefully and more rigorous¬
ly; but there is no specifically historiographical prin¬
ciple underlying the gaining of historical knowledge (but
I must emphasize that I am talking at the moment only of
the establishment of descriptive historical fact). There
are no epistemological problems peculiar to history, and
so there is little cause to be concerned with the validity
of any general theory of knowledge in a specifically his¬
torical context.
The historian's knowledge is founded on inference
from material evidence. There obviously cannot be any
direct knowledge of the past equivalent to that direct
knowledge which we have in our immediate perception of the
present. This does not make historical knowledge somehow
inferior to our knowledge of the present, for truly direct
knowledge forms only a small part of the body of present
knowledge of any individual. Nor do the only inferential
conclusions admissible to the sceptic, that is, those con¬
clusions grounded in a logical necessity, form a very sub¬
stantial part of our knowledge of the world. History is
not significantly disadvantaged, in the way in which it
infers its factual knowledge from evidence, when it is
compared with other disciplines such as the physical sci¬
ences and the social sciences. This will be more readily
agreed with when it is made clear in the next section that
historians•by no means .rely in the main on the evidence of
testimony or the accounts of previous writers, and other
intended records. It is from a knowledge of the truly
wide variety of historical evidence, and experience of
what that evidence means and what may be learned from it,
that the historian, through informed inferential methods,
builds up and extends factual knowledge of the past.
The inferences on which the historian relies, like
the inferences of other disciplines, with the exception
of deductive logic and mathematics, are fallible; but his¬
tory is no worse in comparison with other disciplines.
No empirical inferences guarantee the truth of factual
statements: they are always
inferences which, when the premisses are true and the
reasoning correct, do not insure the truth of the con¬
clusion, though they are held to make the conclusion
"probable" in some sense and in some degree. Except
in mathematics, almost all the inferences upon which
we actually rely are of this sort. In some cases the
inference is so strong as to amount to practical cer¬
tainty . 24
Whether the historian strictly infers his conclu¬
sions from the material evidence, or forms a hypothesis
suggested by some aspect of the evidence or some histori¬
cal problem which is later tested against that evidence
or some other factual knowledge in order that it may be
confirmed or refuted by it, is not a question that needs
25
to be decided here. It is probably the case that most
historians do both. What matters is that the historian's
factual statements are either formed or confirmed by a
24. Bertrand Russell: Human knowledge — its scope and
limits (London, 194871 178.
25. I am thinking particularly of Sir Karl Popper's
ideas about the way in which the scientist comes to
form his hypotheses. See especially The logic of
scientific discovery (London, 1959).
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process of reasoning that is in general straightforwardly
inferential, and no more than that. Only those statements
which are based on intuition constitute an exception here;
and such intuitive factual statements will be looked at in
a later section of this chapter.
What is to be emphasized is that there is no need to
try to claim certainty for historical work by postulating
some kind of direct historical knowledge, such as Oake-
shott's "present experience" or Collingwood's "re-enact¬
ment". History may appear to be at some disadvantage to
other fields of knowledge because its subject-matter, the
past, is not present. However, if inductive inference is
allowed in other fields of knowledge (with present subject-
matter), then it must be admitted that historical inference
too provides us with genuine and practically certain know¬
ledge. Such inference is no more hazardous than scien¬
tific inference or the ordinary reasonings of everyday
life: the practical certainty of its conclusions may be
asserted with full justification.
The principal source of many arguments that histori¬
cal inference is in some way especially uncertain is the
belief that the historian's conclusions are almost all
based on a consideration of materials of the same type,
that is, testimony; and testimony may easily become the
expression of the bias and prejudices of its author to the
consequential detriment of its factual content. In the
past such arguments might have been.well founded; but in
fact historians have not relied wholly or even largely on
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testimonial sources and related materials, such as memoirs,
records intended for posterity, and secondary historical
accounts, for over a century. Indeed, the recent tendency
of some historians has not seldom been to over-react to
criticism of the use of testimony, with the result that
they have discounted intentional records almost completely.
In history today, historical conclusions are generally
based on many different types of sources: for example,
intentional records will be confirmed or placed in doubt
by records that have been left unintentionally; contempo¬
rary accounts will be looked at in the light of archaeo¬
logical discoveries; the written history of the past may
be modified by the use of scientific methods such as radio¬
carbon dating. In the next section I intend to give some
idea of the -wide and varied grounds for historical conclu¬
sions provided by the different types of historical mater¬
ials available for the researcher's examination.
5. Historical materials
By inductive and inferential methods the historian
reaches certain conclusions about the past from the evi¬
dence of the materials open to him. It is important in any
discussion of history that it is stated clearly just how
varied historical materials really are. Some writers seem
to suggest that for the most part the historian's work con¬
sists of the evaluation and criticism of testimony. In one
passage, for example, Popper talks of the historian in a
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way that equates his use of documentary evidence with the
scientist's use of observations. In truth, if one is
asked to suggest material used in historical research, one
will immediately think of examples of the so-called pri¬
mary sources, such as written documentary material (for
example, charters, deeds, wills and accounts), the better-
known sorts of archaeological evidence, and (for more re¬
cent history) oral reports, and examples of secondary
sources, which consist chiefly of previous written his¬
torical accounts and accounts taken from other, non-his¬
torical disciplines. Examples of different materials are
rarely thought of at first; yet when the actual variety
of historical material that can, and indeed must, be used
by the historian is made clear, it should come as no sur¬
prise, for it is really quite obvious that the sources of
history must be widespread.
Realization of the variety of the types of histori¬
cal material that may provide useful information will
lead to the development of a wider conception of the his¬
torian's world of evidence and eliminate at least one
source of scepticism. One sceptical argument that should
not survive a listing of the various types of historical
material is that which is based on a (supposed) almost
exclusive use of testimony by the historian; it claims
that testimony is inherently unreliable and provides no
basis for objective statements about the past, even when
an attempt .is made to establish the truth by comparing
26. See Karl R. Popper: Objective knowledge (Oxford,
1972), 166.
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and synthesizing different testimonies. This argument is
easily refuted because testimony and intentional record
need form only one part of the historian's source material.
When testimonial material is made use of by the historian,
it can, and indeed should, be confirmed or placed in doubt
by evidential material which has been left behind by the
people of the past with no thought for posterity. Many of
the historian's factual conclusions from the use of testi¬
mony will receive objective corroboration from non-testi¬
monial evidence.
What are some of these various sources of historical
material? Apart from the more obvious records, in his es¬
tablishment of statements of fact the historian may make
use of such objects as coins and seals; he may be justi¬
fied in reaching certain conclusions through a knowledge
of place-names or family-names -- place-names, for instance,
are a helpful aid in deciding who settled where when Eng¬
land was invaded by the various Anglo-Saxon peoples, and
family-names provide a good deal of the evidence for de¬
termining the varying degrees of penetration of different
areas by immigrant groups in the United States. Newspa¬
pers, magazines and pamphlets may be useful to the his¬
torian indirectly, as well as providing him directly with
reported evidence of one kind or another: they can be
greatly indicative of the differing attitudes of a par¬
ticular period or country. Features like advertisements,
in newspapers and elsewhere, can furnish the historian
with much information that will be relevant to social
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history. For local history, and even for more general
history, buildings in their styles and their details will
give useful information that may sometimes be completely
undocumented. Portraits and paintings are a source of
much background material for the more specific events of
a period; notably, their importance may often be less di¬
rect than indirect: the anachronistic details of the paint¬
ings of the Italian and Flemish schools, for example, tell
us nothing about the historical reference they often lay
claim to, but they do tell us a good deal about the style
of life of the society in which they were painted, with
details which otherwise might be entirely lost to us. In
cathedrals and churches monuments and effigies, and even
the sometimes frivolous carvings on capitals or miseri¬
cords, have left us useful historical details. And ob¬
viously artefacts in general have much to tell the person
who is seeking historical knowledge.
Of course, the historian will often not have the
necessary expertise to make satisfactory use directly of
such non-testimonial sources. To a large extent he will
rely on workers in other disciplines; indeed some of those
disciplines may be considered as auxiliary to history
proper. Archaeology and genealogy and heraldry all exist
in their own right; but other disciplines may be thought
of as existing only to serve more important studies: for
example, the disciplines of paleography, diplomatic, epig¬
raphy and sphragistics. In some fields non-historical
disciplines will provide the historian with many important
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contributions both to his knowledge and to his understand¬
ing of history.
It should not be forgotten that for more remote
periods of history myth and saga, such as the works of
Homer and some of the books of the Bible, may be used to
establish certain historical facts. It is important to
bear in mind that many facts are not discovered by a sim¬
ple, direct reading of an ancient literary text: the ma¬
terial may be used both to provide us with a partial idea
of the writer's society, and, through the application to
it of general principles of certain types of society, to
reveal to some extent the truth about the real historical
events to which a myth relates. In a related way, the
historian may "read between the lines" when he studies
more modern historical sources. Even when the historian
makes extensive use of those records intended by their
writers for posterity he will rarely confine himself to
using them straightforwardly for the information they pur¬
port to give, allowing himself to practise only surface
criticism (for example, by taking note of the writer's
prejudices, by verifying factual statements, or by com¬
paring different accounts). Many written records give the
historian information which their writer never intended to
give and may not even have thought about.
It is obvious that the historian will require a good
deal of specialized knowledge relevant to the materials
he wishes to use. Indeed, if the knowledge used by him
is very specialized and very extensive, his historical
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work will seem that much more "scientific". So it may¬
be: I am not suggesting that the historian requires no
specialized training; clearly- he does. There will be a
body of basic techniques and procedures of historical re¬
search and writing to be learned. Nevertheless, much of
what the historian learns about will not be historiog¬
raphy as such, but will be related to disciplines allied
to history, and, according to his predilections, any other
subjects possessing a possible historical interest. Much
of the knowledge that is brought to bear on historical
problems is not primarily a part of historiography proper;
and it should therefore be considered to share in philo¬
sophical difficulties surrounding all empirical knowledge
rather than in the supposed peculiar difficulties of his¬
torical knowledge.
6. Intuitive factual statements
Inference and induction are perhaps to be considered
as the ideal way in which historical facts are to be es¬
tablished. In history, however, the application of gene¬
ral inductive methods, whether formally or informally, will
not prove wholly adequate even simply for the establish¬
ment of facts about the past. It is where rational pro¬
cedures are inadequate that an "unscientific" but very
important feature of historical study comes into play:
this feature is the historian's use of intuition in coming
to his conclusions. Sometimes, less flatteringly, the use
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of non-rational methods is called not intuition but guess¬
work; but "guesswork" is not a fair description of what
the historian does, for his thinking is related, though
not on a rational basis, to what happened in the past,
and there is therefore a meaningful distinction to be made
between intuition and genuine guesswork. Intuition serves
two main purposes: it will suggest certain possible occur¬
rences that will fill in the gaps left by the application
of rational method, as well as help the historian to decide
between opposing conclusions where the evidence for the
one or the other is fairly evenly balanced, and it will
sometimes lead the historian to go directly against what
is seemingly the trend of the evidence in his conclusions.
Here are some examples of historical intuition at
work in history:
The slow and gradual manner in which parochial churches
became independent appears to be of itself a sufficient
answer to those who ascribe a great antiquity to the
universal payment of tithes. There are, however, more
direct proofs that this species of ecclesiastical prop¬
erty was acquired not only by degrees but with consid¬
erable opposition. We find the payment of tithes first
enjoined by the canons of a provincial council in France,
near the end of the sixth century. From the ninth to the
end of the twelfth, or even later, it is continually en¬
forced by similar authority. ... This reluctant submis¬
sion of the people to a general and permanent tribute is
perfectly consistent with the eagerness displayed by them
in accumulating voluntary donations upon the church.
Charlemagne was the first who gave the confirmation of
a civil statute to these ecclesiastical injunctions; no
one at least has, so far as I know, adduced any earlier
law for the payment of tithes than one of his capitula¬
ries. But it would be precipitate to infer, either that
the practice had not already gained ground to a consider¬
able extent, through the influence of ecclesiastical au¬
thority, or, on the other hand, that it became universal
in consequence of the commands of Charlemagne.27
27. Henry Hallam: View of the state of Europe during the
Middle Ayes (London, 1856), 142-43•
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It cannot be said that the evidence Hallam puts before us
here, and in the footnotes accompanying the passage, ought
to be considered sufficient for him to infer a factual
conclusion of any sort — whether that tithes were regu¬
larly and universally paid before the time of Charlemagne,
or that they were an infrequent custom until Charlemagne's
capitulary led to their becoming a universal practice, or,
for that matter, that tithes were paid in an erratic fash¬
ion both before and after Charlemagne. Hallam seems to
see the recurrence of regulations relating to the same
subject as evidence for a largely continuous and regular
increase in the slow development of the practice of tith¬
ing; yet, quite reasonably, in another context, the repe¬
tition of legislation could be seen as evidence that the
practice it relates to was not being followed. Hallam's
statement about a gradual but reluctant increase in the
practice of tithing over the centuries, working principal¬
ly as a growing custom reinforced by occasional explicit
legislation, convinces the reader, if indeed it does con¬
vince him, not by the evidence presented, but rather by
what initially must be described as a general feeling of
Tightness about the conclusion. This feeling of "Tight¬
ness" is created by an understanding of the events of a
period considered together and as a whole, rather than by
an examination and explanation of discrete events; and
this understanding is made over to the reader through the
general structure of a passage and in the way the historian
arranges his material. The intuitive foundations of a
9S
conclusion are implicit in the material of a historical
account, and they could only be stated explicitly through
an exposition as unconvincing in itself as it would be
laborious. If the reader concurs in a historian's intui¬
tive conclusions then the intuitive understanding of events
has been successfully conveyed by the historian in his ac¬
count. This belongs properly to the topic of historical
understanding, and I shall be developing the theme of
"intuition" further when I come to consider explanation
and understanding in history in a later chapter.
The intuitive judgment of Hallam leads to a pur¬
portedly factual statement about the past. The second
way in which the historian may give scope to his intui¬
tive ideas is in the proposal of factual alternatives for
which there is little or no evidence at all. Thus, by
saying "Whether or not he £Henry] had any hand in his
brother's death in the New Forest, he moved very quickly,"
a modern historian suggests in passing that the death of
William Rufus may not have been an accident; but he does
not assert it for a fact and he does not adduce any evi¬
dence to support his suggestion, and he freely admits in
a footnote that the suggestion here is "pure speculation".
What is noteworthy is that historians not infrequently
commit such speculations to writing, and in doing this
they may leave behind an idea that will prove fertile in
later research.
28. See John Le Patourel: "The Norman succession, 996-
1135", English Historical Review, 86 (1971), 243.
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The third type of statement to be considered in this
section is the hypothetical statement. Historical hypo-
theticals about events that did not happen must be held
to be based on intuitive reasoning. Since general laws,
because of the complexity of history, are usually of lit¬
tle positive use for the historian's conclusions in their
final stage, and since there are no sources of evidence
about events that did not happen, only intuition can or¬
dinarily be the basis of such statements. Hypothetical
statements do have an importance in history: they serve in
a rhetorical way to emphasize what the historian has said
about actual events or actual personalities, and to give
an increased depth to his judgments and conclusions about
them by suggesting what dangers may have been avoided or
what opportunities missed in the real course of events.
The following passage is an example of a hypothetical
statement in a work of history, where intuition alone must
be held to be the basis of the historian's statement.
It is hardly open to question that this brilliant
lord of well-trained myriads (^Alexander] would have
advanced to the conquest of the West; nor can we af¬
fect to d.oubt that, succeeding where one of his suc¬
cessors failed, he would have annexed Sicily and Great
Hellas, conquered Carthage and overrun the Italian
peninsula. To apprehend what his death meant for
Europe we need not travel farther in our speculations.
To the Indies he would certainly have returned and
carried out with fresh troops that project of visit¬
ing the valley of the Ganges which had been frustrated
by his weary army. ... It is needless to add that if
Alexander had lived another quarter of a century, he
would have widened the limits of geographical know¬
ledge. The true nature of the Caspian Sea would have
been determined; the southern extension of the Indian
peninsula would have been discovered; and an attempt
would have been made to repeat the Phoenician circum¬
navigation of Africa. Nor could Alexander have failed,
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in his advanced position on the Jaxartes, to have
learned some facts about the vast extension of the
Asiatic continent to the east and north, and the
curiosities of Chinese civilisation.29
As an example of a hypothetical statement in history, this
passage attains an untypical complexity; it is also a sur¬
prising passage as it occurs in the work of an avowedly
"scientific" historian. If it is looked at analytically,
the hypothetical content of the statements above depend
on so many other particular conditions for their fulfil¬
ment that any relation to the actual facts, in so far as
they could be the basis for the historian's speculations,
is a very tenuous one. The historian's case rests on an
extensive intuitive perception of what would have been the
case in many fields if just one condition, the death of
Alexander, had been changed. In an important wray, hypo¬
thetical statements in history are unlike other state¬
ments resulting from an intuitive approach in that, as
is obvious, they cannot be tested. They are best regarded,
as I have said, not as presenting a type of "genuine" hy¬
pothesis but as a rhetorical device that serves to empha¬
size some point the historian wishes to make, which, in
Bury's case, is the greatness of Alexander.
It should now be clear hoxv the historian sets about
formulating his factual statements; he does it not simply
by means of inductive inference from the evidence of his¬
torical material but also by the intuition of factual or
hypothetical circumstances implied by that evidence wrhen
it is fully understood.
29. J. B. Bury: A history of Greece (London, 1906), $22.
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7. The existence of established facts in history
Through an examination of various historical mate¬
rials and the use of inference and induction, on the one
hand, and his intuition, or feeling for the evidence, on
the other, the historian is able to formulate a body of
factual historical statements. From his factual knowledge
he will be able to proceed to explanatory and interpretive
conclusions. About the way the historian prefers one in¬
terpretive conclusion to another there is little to be
said at this point; how the historian himself prefers one
conclusion to another and how the reader comes to prefer
one historical conclusion above others present problems
that will be considered at a later stage along with other
topics. The initial historical task, that is, the estab¬
lishment of historical facts, is, logically considered, a
fairly straightforward business. For the most part, it
will either have an acceptable basis in common sense or
else be founded on sound inductive reasoning. The factual
account, with its substantiation and the inferences by
which it proceeds, will be open to criticism according to
commonly accepted objective principles.
Against critics who would hold that all the factual
statements of history are open to sceptical doubts it must
be made clear that a very large number of facts are estab¬
lished beyond doubt in history; and such established facts
do not relate simply to physical aspects of the past but
also to the feelings and attitudes of individuals. Any
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work of history contains an important proportion of indis¬
putable facts; for example:
Led by the Gepids, the various tribes of Goths, Rugii,
Sueves, and Heruls inflicted a crushing defeat upon the
Huns at the River Nedao (153) and drove them back into
the Russian plains, only a few scattered bands remaining
in Hungary.30
This statement is about purely "physical" facts, although
the phrase 'crushing defeat' implies that the historian
31
has made an evaluative judgment, however rudimentary.
The following passage, however, contains quite in¬
disputable facts about the attitudes of people involved in
a particular historical event:
In April 1913 in the aftermath of military reversals
in Europe the Lloyd George government decided to extend
conscription to Ireland. In order to make its decision
more palatable to the Irish Nationalists the government
also decided to grant home rule as well. It was quick¬
ly apparent that this dual policy was unacceptable to
J the Irish, Nationalist and Unionist alike, and in the
charged emotional atmosphere of the next few weeks a
compromise solution was sought to the problem.32
Here there are indisputable statements not only about ac¬
tual physical facts, but also about a decision, the unpala-
tability and unacceptability of that decision to certain
people, and the charged emotional atmosphere consequent on
that. Given the evidence, such conclusions are inescap¬
able, and must be acknowledged as factual and objective.
30. H. St. L. B. Moss: The birth of the Middle Ages 395-
31A (Oxford, 1935 ), 53 .
31. Ideally, one would like to deal with really simple
historical statements of fact such as 'The Battle of
Hastings happened in 1066'. Statements of this type,
however, though they are attractive philosophically,
occur almost not at all in actual historical accounts.
32. John Kendle: "Federalism and the Irish Problem in
1913", History, 56 (1971), 207.
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In addition there can be indisputable statements
involving a historian's value-judgments; for example,
there can be no quarrel that England was hospitable to
political exiles who came to live there in the last cen¬
tury, as is claimed in the following passage:
England in the nineteenth and early twentieth century
was more hospitable to political exiles and refugees
than perhaps any other European country of the time.
It gave shelter to fallen emperors, such as Napoleon
III, and to communist revolutionaries, such as Marx and
Engels; to Russian aristocrats such as Herzen, and to
Italian nationalists such as Garibaldi and Mazzini.33
It needs to be mentioned, nevertheless, that any agreement
here about the value-judgment of the historian, vis-a-vis
England's hospitality, does not have regard to whether
hospitality as such is good or bad but only to whether,
given the current meaning of "hospitality", the word can
in the context be correctly predicated of England. The
objective agreement that underlies the established fact
here should therefore be analysed as factual and lexico¬
graphical and not directly valuational. The use of a word
like "hospitable" generally connotes approval; yet disap¬
proval could still be expressed within the passage as it
stands. The basis of agreement on the historian's value-
judgment may be said to be relative to that scheme of
o ;
values within which "hospitable" is defined. ^
That facts like those in the passages cited above
can be considered as quite definitely established should
33- Lionel Kochan: "Lenin in London", History Today,
20 (1970), 229.
34. For further discussion of the difficulties concerning
absolute agreement on values see below, chap. IV, sects.
4 and 7-
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give considerable encouragement to the proponents of ob¬
jective history. The evidence supporting such statements
of fact is of an objective nature, the way in which the
conclusions are arrived at follows an objective (commonly
accepted) pattern, and the conclusions themselves must
therefore be allowed to be objective. Furthermore, the
factual objectivity of such statements provides a firm
basis for the progress of historical argument.
If it is said, however, that such facts are estab¬
lished beyond doubt, it should not be understood that this
entails that they cannot possibly be untrue. The historian
who arrives at conclusions about the past and embodies
them in factual and objective statements like those cited
above may well be proved wrong in the future. To talk of
such statements as established beyond doubt is to be un¬
derstood in the manner of all empirical disciplines as
signifying established beyond reasonable doubt; firm
statements of fact make no claim to be irrefutable, but
they are established as soundly as anything ever is in
everyday life, and there is no reason for us to be harder
on historians than on ourselves when we talk of "estab¬
lished facts". The established facts of history, like
the established facts of everyday life and other empiri¬
cal disciplines, have such a high degree of probability
that to treat them as uncertain would leave nothing in
the world that was certain. When such established facts
are proved wrong, of course, support is given to extreme
scepticism; but there is no support for the more positive
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type of historical relativism which would assert that
one can be peculiarly sceptical about historical know¬
ledge alone.
It can be usefully pointed out in this context that
if a historical statement of fact is proved false, this
does not mean that it is not "objective". One basis for
the argument against historical objectivity is that the
historian's conclusions, because they are about the past,
are especially uncertain. That a statement of fact is
objectively established does not entail that it is true;
nor, when the number of statements that are incorrect or
incomplete or unsatisfactory turns out to be relatively
high, does this entail that the study of history is large¬
ly a subjective business. A conclusion objectively come
to may very well be found to be an incorrect one, and
not necessarily only when the evidence for it is found
to need reconsideration. Historical work may be both ob¬
jective and uncertain simultaneously. The uncertainty of
much written history is a definite fact, and it cannot be
ignored by either historians or philosophers of history.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to repeat that many facts
of history are established beyond reasonable doubt.
8. The historian's involvement with history
The establishment of facts is only part of the his¬
torian's work. Considered solely in themselves, passages
in historical accounts containing statements of established
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fact, like those I quoted above, must appear to be strange¬
ly sterile. Earlier in this work I affirmed that history
is more than a mere assemblage of facts, and this is gen¬
erally agreed by all those who write about the nature of
history. The historian must do more than assemble mate¬
rial, and he must also go beyond purely analytic explana¬
tion and interpretation: he must explain to his audience
wrhy what happened did happen, with regard to broader and
less immediate causes and conditions, and he will often
provide understanding of his topic in its totality and
in many cases make clear the contingent inevitability of
historical events.
Of course the scientist too gives us to understand
that things happen in one way rather than in another. In
this regard, however, there are two ways in which the re¬
lationship between the historian and the material with
which he works differs from that between the scientist
and his material. Firstly, the scientist's explanations
are ultimately based on general laws, and this cannot be
said of all the explanations that a historian feels are
satisfactory in history: but this point must be left to
one side for discussion in a later chapter. Secondly,
the historian is involved in both a social and personal
way with his material; and this involvement must be exam¬
ined here. The historian and his readers too are part of
the course of history; as Tapp has pointed out:
Unlike- the physical scientist, the ... historian
cannot stand so far apart from his problems. Think¬
ing about the past makes meaningful the space-time
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continuum within the penumbra of which he is a living,
sentient part.35
Because the historian is a member of a society, because he
is a thinking and feeling social being, and because histo¬
ry is precisely about men thinking and feeling in their
social life, and in a social life that has in many cases
undoubtedly affected his own society, he must, if he finds
any interest and derives any true meaning from his stud¬
ies of the past, in some way see history as belonging,
however indeterminately, to himself. Societies which have
no historical sense (as we understand it), and which have
little written history as such, have in many fields an
orientation of their attitudes that is almost incompre¬
hensible to us; and the members of that society, including
even the most cultured among them, have their own ideas
and feelings partly determined by a tradition of the past
from which the priority normally accorded to pure truth
in history is absent. The earlier Middle Ages provide a
good example of such a society.36 Nonetheless, even here,
in a society unfamiliar with our concept of historical
truth, the personal, social, and religious needs of men
in society partly created the medieval conception of his¬
tory; and the truth about the past was conceived in such
a way that it was still very much a living and meaningful
part of man's intellectual life. The conception of the
historical past and the conception of the social present
35• G. J. Tapp: "Knowing the past", Journal of Philosouhv,
55 (1953)~, 464.
36. Cf. H. 0. Taylor: The mediaeval mind (London, 1911),
I, 77-66.
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must always come to mould one another. Our historical
sense determines and is determined by present attitudes
in many fields of knowledge; and it is a sense that is
continuously modified and transformed so as to remain a
living part of our experience. An examination of the past
events that constitute and determine his own historical
sense and his own sense of the present cannot fail to
have an importance for the historian, even if it never
happens that he makes this personal importance explicit
to himself. The historian personally is deeply involved
with his studies.
How precisely does this real involvement of the
historian with the material of his work affect the re¬
sults of his work, the historical account? Involvement
has three effects: the achievement of factual objectivity
in history is much more difficult than its achievement in
science; when factual objectivity has been achieved, it
may be easily compromised by valuational and interpretive
attitudes extraneous to the facts as such; and the his¬
torian's involvement with history, as it is manifested
in the completed historical account, has an importance
for his readers and for their understanding of his work
and of the past itself.
Firstly, as I have said, the historian's involve¬
ment with history has considerable significance with re¬
gard to the attainment of historical objectivity. For
science it is the very apartness of its subject-matter
which makes objectivity a relatively straightforward and
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uncontentious point in considerations of method. To put
it simply: mind, or intellect, or feeling, that is to say,
man's "mental side", as it may be called, is not involved
directly as an object of consideration for the physical
sciences. The materials and the subject-matter of science
are simply objects in the physical world, even if they are
only hypothetical objects, such as sub-atomic particles;
indisputably, therefore, they are open to simple objective
scrutiny. Of course, this is also the case with the pri¬
mary materials of history; but, whereas the description,
interpretation, and explanation of scientific facts con¬
tinue to relate to an objective world, in so far as sci¬
entists have formulated and accepted universally certain
fixed principles of scientific procedure, the description,
interpretation, explanation, and understanding of histori¬
cal facts relates to a considerable and essential extent
to the rational, spiritual, and emotional world of man,
conceived both individually and holistically (socially).
The non-physical elements of history cannot be eliminated:
they form an important part of what history is about, and
some of them cannot be accommodated within fixed and ac¬
cepted working principles. To attempt to consider history
objectively after the manner of the physical sciences at
least, or to reduce it perhaps to some sort of behavioural
discipline, would in many cases lead to an elimination of
the truly characteristic features of history. The "per¬
sonal", mental subject-matter of history, therefore, makes
historical objectivity much more difficult to attain than
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scientific objectivity, because the former cannot come
under the simple objective scrutiny of the latter. The
mental side of history is not only part of the subject-
matter: it also has its place in the historian's approach
to his subject. It provides a basis for the historian's
involvement, and in some cases identification, with his
subject. If the non-physical in history is ineradicable,
then criticism of a historian's results must, for some
purposes, also take place through involvement and not
through apartness.
For history, the historian's involvement with his
historical subject-matter entails that the work being done,
in its conception and completion, can never be entirely
separated from the individual who is doing the work. This
may well be a prime reason that the true social sciences
(that is, excluding history), which also have for their
subject-matter material in which a worker must of intrin¬
sic necessity be involved, cannot at the moment, and would
seem never to be likely to be able to, fulfil their as¬
pirations to become true and proper sciences grounded on
37
universally applicable general laws.
Since the subject of this thesis is the relationship
between historical objectivity and the individual histori¬
an, I feel it should be emphasized here that this inelim-
inable personal involvement of the historian with the past,
as I have outlined it above, is one of the foundations of
37- The worker in the social sciences is not always in¬
volved in his subject in the same way as the historian:
his involvement may be contemporary and immediate.
Ill
the importance of the historian as an individual in his¬
torical work. The central significance of involvement
will be developed still further when the individuality of
historical understanding is discussed in a later chapter.
The point to be made in this connection is that, because
the historian must involve himself, and often, to a cer¬
tain degree, identify himself, with his subject-matter,
and because that subject-matter is the particular and not
the general, so work that is particular requires a worker
who is individual. Historical work is frequently the
poorer when individuality is suppressed: historical in¬
volvement requires the historian's individuality.
The second effect of the historian's personal in¬
volvement with his material is that this involvement al¬
lows the relativist initially a much stronger case than
if it were straightforwardly conceded that historical ob¬
jectivity required the historian to keep a certain distance
between himself and his subject. It goes without saying
that involvement makes the nature of the objectivity that
is possible in history much more difficult to establish.
If, we may ask, it is going to be maintained that involve¬
ment and objectivity are in some way compatible with each
other, what is to be said about all those features of a
historian's personality which must surely be extraneous to
historical fact as such, features which, unless they are
inhibited by the historian, must seem at the best to colour
such fact and at the worst to distort it seriously? Yet,
if we are to hold to a theory of the personal involvement
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of the historian with his work, surely such features can
no longer be considered extraneous to history?
It is said that if bias is making itself felt in
historical wrork, then the conscientious historian can make
sincere attempts to eradicate it. However, if the histo¬
rian succeeded in removing all trace of his personality
from his work in order to present the true, objective,
"scientific" account (and the elimination of any expres¬
sion of his personality would appear to be the best way
of destroying some of the possible sources of bias), then
he would have succeeded in making his history something
totally apart from himself; and apartness of this sort is
something that does not belong to history. If it is true
that history is not to tolerate a scientific apartness,
then personality cannot be finally removed from it. It
would seem prima facie that the relativist need not even
take the trouble to argue his position. I hope to show
later that this is not the case at all: the historian's
personal involvement with his subject-matter, including
even his pursuit of the proof of his own historical the¬
sis, with his own understanding of events, in no xvay pre¬
cludes the possibility of historical objectivity. These
problems are better left, though, until relativism can
be given a proper consideration.
Thirdly, the involvement of the historian with his
subject-matter is of considerable importance for his audi¬
ence, in particular for its understanding of his finished
historical work. The reader of history to an extent comes
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to reflect in his involvement the writer of history. Just
as the historian is not wholly apart from his subject, so,
on the reader's side, there must be a personal involvement
with the subject if what is history for the historian is
to be history for the reader and comprehended by him. If
a historical account is to be completely understood, the
reader cannot be apart from it any more than the historian
can. Without historical involvement it can be only a dead
thing, rather than alive and meaningful. The understand¬
ing of history can only come through a reader's involve¬
ment: without this all the historian's efforts, with his
public in mind, are wholly in vain. The final stage of a
historian's explanation and interpretation must be an at¬
tempt to grant the reader scope for his involvement; he
must enable the reader to understand in some complete way
the historical events related. Without this final, syn¬
thetic understanding, the reader may find the account
technically satisfactory while it remains nothing more for
him than a collection of cold, remote facts. Here is to
be found another difference betx^een history and science:
the historian understands his material internally whereas
the scientist does so externally; thus in a special way
history needs to be personally and inwardly understood by
the historian and his reader. A full treatment of under¬
standing, however, must be left until I come to discuss
historical explanation and interpretation in detail.
I should wish to say that history, to be fully his¬
tory, must be understood, or at least understandable, and
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that the understanding of history requires a personal in¬
volvement. In some ways this personal involvement can be
identified with the "vital interest" of the historian or
reader as that is conceived, for example, by Croce. I do
not wish to emphasize this "vital interest" to the extent
that historical truth (according to the general modern
conception of such a phrase) is subjugated to the demands
of the present, as seems to be the case in Croce's own
3 $
theory. Nevertheless, the Crocean distinction between
history and chronicle is an interesting one, for it shows
how important attitudes are in history. This distinction,
which is of central importance for Croce, is not made in
the usual way, which I have already discussed, by distin¬
guishing plain narrative and significant narrative, but is
determined by the presence of one of two different spiri-
3 9
tual attitudes towards the historical work in question.
For Croce, the question whether a written account in front
of us is to be denominated history or chronicle is a ques¬
tion that is answered by a consideration of the extrinsic
relationship (extrinsic, that is, as the realist would see
it) between the work and the mind or spirit of a particu¬
lar person, rather than by an examination of any of the
intrinsic qualities of the work itself. A historical nar¬
rative is Crocean "history" if we are vitally interested
3$. This seems to be the gist of the relevant passages
of Croce's Logic (trans. Douglas Ainslie, London,
1917)- See especially Part II, chaps. 3 and 4 of that
book.
39- Plain and significant narratives are treated above,
chap. II, sect. 5.
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in the topic of that narrative immediately while we are
reading it.
Without adopting the extreme philosophical conse¬
quences of Croce's position, we can admit that what Croce
said does usefully emphasize that history is characterized
by our interest in it, by a certain meaningfulness that it
possesses for us. Now that the implications of the his¬
torian's involvement with his historical work have been
set out and, hopefully, rendered understandable, it will
be useful to consider next some of the ways in which this
involvement will become apparent to the reader of a his¬
torical account. In the next chapter, among considera¬
tions of other topics, I hope to show that some of the
modes of involvement can always be considered legitimate
in historical work, that is to say, they do not of neces¬
sity impede historical objectivity, whereas other forms of
involvement present dangers for objectivity and truth. It
should be made clear, however, that I am not suggesting
the suppression of some degrees of involvement of the his¬
torian with his subject-matter, but rather the avoidance
by him, if he wishes to write an objectively true account
of the past, of some of the ways into which that involve¬
ment may be channelled in expression.
The historian is involved in his work through his
beliefs and feelings and attitudes. These may appear in
40. Gf. Theory and history of historiography, trans.
Douglas Ainslie (London", 1915) , chap. 1; and "History,
chronicle, and pseudo-history", in Philosophy, poetry,
history, trans. Cecil Sprigge (London, 1966).
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many ways. There are four principal ways which I intend
to examine: two ways which will be examined in the next
chapter are to be found in those explicit judgments which
are made by the historian and which are of a moral or •
other valuational nature, and those judgments that are
implicit in the language the historian uses; in later
chapters I shall look at the problem of selection (al¬
though one aspect of selection forms the subject of one
section of the next chapter) and the problem of the ar¬
rangement and balancing of various elements of a histori¬
cal account as they are achieved individually by different
historians.
Before I proceed to an examination of the manifesta¬
tions of involvement it will be necessary for me to look
briefly at the causative factors behind the degree and
manner of the historian's involvement. In the next chap¬
ter, therefore, my discussion will take as points of ref¬
erence certain problems of relativism, or, more precisely,
certain features of historiography which are held to jus¬
tify the relativist's objections to the historian's claims
of objectivity.
9. Conclusion
In this chapter I have intended to show how the
historian and his material are connected, and what the
initial steps are towards making of his material a his¬
torical account. In the last section I made the point
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that the historian is not to, and cannot, regard himself,
or be regarded by others, as "apart" from his subject-
matter in the same way as the scientist, or at least the
physical scientist, may. I have stated that personal in¬
volvement is very much an integral part of the historian's
understanding of history. If I have said that this in¬
volvement should be present in historical work, it is also
true that I have not yet adequately explained why it
should be present; this must wait until I am able to deal
properly in a later chapter with historical understanding.
This chapter may be concluded with a brief explanation of
why it is that involvement is a matter that must concern
the individual historian.
History deals with the past of man in his social
life. Consequently, in its account of the past, it is
necessarily concerned with human actions, human thoughts,
and human feelings. It is precisely this essential human
aspect of history which requires and entails the histo¬
rian's involvement. If the study of history were to be¬
come something apart from the historian, it would lose
this human aspect, it would no longer be about men as
persons; and as a result it would cease to be history.
Social life as we understand it (which is what history is
about) requires the participation of persons expressly in
order that it be social. A behavioural approach to his¬
tory might provide adequate results as history was approx¬
imated more- and more to.the social sciences; for instance,
it can prove extremely useful in economic history and, in
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some ways, social history. But where a historical account
is about individuals, a language of behaviour alone is
inadequate: what individuals do in history is too complex
to be described satisfactorily by a behavioural account.
To relate coherently an individual's actions and inten¬
tions and thoughts, with the employment of "mental" lan¬
guage, is a very difficult business, which is intimately
bound up with the attitude of the particular historian to
the individual in question. The differing psychological,
as well as social, conditioning of historians must mean
that, with the rarest chance exceptions, no two histori¬
ans, doing detailed work, will ever evaluate every action
of a historical individual in an exactly parallel fashion.
There can be no question of achieving a compromise between
historians, of reaching a "correct" historical synthesis
through the collation and criticism of the varying evalu¬
ations of different histories. To claim that a certain
individual, in committing a certain action, was foolhardy
or bold, is a judgment on the whole individual and is in
rapport with all the judgments on other actions of that
individual. Such judgments cannot be suppressed, for they
finally ensure the characterization of historical individ¬
uals as persons. These judgments, linked as they are to
the value-scheme of an individual observer, are necessari¬
ly made by an individual, and only have their full meaning
when they are considered in this light. They are a prod¬
uct of the historian's conditioning and development both
socially and psychologically; and because these are to be
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found ultimately different in every case, they are unique¬
ly his together with the value-judgments they engender.
Of course, a historian may be induced to change his opin¬
ion under the influence of other individuals: this does
not mean, however, that the new judgment is somehow a
"joint" one, the result of an impersonal effort at syn¬
thesis. The historian may change his mind, but his new
opinion is still his own individual one.
Such evaluative judgments are essential to histori¬
cal accounts of man in the past. How it is that differ¬
ences between historians in their judgments need not be




SOME PROBLEMS OF RELATIVISM
1. The enduring value of a historical account
The nature and extent of the subjective element in
historical accounts is a perennial problem in the philos¬
ophy of history. Some historians, especially in the last
century when the idea of "scientific" history was rapidly
gaining ground in academic circles, came to take it almost
for granted that an objective account was possible not
only in theory but in practice as well. This nineteenth-
century conception of history was expressed in the well-
known dictum of Ranke that the task of the historian was
to describe the past as it really had been. Still, even
some "scientific" historians, while they sincerely at¬
tempted to apply rigorous objective principles in their
working procedures, saw and accepted the validity of a
relativist viewpoint on the value of historical work.
J. B. Bury, for instance, did not hesitate to admit that
the historian was a product of his own time:
The point of view of the historian is conditioned by
the mentality of his own age; the focus of his vision
is determined within narrow limits by the conditions
of contemporary civilization.1
So it was that Bury went on to say of the historian, in
1. The ancient Greek historians, 252; quoted by J. B.
Black: The art of history (London, 1926), 9.
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much the same way as the relativist of today not infre¬
quently does:
There can be nothing final about his judgments,
and their permanent interest lies in the fact that
they are judgments pronounced at a given epoch and
are characteristic of the tendencies and ideas of
that epoch.^
It is not easy to believe, however, that historians
generally take this view of their own work; and the his¬
torical value of much of Bury's own work itself has shown
an impressive durability. Ever since historians began to
write history the ambition of most of them has probably
ensured that they frequently have the same intention as
Thucydides, who could state unequivocally that his work
was 'not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of
an immediate public, but was done to last for ever'.
Relativist statements about historical work are to
be found in the writings of historians; although when a
historian makes a statement supporting relativism in an
extreme form, his theory is likely to be belied by the way
he actually carries out his historical work. Positions of
pure, irremediable relativism are most unambiguously taken
up by philosophers.
The relativist position in the philosophy of history
can take several forms. Croce, for example, with his
doctrine of a historical "vital interest", adopts with
assurance the theory that the historian is not primarily
2. Ibid.
3. Thucydides: History of the Pelooonnesian War, trans.
Rex Warner (Harmondsworth, 1954), 24-25.
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concerned with the past at all: his statement that all
history is contemporary history is to be taken quite
literally; history is created by the immediate present
interests of the historian. Thus Croce can maintain that
different individuals can write conflicting yet equally
valid and true histories of the same subject.^
This kind of deeply philosophical position, a conse¬
quence of CroceTs idealism, is not, however, a commonly
held relativist position. The more straightforward kind
of relativism presents arguments that have an understand¬
able appeal for immediate acceptance by anyone who re¬
flects on history. Mandelbaum has summarized succinctly
the more common relativist arguments; the relativist holds,
he writes,
that no historical account can faithfully depict the
past since, first, the actual occurrences of history are
richer in content than any account of them can possibly
be; second, because the continuity and structure which
historical works necessarily possess do not afford a
true parallel to the continuity and structure which
characterize the events of history; and, third, because
the historian of necessity passes value-judgments, and
these are relevant to the present but not to the past.5
The relativist claims that the truth of a historical
work can only be grasped and judged when the context of the
narrative is referred to the psychological and social
context of its composition. We must not only understand
what is said, but also why it is said. And it is undeni¬
able that every occurrence described by the historian is
4. See especially "History, chronicle, and pseudo-
history", in Philosophy, poetry, history, trans. Cecil
Sprigge (London, 1966).
5. Maurice Mandelbaum: The problem of historical
knowledge (New York, 1967), 36.
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demonstrably richer in content than his account of it, and
that the historian cannot recapture in his depiction of an
event the sense of immediacy experienced by those in the
thick of many events. Even from all that material with
which he is acquainted the historian does not take every¬
thing, but selects certain aspects of the events he des¬
cribes and ignores others; in consequence, he gives to the
events narrated a structure or pattern which the original
occurrence did not possess. The relativist also holds,
importantly, that historical knowledge is value-charged:
the historian constructs his account under the dominance
of his own particular values, from a valuational stand-
z:
point derived from the present.
Most thinkers, of course, are not to be found taking
up the two positions of relativism and anti-relativism in
the most extreme way possible; yet it is clearly the case
that many philosophers and historians believe that the
writer of history suffers some type of disability in his
attempts to think about the past and create an objective
account of it, by reason of his being a product of a par¬
ticular time and place.
In this chapter I wish to concentrate on the problem
of the social and psychological factors involved in the
historian's work, and on the related problem of the values
a historian brings to his work and the value-judgments
they may lead him to make as he writes his account of the
past.
6. Cf. ibid., chap. I.
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The historian probably finds it easier to adhere to
a statement that an objective historical account of past
events is possible: as I have said, an objective account
has always been the aim of most conscientious historians
in the past. This is true when it is taken into account
that the term "objectivity" has sometimes come to be
applied in what from some points of view seem strange
ways, as, for example, in the historiography of the Soviet
Union and the communist countries of eastern Europe: there
is no immediate reason to attribute disingenuousness to
those who talk of "historical objectivity" after their own
fashion.
Since for most historians objectivity has been a
goal that it is believed practically possible to attain,
it is not surprising to find that Ranke and other his¬
torians in the confident atmosphere of the nineteenth
century had few doubts concerning the possibility of
objectivity. Even Bury, in the passage I cited above, was
probably thinking not so much about the impossibility of
objective history as about the probability that scientific
history, if properly carried out, would be superseded by
the work of later historians in much the same way as
scientific discoveries and theories, even in the pure
sciences, are modified and improved by later developments,
or even rendered obsolete and supplanted by them. Only in
this century have historians not only come to see that
relativism presents very real problems for them as working
historians, but, in some cases, actually admitted that
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their accounts of the past must be considered irreducibly
relativistic.
Nevertheless, the historian who has admitted the
impossibility of final objectivity in his own work rarely
seems to reach the position where he would be prepared to
assert that the accounts he has produced are scarcely, or
not significantly, or not at all, about past events.
Perhaps it is natural that such a view should be held by
philosophers, particularly by those with idealist tenden¬
cies such as Croce; even the most admittedly relativist of
historians must surely baulk at developing the idea in his
actual historical work that he is concerned with his own
present interests or with making -- if he follows Oake-
shott — a special sort of statement about present facts.
It must also be assumed that historians do not
believe that their work, ostensibly and actually about the
past, has in fact only an enduring value in so far as it
is informative about their own period and society. It is
true that historical work always is, or at least is always
able to be, superseded. But can this really mean that the
permanent interest of a historical work lies in its being
typical of a given age? Do many people actually find the
enduring, central interest of Gibbon's work, for example —
and Gibbon provides a more favourable case than most
historians — in that in some of its aspects it is illus¬
trative of, and informative about, the eighteenth century?
Certainly, one of the chief interests of The decline and
fall of the Roman Empire is what it tells us about Gibbon
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as well as about his society; and this is a point, inci¬
dentally, which shows how important the personality of the
historian can actually be in his work. All the same, in
the end it must be affirmed that whatever an accomplished
work of history tells us about the historian and his
society is quite secondary to wThat it tells us about the
historian's chosen subject-matter. As well as for its
literary qualities, Gibbon's work is certainly read,
despite all its undisguised emotional attitudes and out¬
right prejudice, as a work of history, and a very great
work of history. Even for the advanced scholar Gibbon is
important as a landmark in the development of the study of
ancient history, and can prove to be an important back¬
ground work for some studies of the period and its problems.
Of course, to say all this is in no way to deny that the
age in which The decline and fall was written will throw
light on its limitations and deficiencies.
The sort of statement that Bury makes presents us,
if we take it literally, with an immediately paradoxical
view: that to read a work of history is to learn more
about the historian's age than about his supposed histori¬
cal subject. It is a paradoxical view because, when the
argument is thought about and carried to its logical
consequence, it will be seen that it invalidates its own
point. To read a history book, it should follow, is not
even to find out about the historian who wrote it, for
since we ourselves are creatures of our own age as we read
the book, in our study of history we only really learn
about ourselves.
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Bury's statement says nothing about the intentions
of the historian as he sets about his work. The historian
has certainly never accepted that his work only concerns
the subjective present; nor has he accepted that his work,
even for any future audience, is not primarily about the
subject he has chosen rather than about himself. The
historian has always believed it to be his task to give
an account of the past; and he has always believed that he
has carried this task out, at least to the best of his
ability. Of course, it is a valid criticism of some
professed historians that their work does tell us more
about them than about their historical subject. Lytton
Strachey provides a good example of what it can really
mean for a historian to tell us about himself.
From here on I shall take it for granted that all
historians believe that they are in one way or another
telling us about the past, and that for most of them this
is overtly their primary aim. It is obvious that
philosophical interpretations of historical facts in terms
of something other than past events cannot in the end ring
true for the historian. It is difficult to think that any
historian who began to take a theory like CroceTs or
Oakeshott's seriously -- in his practical work — could go
on writing a historical narrative much as he had done
before.
Despite a certain implausibility in the notion of a
historical account that is not to be considered primarily
informative about the past, it is true to say that in this
12§
century many historians, particularly in the English-
speaking world, have come to reject the idea, at least in
any theoretical statements they may make, that their
accounts are really objective; nor do they believe even
that objective accounts are possible. However, this
relativism that is to be found in genuine historical
thinking could perhaps be characterized initially as a
fairly reasonable type. Beard, for example, writes that
any selection and arrangement of facts pertaining to
any large area of history, either local or world, race
or class, is controlled inexorably by the frame of
reference in the mind of the selector and arranger.
This frame of reference includes things deemed necessary,
things deemed possible, and things deemed desirable.7
It is interesting to note that Beard, as a professional
historian who was influenced by Croce and who was one of
the more unashamedly relativistic of historians, in a very
unCrocean way saw one of the tasks of the historian as the
arrangement of facts. In saying this, Beard, clearly,
believed that the "bare" facts of history were in one way
or another knowable to the historian. This point of view
is typical of historians in general, since, for historians,
relativist problems occur not in the collection of data but
after the facts have been established. Difficulties of
relativism arise when the facts are transmuted into an
account through selection and arrangement and through
interpretation and understanding. The historian seems
rarely to be concerned with the problem that he may never
even be able to establish historical facts.
7. "Written history as an act of faith", in The
philosophy of historv in our time, ed. Hans Meyerhoff
(New York, 1959), 150-51.
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In seeing the problem of relativism in this way the
historian may be ignoring certain deeper philosophical
problems, as whether "bare facts" are even truly conceiv¬
able. What the historian thinks of as elementary facts of
history are undoubtedly in many cases the results of
sophisticated historical judgments and interpretations of
evidence. Nevertheless, certain facts, or more properly
statements of fact -- no matter how complex their formula¬
tion has been -- are almost universally agreed on and
accepted by historians of many societies and many ages.
Relativist problems arise in history when these accepted
facts form the basis of further historical judgments and
interpretations. The historian is right, therefore, to
separate for practical purposes fact and interpretation in
the way that he does.
2. Relativism in arrangement and selection
In so far as the historian encounters problems of
relativism in history he will find that many of them are
connected with the possibility of an objective selection
and arrangement of historical facts in order to construct
an account, as a whole, that will be both true and compre¬
hensible. In this respect the practical difficulties
thrown up by relativism centre on the question "In what
ways can a historian's treatment of nothing but true facts
lead to a narrative of past events that is historically
unsatisfactory?"
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In his paper "Can history be objective?" Morton
White cites the simple example of a historian who is
constructing a historical narrative from a list of American
presidents. How can a process of selection lead to the
construction of a narrative which is misleading or
inaccurate? White points out that
if selection simply means paring down the original list
(known to be true), the result of selection will also
be true. Any part of a true conjunction remains true.
And surely any re-ordering of the true statements on the
original list will also be true by virtue of well-known
properties of conjunctions.9
White goes on to show that the problem of historical
selection emphasizes the point that it is ideally the task
of the historian to tell the whole truth, or, more
realistically, to give us a narrative that is representative
of the whole truth.
The key word in a consideration of relativist problems
in historical work Is precisely this term "representative":
the historian cannot tell (literally) the whole truth, but
his work must be representative of the truth about that
particular segment of the past to which he has directed
his attention. It is clearly the case that any historical
narrative is more than simply the sum of its facts. As I
pointed out in talking of plain and significant narratives,
no historical account treats of plain facts; even without
the complexities of explanation being taken into account,
the relation of facts in a historical narrative is more
than the simple conjunction of "a and b and c..." Even
3. In Meyerhoff: op. cit.
9. Ibid., 193.
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the barest of so-called chronicles is more than the sum of
facts it relates, for the reader, as he discovers the
facts related in the narrative, not only reads his own
experience into them but also learns about the experience
of the chronicler or historian: the chronicler's experience
determined the arrangement of the narrative and led him to
impose on that narrative, and through it to convey to the
reader, particular attitudes and judgments. Thus, a
selection and arrangement of true facts may not simply be
unrepresentative but quite false, not because of what is
explicitly said (since, elementarily considered, what is
said will almost certainly be quite true) but of what is
implied. The importance attaching to the representativeness
of a historical account was made clear by Lord Macaulay:
No picture, then, and no history, can present us with
the whole truth: but those are the best pictures and
the best histories which exhibit such parts of the
truth as most nearly produce the effect of the whole.
He who is deficient in the art of selection may, by
showing nothing but the truth, produce all the effect
of the grossest falsehood. It perpetually happens that
one writer tells less truth than another, merely because
he tells more truths.10
Professor Nevins has underlined a related feature of
history, namely that contradictory historical judgments
can be based on exactly the same true facts:
The Conservative will present an argument, involving
a long train of facts, which seems utterly convincing.
A moment later, the Liberal will rise, and treating
precisely the same facts, present them in an entirely
different light which nevertheless also seems
momentarily convincing.!
10. "History", in The Varieties of History, ed. Fritz
Stern (London, 2nd ed., 1970), 76.
11. Allan Nevins: The gateway to history (Garden City,
N.Y., 1962), 224-25.
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That is to say, the arguments and interpretations of a
historian — supposedly en rapport with the historical
truths cited, and indeed intended to be in some way
deduced from them -- can differ markedly from those of a
colleague without any dispute about the "facts" as such.
The objectivity of facts is independent of the subjectivity
manifested in interpretation. This point has important
consequences for discussions about the interpretation and
12
understanding of history. For the moment, however, we are
confined to a treatment of immediate problems of relativism.
It is sufficient to say that even in our everyday experi¬
ence disagreement with others about a certain occurrence
often arises not over the facts of the case but over how
those facts are to be interpreted, what is to be made of
them, what they "mean"; and, in connection with the more
unscrupulous sort of historian, everyday experience tells
us too that the best lies can often be told by making a
judicious and quite unadulterated selection of perfectly
true facts.
Historical statements -- what we think of first when
we hear the term "historical facts" -- are the result of a
collection and interpretation of simpler facts, which in
their own turn must, logically, be considered as interpre¬
tations and not as "bare" facts. As Professor Oakeshott
has pointed out, the historian
is represented as starting from a "bare fact", whereas
it is safe to say that he never does so, because such
12. See below, chap. VIII, sect. 9.
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a starting-place is impossible — he begins with an
interpretation, which he reinterprets.^
Nevertheless, we can still make a worthwhile distinction
between what must be categorized as "interpretations" for
the philosopher and what must be considered more practically
as "interpretations" for the historian; alternatively, we
can say that historians quite validly consider certain
statements to be statements about bare facts but regard
other statements as being quite properly interpretive
statements.
"The Western Roman Empire came to an end in AD 476"
is an example of a statement that seems to be about a very
simple historical fact; but it is very much a conclusion
based on historical judgment and interpretation of events
in, and subsequent to, the year 476. It was not a conclu¬
sion known to the contemporaries of those events. And the
difficulties presented by the concept of "historical truth"
may be compounded still further when the historian finds
himself obliged to deal with other persons' statements
about historical events. These statements are already
themselves interpretations of historical facts, for in
making a statement, the individual who originally decided
to record the events would have chosen certain affirmations
about the event rather than others, according to his beliefs
and prejudices, his society and culture, and the purpose he
may have had in mind at the time he made the statement.
13. Quoted by Christopher Blake: "Can history be objec¬
tive?", in Theories of history, ed. Patrick Gardiner
(New York, 1959), 330-31.
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The purpose he had would determine his meaning, and his
meaning the character of the supposedly simple historical
fact. So it is that two relatively simple statements
about the same event may relate the event with equal
fullness and equal truth; yet in the way that the statement
is made, in the very order of the words in the statement
as it stands, the simple fact is indelibly coloured by the
historian's own interpretation and evaluation of the event.
The relativist's belief, however, that the historian's
judgments, determined as they are by attitudes conditioned
both in personal psychological ways and by society, are
somehow valid only for a particular society and age (that
is, the society and age in which the historian writes),
and that they have nothing absolute about them but v/ill be
superseded by the judgments of the next generation, leads
too easily to the assertion that objective and permanent
historical truth is consequently unattainable. It must be
made clear, therefore, that the argument claiming that what
the historian says is necessarily conditioned by his own
position in history does not of itself entail that there
can be no such thing as a historical account of enduring
value. History is essentially seen with the eyes of the
present; it cannot be known absolutely or transcendentally.
But what is there that can be? As Mandelbaum observes:
In the knowing relationship we are always aware that
the object-to-be-known transcends that which we know
concerning it; we seek to grasp the nature of an object
14- Op. cit. , B/f..
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To say that history cannot be known absolutely is not to
say that our necessarily incomplete and relative knowledge
of it is in some way actually incorrect, or invalid, or
impermanent; and certainly it is not inferior to other
forms of our knowledge about the world. (That the
relativist's statement itself, according to the terras of
its own argument, may make no claims to be objectively
true, proves nothing positive, of course, and so need not
be considered in support of objectivity.)
Far from having the dire effects on the absolute
integrity of the historian imagined by many of the
relativists, historical conditioning may simply cause each
generation to see different aspects of past events, or to
see past events in different lights. It does not neces¬
sarily mean that, considered historically, the same period
presents quite different events to each generation, so
that each account is consequently in conflict with previous
accounts, postulating new historical facts or understanding
the same events in an incompatibly different way. 'There
will always be a connection between the way in which men
contemplate the past,' wrote Buckle, 'and the way in which
they contemplate the present. '15 This is quite true; but
the contemplation of the same historical events in differ¬
ent ways and from different points of view, if carried out
according to sound principles of historical methodology,
should not produce conflicting accounts of those events
(although they may produce conflicting evaluative judgments
1$. Henry Thomas Buckle: History of Civilization in
England (London, 1903), I, 237*
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of them) any more than the perception of objects from
different viewpoints should result in incompatible
descriptions of those objects. Indeed, if a purely
pragmatic outlook is taken, reading accounts of historical
events from other viewpoints should result for us in a
better knowledge of those events, just as a description of
a physical object from another perceptual viewpoint (if we
understand that viewpoint) gives us a more complete know¬
ledge of that object, and may additionally help us to make
corrections to our own account, although, as I shall show
later, we do not succeed in creating an objective account
in this way, by comparing different accounts from many
viewpoints. Of course, to talk like this is, in the end,
to indulge in an oversimplification of the problems
involved: problems of conditioning regarding a historical
viewpoint are vastly more complex than those regarding a
perceptual viewpoint, so it will be necessary to consider
in detail the various sorts of historical conditioning and
various examples of their aspects as they are relevant to
problems of relativism.
3. Conditioning as a source of historical values
In the difficulties that are raised, the considera¬
tion of several different classes of problems seems to
provide support for the person who objects to historical
work being centred on the individual historian. One class
consists of problems of valuational relativism, or problems
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which relate directly to the historian's scheme of values
or conditioning.
Conditioning may be either social or psychological,
although the latter kind is often given little attention
by relativists. Even so, it must be considered, for it
can obviously have results for historical work at least as
important as those of social conditioning. Personality
can turn out to be an important element in a historical
narrative, as Elton has recently written, for 'in trying
to criticize received narrative histories and their like,
the historian must understand both the social conditioning
and the personal qualities of the man who produced this
evidence for him'. Nevertheless, relativists concentrate
their attention on the social conditioning of the historian
and do not concern themselves greatly with his psycho¬
logical conditioning. They seem to hold, more or less
implicitly, that serious relativist problems worthy of
philosophical consideration arise in society rather than
in the individual. Owing to the historian's importance as
an individual in historiographical work, I do not believe
that the results of psychological conditioning in a his¬
torical narrative can be discounted entirely; and although
group- or committee-history would solve most overt prob¬
lems of psychological relativism, relativists do not often
come out directly against the individual historian as such.
Yet the "academic" position of the historian will be at
bottom the result of an interaction, and a continuing one
throughout his work, between his individual psychology,
16. Political history: principles and practice (London,
1970), 7b"
136
through his singular personality as intermediary, and the
society of which he is part.
The reasons that relativists give so much weight to
the social orientation of the historian and so little to
his psychological make-up are not immediately clear. One
reason may be found, perhaps, in the positive and con¬
structive aspect of the relativist's argument. The rela¬
tivist is constructive in so far as he says that written
history is relative to the historian's time and place, but
that, all the same, the historian, holding this fact always
in mind as one of his basic principles, must carry on writh
his work; the historian's work, many relativists claim,
will be the better for his recognition of the limits of its
validity and significance. Social relativism, it appears,
can lead to a positive and constructive historical outlook.
Psychological relativism, obviously, could not lead us to
formulate any cogent positive argument, for in the end it
must lead to the conclusion that any supposedly objective
body of thought vri.ll in reality be nothing more than a
worthless intellectual chaos, manifesting a pervasive
historical solipsism.
Another reason, however, may be found in the general
dislike for arguments about psychological features of an
individual with regard to his intellectual work. It is
clear that in our own society (although by no means is
this true of all societies present and past) there is a
certain distaste for bringing some kinds of psychological
questions about an individual into intellectual discussions,
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as if psychological factors in the genesis of an intellec¬
tual position could be discounted, and arguments based on
a consideration of those factors (or even simply including
them as points to be examined), might be deemed of no ac¬
count and perhaps quite disreputable. It is an attitude
that may be connected with the widespread feeling that
personalities should not be brought into intellectual ar¬
guments. Nevertheless, it is to be maintained that if
those arguments which are based on the social grounds of
an intellectual position are in order, so are those argu¬
ments which are based on a consideration of its psycho¬
logical grounds. It seems in any case an arbitrary and
even absurd intellectual limitation to say that ideas
should be examined in their own right, without reference
to any extraneous factors that may have had some direct
bearing on the formulation of the argument behind them.
And it is still more arbitrary for the effect of some of
these factors (the social ones) to be considered, while
the effect of others (the psychological ones) is ignored:
the effects may be substantially similar and may well have
an equivalent significance. A psychoanalytic examination
of an ostensibly intellectual argument may provide us, if
not with a sufficient basis for the rejection of the argu¬
ment, then at least with very strong support for an oppos¬
ing position. The apparently irrational aspects of man
cannot be ignored even when fully rational aspects are
being examined. To make a separation of the rational and
the irrational in any discussion of man is to create an
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abstraction, which, however fine it may be as a pure con¬
struction for intellectual discussion, will fail to be
directly applicable to the case where the real problem is
found; the rational and the irrational, reason and ration¬
alization, can prove to be inseparable in the loftiest
thought. In the end, the implicit foundations underlying
the social determination of an intellectual position may
be as irrational as those which underlie its psychological
determination. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that
as the origin of an intellectual position has a basis in
both psychological and social factors, so too its accepta¬
bility to any individual will be psychologically, as well
as socially, conditioned.
In their allowance and use of arguments based on
social conditioning while they ignore or reject arguments
based on psychological conditioning, the relativists make
the implied assumption that value-judgments and whatever
effect they may have on objectivity can be overcome. In
effect, they contribute to the refutation of their own
position. Relativists agree that there can be a (compara¬
tive) objectivity within a society — an intersubjective
agreement not simply about facts but about values as
well -- despite the evident fact that different individ¬
uals have different values, make use of these values in,
among other things, accounts of fact or involving facts,
and may well, because of this, be misunderstood or may, if
they are historians, lead their readers into error. Yet,
since relativists do not wish to be solipsists, they do
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not argue that problems arising in this connection cannot
be solved; they would agree that in one way or another,
one should be able to compensate for individual judgments
and understand for oneself what sort of account might be
17
"objective" for any particular society." Within any one
society we can understand other individuals simply because
they are not irremediably cut off from us as a solipsist
might hold. Nevertheless, relativists, while they would
probably dismiss individual solipsism, embrace what might
well be called a type of societal solipsism. Thus we can¬
not know what "supra-social" objective truth might be —
the argument might run -- because we always see history
with the values of a particular society. And the idea has
"been put forward that knowledge (as such) is itself so¬
cially determined and orientated, and, more, that this
represents the final position of human knowledge, that
societies (in a stricter sense than I am generally using
the term in in this chapter) provide the setting or context
of knowledge. Professor Walsh observes that
once we move outside the sphere of necessary truth, no
contradiction will be involved in rejecting any given
set of standards; there will be nothing internally to
commend any one consistent set against any other. In
determining what is correct here we accordingly have no
alternative but to consider v/hat standards are in fact
17* It is to be understood that "society" is a very loose
term in this context. It can be taken with its literal
sociological meaning; but it can also be understood to
refer to any group sharing common social values and a
distinctive world-outlook. Since in any group only some
values are relevant socially, psychological differences
that could lead to differences in values relevant social¬
ly in other groups can be ignored. "Society" here,
therefore, could be, for example, Western, Islamic,
Marxist-Leninist, or Protestant.
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applied by those who work or have worked in the area
concerned. The sharp contrast between what is accep¬
table and what is accepted loses its force in these
circumstances, for in deciding what to accept we neces¬
sarily have an eye to what is in practice accepted.1$
If knowledge is only truly to be accounted knowledge
(or to be defined as knowledge) through its social context,
then, specifically, our knowledge of the values of other
societies is similarly to find its essence and justifica¬
tion through our own social setting and thus through our
own values. In one way or another the values of other
societies must be seen in terms of our own. It must fol¬
low that any work of compensation for the bias to be found
in different accounts cannot even be begun; for we can
never find out quite what the "real" point of view of an¬
other society is. The relativists' solipsism would hold
that one society is irremediably cut off from another;
other societies are for us interpretable only in terms of
our own society, and not in their own terms, or in neutral
or objective terms (except in so far as "objective" is
taken to mean "objective within a society's accepted body
of knovKLedge") However, to view societies in this fashion
is patently anti-historical, for it is to see societies
ultimately as quite separate and discrete. Yet, with a
few exceptions, all human societies have a record of contacts
IS. "Knowledge in its social setting", Mind,'SO (1971), 336.
19. The existence of different points of view contempora¬
neously in the same society, as, for example, with
Catholics and Protestants, is no argument against the
relativist's position. The relativist could hold that
mutual understanding might be reached on a different
level, that is, in a higher, common scheme of values,
in this case the Christian.
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with other societies, involving influences, overlaps, and
exchanges. Where societies have been in close contact,
one society has frequently dominated the other; as time
has passed and conditions have changed, one society has
frequently been transformed into another. Societies do
not change in discrete jumps; they are not distinguishable
by means of a sharply defined border. Through historical
understanding we shall find that other societies share
some of our values, and this will provide us with, so to
speak, a "way in" to those societies and to an understand¬
ing of the way in which they saw, or still see, the world.
As we succeed in compensating for differences in values
between individuals and come to understand what is an
"objective" account within a society, so, with a sufficient
but not unattainable comprehension, we most certainly can
set out to achieve, having come to grasp its nature, at
least a partial balance of the differences between socie¬
ties, and formulate an account which, although not quite
an "objective" account for humanity, has taken notice of
the many ways in which the same events can be interpreted
by humanity. In any case, to strive for an objectivity
beyond this would be pointless, for history takes its
references from the human world and not from a world of
objects.
What I hope to show, therefore, is that social
relativism and psychological relativism must be accepted
or rejected together: either the relativist must be ready
to admit the total collapse for history of any hopes in
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respect of substantial non-subjective validity, not only
absolutely for all time, but also even within one particu¬
lar society, and to agree too that in history nothing can
count for truth; or he must reject the conclusions of his
relativistic arguments, in so far as they deny a validity
that can claim to be unrestrictedly absolute, the conclu¬
sions both of those arguments with a psychological refer¬
ence and of those with a social reference, and accept that
historical truth can be known through the historian's
valuational judgments and his value-conditioned judgments.
Social relativism and some of its attendant problems
will be considered first. The relativist's common objec¬
tions in this connection have as their basis the point
that each age and each society see history in their own
ways. It is to be emphasized here that I am not talking
about the more or less conscious surface preconceptions
that enter into our judgments — I shall refer to these
later — but rather to the actual deep-rooted basis of our
outlook on the world — to that kind of gulf which, for
example, at its most extreme separates the way we organize
our knowledge in twentieth-century English culture from
the way in which, say, Bede or Alcuin looked at the world
twelve hundred years ago. Such a gulf is not created by
the sort of preconceptions which a historian can come
close to eliminating by conscientious attention to the way
in which he is expressing himself; it has its origins at
the very core of the society in which a historian lives.
Indeed, one cannot even begin to conceive how historians
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might set out to resolve such a truly cosmic disagreement.
The problems found in the differing conceptions that can
underlie history can be illustrated by the example of
"historical truth". The problem of "truth" and its meaning
for the historians of antiquity is sometimes disposed of
by classifying the classical conception of truth in history
as "bad" or "faulty". This is unfair, for the classical
historians were not, for the most part, working to the
same ideal of history as we possess. Thucydides was the
only historian to have our ideal of factual truth; and
even he felt free to invent speeches that could not possibly
have been made, and which sometimes may not even have been
typical of the person to whom they are attributed. Later
classical historians knew both of Thucydides and of his
ideal of factual truth in history, but chose not to attempt
a realization of that ideal in their historical writing.
The question to be asked about classical and medieval
writers of purportedly historical accounts is not why they
failed to conceive of factual truth in history, but why,
having such a concept, for the purposes of writing history
they chose to disregard it in favour of a different concept
of truth.
That our judgments about history, that our assessment
of importance or lack of importance regarding different
events or personages in history, are relative to the
society that has conditioned us, is not to be disputed.
What is to be decided is whether such relativism actually
impairs history so severely that we are compelled to accept
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the sceptic's position. We may find the answer to this
problem in the work of Karl Mannheim. Without agreeing
with the general context of the following passage or with
many of the wide-ranging and significant conclusions to
which this position of Mannheim's partly contributes, the
point made here provides the key to an understanding of
what relativism proper really entails. Mannheim distin¬
guishes between two separate solutions to 'the problem of
what constitutes reliable knowledge', the one is 'rela-
tionism', the other 'relativism'.
Relativism is a product of the modern historical-
sociological procedure which is based on the recogni¬
tion that all historical thinking is bound up with the
concrete position in life of the thinker. ... This
older type of thought [sc. relativism], which regarded
such examples as the model of all thought, was neces¬
sarily led to the rejection of all those forms of
knowledge which were dependent upon the subjective
standpoint and the social situation of the knower, and
which were, hence, merely "relative". ...
... Actually, epistemology is as intimately enmeshed
in the social process as is the totality of our think¬
ing, and it will make progress to the extent that it
can master the complications arising out of the chang¬
ing structure of thought.
A modern theory of knowledge which takes account of
the relational as distinct from the merely relative
character of all historical knowledge must start with
the assumption that there are spheres of thought in
which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truth
existing independently of the values and position of
the subject and unrelated to the social context. Even
a god could not formulate a proposition on historical
subjects like 2x2 = 4, for what is intelligible in
history can be formulated only with reference to prob¬
lems and conceptual constructions which themselves
arise in the flux of historical experience.20
Once it is clear that we cannot formulate historical
statements, or indeed any statement with a historical con¬
tent, which do not have a relational nature, ;ve see that
20. Karl Mannheim: Ideology and Utooia (London, I960),
70-71.
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what the opponents of relativism are in some cases looking
for is something that is, through our human nature, incon¬
ceivable. Historical judgments by definition (in their
very nature) cannot be objective in such a way: it is
therefore pointless to talk as if they could be. Histori¬
cal objectivity is something other than any notional ob¬
jectivity of judgment. Even the simplest accounts contain
words, phrases, and statements which already contain pre¬
suppositions fundamental to a human society and an intel¬
lectual position within that society, and which are,
21because of that, unequivocally relative. Even so, what
has already been said with reference to the social context
of knowledge is not to be forgotten. That we see things
from our own particular viewpoint does not mean that we
cannot fully and fairly understand other societies. The
presuppositions of our knowledge do not mean that we are
cut off from other societies. Accepting our own presup¬
positions does not entail that we cannot understand the
presuppositions of others.
Sometimes it may happen, when it is believed that
objectivity can only be attained through the exclusion of
values, that one is asked whether "objectivity" implies
that one should talk of, say, Hitler's concentration camps
in words that do not automatically and unambiguously con-
22
demn them. That the idea of using neutral language in
21. I do not continue to make the distinction between
"relativism" and "relationism" with those expressions,
as they are not terms widely found in other writers.
22. I must stress that I am not referring to explicit
moral judgments here, but rather to the general (relative)
14^
such an instance should be quite abhorrent goes to show
precisely ho\tf deep the ostensible values of our social
upbringing go; the fact that we can consider the idea of a
neutral, or even favourable, account of such matters,
which would state the physical truth with equal correct¬
ness, shows that our position is a purely relative one.
4. Implicit and explicit value-judgments
The solution to the problem of the judgments that
are implicit in the language the historian uses and their
significance for objectivity is largely a straightforward
one. As I shall show below, moral judgments do not form
part of historical truth: they have no purportedly factual
content to be criticized. Corresponding judgments which
are implicit in the historian's language are not them¬
selves factual either. They form an emotional (valua-
tional) charge on the factual part of the concepts the
historian uses. The factual part is that part which can
be true or false and which may lay claim to objectivity.
That part of the concept which is strictly a "valuational
charge" on it cannot of itself be true or false (although
it may be true or false through its dependence on certain
facts) and cannot therefore claim objectivity. Values
cannot and do not seek to be objective: they have their
"philosophy of life" that is implicit in any account.
The term "concentration camp" itself has already de¬
veloped as a sign or symptom of bias. The problem here
quickly identifies itself with the problem of the
historian's language, which is discussed later.
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origin and their continued existence in an individual or
in a society.
An extended example may be in order here to illus¬
trate what I "trying to say. "Usurp" is a word that
bears a strong valuational charge. To put the judgment,
implicit in the word, in an explicit way, we might change
a statement like "The generals usurped power" into "The
generals seized power illegitimately". There need be no
disagreement over the facts which lead to the description
of such-and-such a set of acts as a usurpation of power.
Obviously, the description of an act as a "usurpation"
may indeed be false because the historian has the facts
wrong. If he agrees with the facts as corrected, he will
undoubtedly withdraw the word "usurpation". But, if it is
granted that statements of fact are correct, a historian
might say that "usurpation" was a correct description of
what happened because the effective acts were illegitimate,
whereas a second historian might say that the generals —
it is true -- committed these acts, but that these acts
were not illegitimate, either directly because due legal
steps were taken to legitimize them, or, more controver¬
sially, because the acts were justified, in international
law, perhaps, or in terms of "higher" principles, or as a
consequence of the anarchic state of the country. There¬
fore, the second historian might conclude, what the generals
did in no way amounted to a usurpation and hence was not
illegitimate. Now, to describe acts as illegitimate is
dependent either on a judgment of the historian, and
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consequently — usually -- of his society, or on a judg¬
ment of the society in which the acts took place, that is
to say, they are illegitimate according to the laws of
that society. Most people would readily agree that the
first sort of judgment, by the present historian or soci¬
ety, is a value-judgment relative to present ideas and
attitudes. The most obvious exceptions here are those
persons who make historical judgments in the light of
their religious, or quasi-religious, beliefs, and wTho
would therefore claim that their judgments are timeless
and objective. The second sort of judgment, on the other
hand, arguably makes a factual claim. This, nevertheless,
is not the case: actions perfectly legitimate within a
society may later be held to be illegitimate; and of
course, actually illegitimate acts are often legitimized
at a later time within the same society; clearly this
provides an additional example of a relative value-judg¬
ment within a society. In consequence, we may say that
the historian's judgment need not correspond either to the
judgments of his own society or to those of the society
about which he happens to be writing: there can be no es¬
tablished "objective norm" for a historian's behaviour in
this regard.
Of course, if it is made clear that "illegitimate"
as used in an account is to be understood to mean some¬
thing like "illegitimate according to the laws of the so¬
ciety under study" then "usurp" in this context will be an
entirely factual word with a reference internal to the
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account, and involving no judgment on the historian's
part. The historian must make it apparent that he is
claiming to do no more than this: he should, if he asserts
a factual use of "usurp", make statements of the form, for
example: "Constitutionally the generals' actions were a
usurpation of power."
A similar sort of criticism, parallel to the criti¬
cism of implicit judgments, can be made about explicit
valuational judgments, since these differ only in their
explicitness from those judgments that are implicit in a
word through the "charge" it bears. (Or rather, one
should say, perhaps, that the historian's attitude becomes
an overt one in explicit judgments.) To judge an action
morally as wicked, for instance, has no intrinsic factual
relevance and does not of itself and necessarily determine
the truth of a historical narrative. Thus, in principle,
an individual historian may make all the moral judgments
he wishes, so long as any attempt to put forward a moral
judgment in respect of his subject as a whole (as, say,
that King John was a wicked ruler) does not lead him to
tamper with the facts, treating scurrilous rumours as
statements of hard fact and suppressing any well-estab¬
lished facts that might encourage us to view his subject
23
more tolerantly.
23. As examples of valuational judgments I shall be
usually making reference to moral judgments. These are
the judgments that are typically present in written
history. The historian may well make other sorts of
valuation (e.g., aesthetic), but these are comparative¬
ly rare. In any case, similar arguments apply with
regard to all types of valuational judgments.
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The results of social conditioning, in the presence
of relative judgments, are to be found in every historical
account. They cannot be eliminated, simply for the reason
that so much of our language -- and particularly that part
of it which relates to human actions, the first subject-
matter of history -- consists of words which, while having
a central core of factual reference, bear a positive or
pi
negative valuational charge. ^ Indeed, although it has no
factual significance, the presence of such valuational
language is ineliminable from narrative history whether it
is found there implicitly or explicitly, as I intend to
25
demonstrate later. More, it is, as I shall argue,
central to a genuine understanding of the historical past.
The presence of psychologically conditioned judg¬
ments, more immediately relative to the individual rather
than to the historian's society, is also essential to
history; this will be seen to be especially the case when
the individuality of a single historian is understood as
essential to narrative history. There is, however, an
important difference to be observed between social and
psychological conditioning.
24. The problem to which I am referring here is of
course a well-known and basic one in the field of
ethics. By some writers, such as Charles L. Stevenson
in Ethics and language it is treated under the heading
of "persuasive definitions"; by others, notably R.M.
Hare in The language of morals and Freedom and reason,
it is discussed as the problem of "prescriptive
meaning". I look at the problem more fully later,
in section 6.
25. See below, sects. 6 and B, and chap. VIII, sect. B.
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The results of the social conditioning of the his¬
torian, if he is part of the same society as his reader,
will be something that any educated reader can always
understand. We may say that the values of the historian
and the reader are in alignment. This is what makes the
judgments to be found in the history of contemporary
writers in a certain way uninjurious. Where the attentive
reader is not conscious of the historian's socially con¬
ditioned assumptions, it is because they form an inte¬
grated part of his own assumptions; in so far as this
takes place, at least, the reader's understanding can be
taken to be integrated with the historian's understanding.
Where the reader is conscious of the historian's valua-
tional judgments, he will come to understand them, and
then he will either agree or disagree with them or simply
accept them, which implies that he must find them in
accord with his own point of view in other matters.
Unfortunately, where the historian is not one with
the reader in period and society, where the historian's
values and those of the reader are not in alignment,
difficulties must occur: the reader, in encountering evi¬
dence of a certain valuation, by the historian of another
age or society, of individuals, or events, or institutions,
may completely fail to understand that valuation; or,
worse, he may misunderstand it, much as we may frequently
misunderstand the Greek concept of "<xpeTTj" or the Renas¬
cence concept of "vertu". Now, the same sort of misunder¬
standing can also take place about those judgments that
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are psychologically conditioned in the case of a reader
and a contemporary historian. Such judgments may be un¬
derstood in their social way when a peculiar individual
understanding is necessary, or the reader may just fail to
comprehend what it is that the historian is trying to say
about the subject of his narrative.
It must be stressed that while we are thinking about
the problems raised for history by values and value-judg¬
ments, we must continually bear in mind that the valua-
tional judgments in question do not of themselves endanger
necessarily the factual correctness and truth of historical
accounts. Such judgments do not intrinsically bring ob¬
jectivity into question, for there cannot be anything
objective about them in the sense of factual objectivity.
How we judge a historical event or personage is not a
factual matter: it is not, that is to say, something that
is open to justification through objective considerations
rather than subjective attitudes.
Valuational judgments do not necessarily affect the
factual truth of an account; but of course they can in
practice seriously distort fact. Our own moral attitudes
may distort our knowledge of the past: as we read a work
of history we may unconsciously not take in some fact that
does not fit in with our own preconceptions and presump¬
tions, or we may unconsciously belittle important facts,
aggrandize unimportant individuals, seeing them, perhaps,
with a part in affairs which was not in actuality theirs,
postulate for ourselves facts for which there is no
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objective evidence but which provide, in our terms, a
satisfactory explanation for some event, or bring together
in an unlikely but satisfactory relationship different and
remote events. Just as the reader of the narrative can do
this as he reads, so the historian can do the same sort of
thing as he writes the narrative. Now, when the reader is
not aware of the valuational bias of the historian or when
that valuational bias is not in accord with his own (or
when it is opposed to his, but not opposed in terms that he
understands through the society in which he lives ), he
may very well be found to be taking in facts that are dis¬
torted through his unawareness, without either correcting
or disputing them.
The historian's valuation is not necessarily signif¬
icant with respect to the factual truth of his statements.
In practice, however, valuation must almost inevitably
affect the facts of the past as they are recounted in
history, so that accounts of one event by different persons
26. Two persons' opinions may be opposed, but in agreed
terms: bias of this nature will not be hazardous. For
example, there is much talk at present of "our demo¬
cratic way of life". However much we may feel uneasy
that the modern concept of "democracy" has a connection
with the original concept that is becoming ever more
tenuous and vague while the high value associated with
that original concept is retained so that people are
induced to value greatly our present political set-up,
we do nevertheless understand what the use of the word
is meant to denote. Thus we shall be misled to no
greater extent by the arguments of Labour politicians
than by those of Conservative politicians, by the argu¬
ments of the supporters of democracy than by those of
its opponents; for all these people will be arguing
about democracy in the same terms. However, we may be
seriously misled by a writer who, in the context of
the twentieth century, uses the word "democracy" with
its authentic and original meaning without actually
specifying carefully that he is doing so.
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vary in factual detail (without contradicting each other)
and in interpretational conclusions. Is valuation, then,
truly an essential part of history, something that is
essential to the narrative, something that must -- in
reality -- significantly affect the historian's facts?
Or, in order to prevent as far as possible even the
slightest distortion of facts, should we strive to exclude
valuation from history altogether?
It is definitely the case that there are many points
in their common subject-matter on which all historians
agree. Yet all historical accounts differ in the way the
facts are presented; and the differences between various
accounts are greater when the accounts originate in
different cultures, different periods, or different
ideologies. Valuation of itself does not change facts;
nor does it necessarily affect the truth and validity of a
historical narrative. However, if valuation of a moral,
cultural, aesthetic, or similar kind is seen as essential
to a historical narrative and, even more strongly, as part
of the very core of history, somewhere at some time
readers will be led into error about historical fact, not
necessarily because of a lack of objectivity on the part
of the individual historian but because of a lack of
objectivity on their own part. How, then, are moral
judgments a historian's business?
The moral position of the historian can be shown to
be logically a gloss on historical fact and not an integral
part of it. But what is the real position of valuational
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judgments in historical work? Many historians and philos¬
ophers see moral judgments (and, mutatis mutandis, what is
said about moral judgments can be applied to related sorts
of valuation) as a very central part of the historian's
task. Indeed, a moral position is so central a part of
written history for some thinkers that objectivity in his¬
tory must rest in the end on the attainment of a final,
universally accepted moral position; Professor Walsh, for
example, suggests that the final (and only) solution to
the problem of historical objectivity is 'the ultimate
attainment of a single historical point of view, a state¬
ment of presuppositions which all historians must be pre-
27
pared to accept'. But this, as Professor Walsh himself
points out, would have ramifications far beyond the con¬
fines of historical theory narrowly considered, and would
require not only a straightening-out of the historian's
factual knowledge but also a standardization of our moral
and metaphysical ideas. Many relativists too point out
that objectivity in history would require an agreement on
common interpretational standards among historians.
As a corollary of the central place of moral judg¬
ments in history Professor Walsh indicates that the his¬
torian needs final knowledge of how people ought to behave
as well as knowledge of how they in fact do behave. For
objectivity in history, the argument runs, there must be
an absolute standard of morality; and yet it is difficult
to understand how a set of moral standards could ever be
27• Philosophy of history: an introduction (New York,
I960), 118.
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shown to be absolute and final, let alone objectively-
grounded. If there can be such a concept as moral objec¬
tivity, and if moral judgments are admitted as a primary
and somehow factual part of the historian's task, it will
be a necessary consequence that an account cannot be
objective unless the elusive moral standards have been
found. The possibility of a final moral standard is a
questionable one, and in any case properly the province of
ethical studies. The far-reaching consequences of a pro¬
gramme of standardization not only for ethics but for our
world-view itself suggest that it could prove more imme¬
diately productive to approach the problem of historical
objectivity in another way. It would be better, there¬
fore, to discuss the role of morals in history in a way
that is not affected by a problem which is really one of
the basic problems of philosophical ethics. Consequently,
in the next two sections I shall look at valuational judg¬
ments in history with reference only to our present situa¬
tion where differing moral standards are apparently in
competition with one another.
5. Explicit moral judgments
Historians make moral judgments; and in some form
moral judgments do have a place in narrative history.
They do not, however, have an inherent factual relevance
and so we do not find, with regard to overtly made judg¬
ments, that objectivity is placed in question. Explicitly
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divorced as they are from factual statements, they do not
lead to factual confusion and distortion. When it is un¬
derstood that moral judgments are not directly part of
history as such, that they are not actually part of the
"material" of history, then a good number of relativist
problems in history will be avoided.
It is important to establish and clarify the place
of overt moral judgments in history, and it is therefore
necessary to mention here arguments for and against overt
judgments by the historian. A strong case can be made for
the assertion that in his account the historian should
make moral judgments in their own right: a statement in
support of the central role of valuational judgments in
history is made by Sir Isaiah Berlin (among others).
We are told that it is foolish to judge Charlemagne
or Napoleon, or Genghis Khan or Hitler or Stalin for
their massacres. For that is at most a comment upon
ourselves and not upon "the facts". Likewise we are
told that it is absurd to praise those benefactors of
humanity whom the followers of Comte so faithfully
celebrated, or at least that to do so is not our
business as historians: because as historians our
categories are neutral and differ from our categories
as ordinary human beings as those of chemists
undeniably do. ... We are further told that we should
practise such objectivity out of respect for some
imaginary scientific canon which distinguishes between
facts and values very sharply, so sharply that it
enables us to regard the former as being objective,
"inexorable" and therefore self-justifying, and the
latter merely as a subjective gloss upon events —
due to the moment, the milieu, the individual
temperament — and consequently unworthy of serious
scholarship, of the great hard edifice of dispassionate
historical construction. To this we can only
answer that to accept this doctrine is to do violence
to the basic notions of our morality, to misrepresent
our sense of our past, and to ignore the most general
concepts and categories of normal thought.28
2$. Historical inevitability (London, 1954), 77.
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It is simply not the case, however, that if a histo¬
rian refrains from making a moral judgment, our ideas of
morality are shocked, or that, when we look at a sample
of actual neutral history, we necessarily feel that we
should be. Neutrality (without the note of disapproval
which is sometimes carried by that word) is a feature of
much historical writing. Here is one example of a scene
which must clearly horrify the reader, described by a his¬
torian quite evenly and with an almost complete detachment
in regard to explicit or implicit moral judgments; but no
violence is done by this attitude to our moral sensi¬
bilities.
Stephen's vengeance -- directed by Spoleto -- turned
on the memory, reputation and remains of Formosus and
on his followers. In February or March 697 a synod
was assembled in the presence of the Emperor Lambert
and his mother. The tomb of Formosus was broken open
and his corpse, dressed in full pontificals, was placed
in a chair as defendant before the synod; a deacon
stood by as his advocate. The grisly scene was fully
played out. Pope Stephen shrieked his accusations at
the corpse — of usurping as Bishop of Porto the papal
throne, of his enmity against John VIII, of his
ambition and of his re-entry into Rome while the ban
still ran against him. The wretched deacon offered no
defence for his principal and Formosus was condeinned.
Three fingers of his right hand, the hand of bene¬
diction, were cut off, his vestments stripped from
him, and his corpse thrown into the river.29
The historian need make no moral judgments: the factual
account as it stands is sufficient for the reader to form
his own judgments. Indeed, if the historian is confident
of his own moral values, he should feel that a clear,
factual account will be sufficient to awaken the reader's
own moral susceptibilities, unless, as may indeed be the
29. Peter Llewellyn: Rome in the Dark Ages (London,
1971), 292.
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case, he is ready to suspect in his readers the presence
of a certain moral lethargy.
Berlin's line of thought, as E. H. Carr points out,
makes the historian a kind of hanging judge. Quite
obviously Berlin is presenting us with a most extreme
version of the case for moral judgments in history. He
does not seem to allow that one can reject a full
conjunction of facts and values without thereby endorsing
their complete separation. But no more should be said for
the moment than that a moral judgment about a particular
historical fact is not a part of factual history -- that
is to say, it does not belong to that part of history for
which there is the possibility of objectivity.
Carr observes quite openly that the historian is not
concerned with the everyday sort of moral judgment, that,
say, Henry VIII was a bad husband. But he may be concerned
to pass a more general judgment on particular actions and
events as they fit into the whole of his historical
narrative. In other words, Carr maintains that it is no
business of the historian to denounce individuals, while
he goes on to say that the historian should consider it
part of his task to pronounce judgments about the events,
policies and institutions that are to be found in history.
Max Weber refers to "the masterless slavery in which
capitalism enmeshes the worker or the debtor", and
rightly argues that the historian should pass moral
judgments on the institutions, but not on the individuals
who created it. The historian does not stand in judgment
on an individual oriental despot. But he is not required
to remain- indifferent.and impartial between, say, oriental
despotism and the institutions of Periclean Athens. He
will not pass judgment on the individual slave-owner.
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But this does not prevent him from condemning a slave-
owning society.30
Logically, Carr's position is untenable. It could be true
that history proper was not concerned with individuals as
such, so that moral judgments about individuals were not
so much out of order as an irrelevant diversion. Yet, for
Carr -- and with this I agree -- it is the historian's
task to write about individuals as well as institutions.
If history is centrally concerned with individuals, to
allow the possibility of moral judgments on institutions
while not allowing their possibility with regard to
individuals -- for, as historical particulars, individuals
and institutions have the same logical status —- seems to
require adjudication of an arbitrary nature. If moral
judgments are allowed in history, it can only be as wrong
to pass judgment on Henry VIII's private life as it is to
go into unnecessarily detailed and historically irrelevant
31
descriptions of that private life. Histories about
individuals, that is, biographies, must surely even on
Carr's principles admit moral judgments about individuals.
It must be the case that if we can make moral judgments
about institutions and so on, then, where they are
appropriate, we can make moral judgments about individuals.
In any case, even if Carr should be advocating a relatively
narrow conception of history, excluding biographies and
biographical tendencies in history proper, to pass judgment
30. What is history? (Harmondsworth, 1964), 7S-79.
31. Historical "irrelevance", of course, is determined by
context, not by any intrinsic property of the "facts"
themselves.
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on an institution is inevitably to pass judgment by impli¬
cation on the individuals who created it, and on those who
willingly and knowingly took part in its activities or ac¬
ceded to its consequences. If there is no judgment on in¬
dividuals implied in such a case, then as a moral judgment
it is meaningless. It must be said that in condemning a
slave-owning society the historian is not condemning every
individual slave-owner, but he is surely condemning most
slave-owners, or slave-ovmers in general.
To advocate the suppression of moral judgments in
historical work need not be considered unmoral. Sir Her¬
bert Butterfield, who believes that 'life is a moral
matter every inch of the way' (although if we read his
remark au pied de la lettre it is hard to understand how
that part of life which is the study of history can be ex¬
cluded from the moral life), is yet prepared to assert
that in history
moral judgments on human beings are by their nature
irrelevant to the enquiry and alien to the intellectual
realm of scientific history. .. . [T]hese moral judgments
must be recognized to be an actual hindrance to enquiry
and reconstruction; they are in fact the principal
reason why investigation is so often brought to a
premature halt.32
Butterfield presents, indeed, a good summary of the case
that can be made against the making of moral judgments in
history altogether:
[T]he historian who leaves the realm of explanation
and description, and moves into the world of moral
judgments, is in reality trying to take upon himself
(and to claim for his intellectual system) a new
dimension. Very quickly this has its effect on the
32. "Moral judgments in history", in Meyerhoff: op. cit.,
230. ~ "
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whole shape and setting which he gives to the course of
things in time, and on his whole conception of the
drama of human life in history. The morality comes to
be itforked into the organisation of the narrative and the
structure of the historical scene in a manner that is
illegitimate. ... [T]he whole historical fabric, at
whatever point we choose to observe it, is shot through
with the colourful contrast of divine right and
diabolical wrong. It transpires that the fabric is in
truth like a piece of shot silk, for the colour of its
parts seems to depend very largely on the way the
observer looks at them after all.33
However, despite Butterfield's arguments, there is
no need to exclude explicit moral judgments from a histo¬
rical narrative. Many historians do in fact make such
judgments. What must be borne in- mind is that the moral
judgments in a narrative are not intrinsically historical
in themselves -- they do not constitute knowledge of the
past, although they may contribute to an understanding of
the past — and their presence in written history does not
make them historical, or factual, or possibly objective.
So long as valuational judgments are explicit, and so long
as the historian does not select his facts in order to
depict a past that is in conformity with his judgments,
but rather remembers to treat the establishment of histo¬
rical facts as if that were an end in itself, judging the
past — institutions or individuals -- will not damage the
factual truthfulness of an account. There is no problem
for the reader of history if one historian of a certain
subject should say that action A was bad, while the second
historian (of the same subject) bluntly asserts the con¬
trary, that action A was good; what matters for history is
that they both agree that action A happened, and happened
33. Ibid. , 247.
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in a certain way, at a certain time, in a certain place.
That action A happened is the historical statement. Since
there is always a risk that moral judgments, and other
types of valuational judgments, will lead to the distortion
or suppression of historical facts by the historian, and
thus to a loss of objectivity, it would not be unnatural
for some historians to wish altogether to avoid making
explicit judgments.
6. Implicit valuational language
Whether they are socially or psychologically condi¬
tioned, explicit valuational judgments, just because of
their explicitness, need present no great problems for
objectivity in history. Implicit judgments, on the other
hand, cannot be removed from history, for they are com¬
pletely bound into the language we use when we talk about
man in society. This was clear to Aristotle when he
pointed out that
not every action nor every passion admits of a mean;
for some have names that already imply badness, e.g.,
spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions
adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike
things imply by their names that they are themselves
bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It
is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to
them; one must alx-/ays be wrong.34
And a most recent writer has looked at this problem in its
directly historiographical connections, observing:
Even very ordinary words over which there has been
less heat than with "liberal" or "tribal", can insinuate
34. The Uicomachean ethics, trans. Sir David Ross (London,
1954), 39 (1107al0).
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a moral tone though they may be correct descriptions
of events: "devious negotiations", "sinister moves",
"tolerant policy" or "wise statesmanship". In the
description of character or group actions imputations
of "irresponsibility", "fanaticism", "prejudice",
"justice", "honesty", "wisdom" or "enterprise",
easily suggest moral judgments. Such a list can be
extended almost indefinitely, showing words containing
moral evaluations, as well as being descriptive.35
Such value-charged words are, however, indispensable to
the true description of human actions. Carefully selected,
neutral and perhaps behavioural language ceases to charac¬
terize actions as specifically human. Our concepts about
human social behaviour {carrying various valuational
charges) cannot be changed to colder, more neutral,
"scientific" forms. Value-charged language is very much
a part of that historical "understanding" which figures
largely in a full account of historical explanation.36
The citation of some examples of passages where
valuational judgments are implicit in the language of the
writer would be helpful here. The following three ex¬
tracts are typical of the sort of writing that is often
encountered in finished narrative history. I have given a
few comments on each passage.
Enough has been said to indicate that the presence
of President Wilson in Paris was a serious misfortune.
It remains to consider how that misfortune arose. It
is no sufficient explanation to attribute to President
Wilson defects of character which precluded him from
viewing his own personality from a detached angle.
35. Ann Low-Beer: "Moral judgments in history and history
teaching", in Studies in the nature and teaching of
history, ed. W. H. Burston and D. Thompson (London,
1967), 141.
36. How "charged" language cannot be eliminated from
those narratives where it occurs, and what part it
plays in historical understanding are subjects treated
in the chapters on explanation and understanding.
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His decision was not unwise merely: it was also delib¬
erate; it was even obstinate. From a Constitutional
point of view the presence in Paris of the President
unaccompanied by a Committee duly appointed by the
Senate was at least open to question. Mr. Lansing and
Colonel House have both revealed with what grave pre¬
occupation they regarded this decision. The latter
attributes the determination of the President to a
conviction on his part that he was the appointed
mediator between man and man.37
Nicolson's language is heavily value-charged. The expres¬
sion "a serious misfortune" has explanatory intent: yet a
more neutral statement that Wilson's presence had, say,
"important adverse consequences" would have served, objec¬
tively speaking, equally well. "Defects of character" is
an expression that is a value-charged equivalent of a word
like "traits" with some additional connotations. That
these defects precluded Wilson from viewing his own per¬
sonality from a detached angle is both a (possibly) true
factual description of the President's psychology as well
as (given the way most twentieth-century Western people
look at these matters) an unfavourable judgment about the
President. "Unwise" is an explicit judgment; "deliberate"
is neutral; but "obstinate" is a very good example of a
word with both a factual, descriptive function and a high
value-content. Instead of "obstinate" the same factual sig¬
nification could have been found in the more or less
37. Harold Nicolson: Peacemaking 1919 (London, 1961), 73.
One possible objection to this passage needs to be dis¬
posed of: and that is, that Nicolson's book is not so
much "history" as "memoirs". This could only be a com¬
plaint on purely technical grounds. Although this pas¬
sage is by an individual who actually took part in
events (which is sometimes regarded almost as a dis¬
qualification for the modern historian, regardless of
praise for Thucydides), the events connected with the
Paris Peace Conference are treated seriously, deeply,
and "historically". The passage quoted must therefore
be undisputedly considered a passage of history.
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neutral "determined" or "strong-willed", in the mildly
approving "resolute", or the very favourable "steadfast"
3 3
or "unfaltering". The view that Nicolson himself has
taken of Wilson's presence in Paris is then justified by a
statement of the doubtful constitutional legitimacy of
Wilson's action of coming to Paris and a description of
the attitudes of two senior Americans. The whole passage
is both almost entirely factual and, in valuational terms,
heavily weighted.
In the following extract the tone is set not by
judgments of a moral order but by implicit valuation of a
different sort.
Most attacks upon the settlement [of the Paris peace
conference of 19193 during the following twenty years
arose from the disparity between the excessively high
hopes that men had pinned upon it and its tangle of
uninspiring compromises. Yet these compromises
inevitably arose in any attempt to apply rational or
moral principles to the fragmented territories of
Europe. Justice in such matters could never be other
than relative: yet the mood of men was perfectionist.
Considering the passions aroused by more than four
years of war, the intractability of the problems
themselves, and the unknown aftermath looming ahead,
the makers of the settlement achieved more than should
have seemed probable when they first met.39
The language of this passage still conveys approval and
disapproval -- even if it does not have a moral basis —
33. Other words may vary between being favourable,
unfavourable, or neutral according to the valuation
which inheres in their context. "Unyielding" is an
example of such a word. But the position is further
complicated by the fact that "unyielding" in the
context of a passage like the one above could well
be disapproving while at the same time the use of the
word could suggest that the general quality behind
the one instance of misguided behaviour was on the
whole to be approved.
39. David Thomson: World history from 1914 to 1950
(London, 1954), S3.
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in terms of what was and what was not reasonable, of what
might be and what might not be fairly expected. To speak
of "excessively" high hopes "pinned upon" the settlement
is to suggest expectations that had not been deeply
thought about and perhaps should have been. A "tangle" of
uninspiring compromises is a phrase that conveys a low
opinion on the part of the historian of the results of the
negotiations. "Fragmented" is not a word that every
historian would use to describe the new states that were
created according to the principle (supposedly) of national
self-determination. And Thomson's statement about justice
is very much a judgment of a valuational type.
Although professional historians might claim that it
is completely unrepresentative of "true" history and
especially of modern historical work, the following extract
is typical of much of the history, albeit often in a more
up-to-date form, with which laymen come into contact.
As the happiness of a future life is the great object
of religion, we may hear without surprise or scandal
that the introduction, or at least the abuse of
Christianity, had some influence on the decline and
fall of the Roman empire. The clergy successfully
preached the doctrines of patience and pusillanimity;
the active virtues of society were discouraged; and the
last remains of military spirit were buried in the
cloister: a large portion of public and private wealth
was consecrated to the specious demands of charity
and devotion; and the soldiers' pay was lavished on
the useless multitudes of both sexes who could only
plead the merits of abstinence and chastity. Faith,
zeal, curiosity, and more earthly passions of malice
and ambition, kindled the flame of theological discord;
the church, and even the state, were distracted by
religious factions, whose conflicts were sometimes
bloody and always implacable; the attention of the
emperors was diverted from camps to synods; the Roman
world was oppressed by a new species of tyranny; and
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the persecuted sects became the secret enemies of their
country.^
A passage like this needs no comments to indicate its
value-charged language. Gibbon, however, provides us with
a good illustration of how facts and values may be re¬
garded separately; and it is also a good example of how an
excessive intrusion of valuational judgments may come
close to distorting the truth. What can Gibbon mean, for
instance, when he says above that 'the last remains of
military spirit were buried in the cloister'? It is un¬
doubtedly a distortion to say that 'the attention of the
emperors was diverted from camps to synods', if by this
Gibbon really means to claim that they forgot about polit¬
ical and military necessities.
Obviously, valuational judgments must not be allowed
to dominate a narrative to the extent that its factual
truthfulness is placed in jeopardy. Nevertheless, although
explicit value-judgments can be eliminated from written
history, implicitly valuational language performs a useful
function in history, by contributing to our understanding
of it according to its true nature. Therefore, where it
is appropriate and "moderate", it is to be retained. For
the reader valuational language provides a grounded point
of view on the facts: it gives him as well a key to the
historian's interpretation of events. The reader is not
given a point of view which he is compelled to accept, or
one which he may only reject with considerable trouble if
40. Edward Gibbon: Decline and fall of the Roman Empire
(New York, n.d.), II, 93 (chap. XXXVIII).
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he possesses that degree of historical sophistication
which will enable him to "get at" the facts "behind" the
account. Rather, if he follows the historian's account
with a fair degree of attention, the valuation and inter¬
pretation to be found in the historian's language may be
straightforwardly rejected by him. Interpretation
here refers to the interpretation of a basic "set" of
facts; on account of their differing points of view, his¬
torians may come to make radically different selections of
facts, but in this we are presented with a more complex
problem which cannot be discussed at this point.
7. Different standards and a common interpretation
Since the historian's valuational interpretation
does not in good faith claim an obligatory acceptance by
the reader in the way that his statements of fact do,
there is clearly no necessity for historians to agree on
common standards, or on a common interpretation from
different standards. Meiland has suggested that the
common attainment of a single interpretation of a histori¬
cal event by historians with different standards and
values is the way in which we might come to achieve objec¬
tivity in history. To see how it is incorrect — and
incorrect in two ways -- Meiland's position must be looked
at in some detail. He writes:
A truly objective conclusion is one that is reached
on the basis of different sets of standards because,
when different standards are used, the bias inherent in
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one or another of these sets of standards is allowed
for or eliminated. By the use of different standards,
the truth is, so to speak, "triangulated" or approached
from different directions. The principle here is
similar to that used when one does a mathematical problem
in several different ways so as to rule out possible
error made by the use of only one method.41
It is worthwhile pausing here to remark that the concept
of "triangulation" as it is set out above is inapplicable
to the historical problem under consideration. Meiland's
principle of triangulation in history is not at all
similar to the process involved in the mathematical exam¬
ple. A mathematical problem involves the use of various
practical methods within the same set of mathematical
standards. In science, unaccepted standards and results
obtained by their application to problems -- the occult,
for example -- are ruled out of order. Mathematicians are
in agreement regarding their methodology ana the principles
underlying it; most historians too are in substantial
agreement regarding the way in which their practical work
should be done. A historian too will often approach his
subject in different practical ways: he will, for instance,
arrive at the same conclusions several times by working
from different evidence. Scientists for the most part are
in agreement about one scheme of interpretation, that
scheme which embodies their scientific standards governing
interpretation; historians are not in agreement regarding
a corresponding scheme of historical standards of interpre¬
tation in their work. We must bear this in mind as we go
on to discuss Meiland's ideas about the attainment of
41. Scenticism and historical knowledge (New York, 1965),
1037
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objectivity in history. From the passage just cited above
Meiland goes on to say:
The highest degree of objectivity consists in
agreement on particular judgments on the basis of
different standards. This seems to be part of the
concept of objectivity, that is, part of the meaning
of the term "objectivity". Thus it is desirable for
historians to have different standards. Only if they
use different standards can the kind of "triangulation"
previously mentioned occur; if they all used the same
standards, we would suspect their conclusions of being
subjective for the reasons given above, even if they
all agreed on those conclusions. This kind of
"triangulation" achieves the same result as the use
of an unbiased or impartial observer would.42
Firstly, Meiland asserts that "triangulation" would ensure
that bias was corrected. I have already pointed out that
that analogy of history with mathematics is quite unsatis¬
factory; but even so, it is still not clear from the con¬
text whether Meiland is referring to common results
achieved independently by historians with different stan¬
dards, or to results that ultimately would really be a
compromise. Given that the facts of the Reformation (to
use Meiland's own example) are all known -- or if this is
not the case with the Reformation, it is certainly true
about some other historical problems -- it is the fact
now, at this present time, that historians disagree about
their interpretation. If the various interpretations are
logically consistent with the historians' standards,
future agreement would require different standards. If
the future common interpretation results from various
historians' agreement on an interpretation, this will be
because those historians are workings towards a compromise
common standard, or at least are changing their own
42. Ibid., 109.
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standards (in detail). Meiland's suggestions about
"triangulation" cannot work so long as different results,
different interpretational conclusions, are in existence;
nor could they be held to be true so long as it was
possible that different results might exist. In Meiland's
terms only the probability of objectivity is increased if
several conclusions agree or a common account is achieved.
While other accounts do exist or can exist, there is still
the possibility that they, or indeed no account at all,
will represent the desired objective position. If twenty-
first century Protestants and Catholics agree on an
interpretation of the Reformation, there would still be
the possibility of interpretations derived from the
standards of nineteenth-century or seventeenth-century
Protestants and Catholics. Compromise in interpretation,
or a common interpretation proper, may be quite impossible
when some basic historical standards of interpretation are
incompatible in their very principles.
Secondly, it is not true that a number of different
standards, when compared in some way, will succeed in
"cancelling each other out" completely; yet that this
would be true in appropriate circumstances is what Meiland
seems to be implying by his maintenance of the position
that "triangulation" can lead to a result equivalent to
impartiality. Meiland writes that
if many different standards and values are used, all of
which yield the same results, this would approach the
condition of using no particular set of standards and
values; that is, this would approach the situation of
the unbiased or impartial observer. So this sort of
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"triangulation" can serve in the place of the unbiased
or impartial observer. And this sort of "triangulation"
seems to be at least one very important thing which can
be meant by "objectivity".43
However, it must be pointed out that it is not the
case that the use of a multiplicity of standards and
values, even if they produce the same results, approaches
of itself the situation of the unbiased observer. To
begin with, the relativist is right when he says that
there can be no unbiased observers of history (in the
relativist and not the everyday sense of "unbiased").
When we talk of an unbiased observer of history, we are
not using "unbiased" in quite the same way as we may do
in other circumstances; rather we are contrasting one sort
of bias with another sort, as I shall explain below when I
come to talk about "committed history". Even a quasi-
scientific objectivity regarding historical events (if it
could really exist) would be for some people an example of
bias and prejudice. The "unbiased" historian will find
his own standards thought of in some societies as
typifying, with other examples, "biased" history. Nov;,
we can only believe that all these different standards
which have been exemplified in the histories of the past
and present, as well as those to be found in the histories
of the future, will cancel each other out (as it might be
phrased), enabling us to achieve impartiality, if we can
be sure that we have an even spread across the whole
spectrum of historical values. An analogy may be helpful
here. On some slips of paper are printed positive or
43. Ibid.
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negative numbers -- one number on each slip. From these
slips, which, it is claimed, are representative of the
range of possible whole numbers, I may be asked to select
a certain sample; following a process like "triangulation",
I am at the end to add up the numbers on the selected
slips in order presumably to find a balanced result. The
equivalent of impartiality in this case should be repre¬
sented by a total of zero; but this total will only result
from a "correct" balance in the slips of paper before any
selection and from a random sampling that does not happen
to be statistically "wild". The total may turn out to be
6, or 2, or -13- With a proper sample I shall know, of
course, that this represents, or (usefully) approaches, a
neutral position for the slips of paper as a whole, but
if I think that this represents "true" neutrality I shall
be deluded. The total of the slips of paper may well
itself be biased to the positive or to the negative. And
I shall only know this if I know what zero is already.
Similarly, a historical sample of standards may itself be
biased, so that the combined result will not necessarily
be anything like an "impartial" one, but merely one, at
least, that is moderated away from the most extreme members
of the sample. (Naturally it will be "approaching" impar¬
tiality in a strictly literal sense; but Meiland surely
means to say, in talking of an "approach", that the result,
if not actually impartial, would be very close to being
so.) I may believe that I have an objectively impartial
result; but I shall be wrong. I may hold (or define) the
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result as impartial; but then I shall be committed to a
relativistic or intersubjective concept of impartiality —
I shall have to admit that another age or another society
with a different range of standards to work with could
well achieve a different "impartial" result. If I know
that the result is impartial, this will be because I know
what impartiality is already, as I was familiar with zero
as the figure that separated positive numbers from
negative numbers. But if I know what impartiality is
already -- and this is the only way in which I can know
the range of standards to be one that contains a fair
distribution — then Meiland's "triangulation" will be a
futile exercise.
We could never know which of differing historical
interpretations is the (truly) impartial one; but of
course the impartiality of a lack or absence of values
or of a compromise or conflation of standards is not to be
achieved in history. Nor can a single interpretation ever
be achieved, since the principles of some historians
necessarily entail different results to those of other
historians: an extreme dogmatic position may necessitate
an almost automatic contradiction of any major statement
or claim by the other side. In any case, as matters stand,
we already possess widely differing and often quite incom¬
patible interpretational results. To believe, as Meiland
seems to, that future (agreed) results will be necessarily
supersessive would be to fall victim to the fallacy of
inevitable historical progress. A common interpretation
17S
of some historical event will never come about if all the
various kinds of historical standards in written history
retain their current validity. A common interpretation
can only arise from certain theoretically determined and
exclusive standards, as in science; but if some standards
are to be permissible in history while others are not, the
case will hardly be better than that which, Meiland states
explicitly, he does not want -- the situation where common
results are obtained through a single standard. Nor is it
clear how the question which standards are historically
valid could be decided. We could scarcely say that those
standards which led regularly to a common interpretation
were to be deemed the historically valid standards. Yet
surely any other criterion for the validity of historical
standards would have been discovered long ago? An agreed
value-standard cannot be achieved in history as that
discipline is conceived at the moment, because history,
far from having the specialist basis which would facilitate
the establishment of such a standard, embraces not only in
its subject-matter but also in its judgments and attitudes
the values of man's social life. Just as many of these
values are irreconcilable in the real world so they must




I have already pointed out that the valuational
judgments incorporated into a historical account, may, if
the historian is honest, be accepted or rejected by the
reader. The reader too will have his own valuational
scheme which will, or will not, be more or less in accord
with the historian's scheme as it is made evident in the
work of written history. It should not be forgotten that
the reader too has a point of view -- the impartial reader
is as actually non-existent as the impartial historian.
Or if the reader can genuinely be thought of as strictly
impartial, this is because the work he is reading is dead
and meaningless for him. Valuation by the historian and
by the reader is essential to historical understanding.
Because history is about man in a social setting, in order
to achieve a full understanding of the past, we must bring
to bear on our study of it those values which normally
contribute to our understanding of the present.^
Since valuation is a part of history it must be held
as a consequence that "committed history" is not necessa¬
rily non-objective. Factual truth may be steadfastly
maintained by the committed historian. In a history of
the nineteenth century, for example, the committed his¬
torian may be saying no more in essence than: *1 favour
the cause of radicalism rather than the cause of conser¬
vatism. ' Thus, that Garibaldi should be praised at the
44- See below, chap. VIII, sect. 3.
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expense of Cavour is only to be expected. The historian's
facts need not be impugned: the reader with opposing views
may easily disagree with the historian and say to himself:
'I can't see Gavour's actions in that light at all,' or
some similar statement. He agrees that what the historian
says is factually true; he disagrees with the historian's
attitude bo the facts.
The historian may be committed in his historical
account in three ways. Firstly, his account may be
committed in so far as it may be generally considered
favourable to his subject-matter; basically, he will be
seen as "for" certain individuals, or certain events, or
certain historical movements. Secondly, the historian may
be considered to be unfavourable to his subject-matter: in
this case he will be seen to be "against" certain individ¬
uals, or other features of his account. Thirdly, the
historian's account may be neutral in its attitude to its
subject-matter; but from the point of view of historical
understanding such a history is still an example of
committed history. Clearly it will often be confused with
"uncommitted" or "disinterested" history -- a type of
account that will be discussed shortly. Positive neutral¬
ity, however, is still very much involved with what took
place, just as "favourable" and "unfavourable" histories
are. It may not look approvingly or disapprovingly on any
of the parties which were actually practically involved in
the events under examination, but it does adopt a point of
view regarding those events themselves. In history of this
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kind, the historian may show his involvement in events by
putting forward possible solutions, or by indulging in
counterfactual hypothetical statements.
In any account, whether it is one that is favourable
or one that is unfavourable to its subject-matter, the
historian is bound to be "for" some things and "against"
others. However, most historical accounts do have certain
focal-points of interest; and the general tenor of a
historical narrative, that is, whether it is approving or
hostile -- or neutral, is determined largely by the theme
of the account or the thesis which the historian wishes to
advance. These in their turn will often be determined by
the historian's contemporary attitudes — for example, by
his political or social attitudes.^
All three types of committed history, it should be
noted, may incorporate both "fair" accounts and "unfair"
accounts. In other words, an account may be either fair
or unfair in its treatment of historical events. If it is
unfair, the historian will show in it little or no respect
for, or take little or no serious account of, the views of
the other party or parties involved in events. If views
once held seriously are not taken seriously by the
45• With regard to "favourable" and "unfavourable"
accounts, another point may be made: if a historian's
work is largely one that is favourable to its subject,
most things which he is "against" will usually be found
to occupy a subsidiary position in the narrative,
either formally or materially -- that is to say,
subsidiary in an "artistic" way, or in regard to the
actual substantive content of the account; if it is an
"unfavourable" historical account, persons and events
of which the historian approves will usually occupy the
subsidiary position.
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historian, the narrative will clearly be badly balanced
and may be considered lacking in historical validity. The
"fair" narrative respects other sides, gives their ideas a
serious and honest hearing, and perhaps goes on to
formulate a well-reasoned criticism. The resulting
account is a committed one that is to be considered
historically valid. A fair neutral account will begin by
having respect for all concerned (where respect is due),
even where the historian is in universal disagreement with
all concerned.^ Of course, there may be exceptions to
the rule that the historian should have respect for all
involved; but if a historian wishes to claim, sa^r, that a
whole nation was at some time in the past collectively
seized by mass hysteria, then his case will need very
adequate substantiation.
The most literally "uncommitted" history differs
significantly from neutral history. "Uncommitted" history
is the truly "detached" history; the uncommitted or
detached historian bears a correspondence in his way to
the reader for \-;hom the historical account is a piece of
dead prose. To achieve true "scientific" detachment, all
types of valuation must be avoided (and not simply moral
46. When a neutral account is unfair, it will be because
the historian sees all the parties involved as, perhaps,
"fools" or "knaves" or "creatures of fortune (or fate)".
However, points of view of this type may sometimes be
the expression of a seriously-held historical world-
view; and the resulting accounts can hardly be called
in this case "unfair". Theories which account for
historical events in terms of chance and accident will
often provide examples of such attitudes.
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valuation, for commitment need not always be, although it
usually is, a moral matter). A "detached" historical
account will often fail to be history proper because , in
order to achieve a fully disinterested detachment, its
component facts must be stripped of all valuation; as a
consequence of this they will be stripped of their essen¬
tial human quality and that quality which makes for their
understanding. It is always to be remembered that, in the
words of Ann Low-Beer,
careful attention to both explicit and implicit moral
judgments, in our use of ordinary language, and in the
principles of value and importance in explanations, is
a part of learning to understand history.^7
Divested of its human aspect in understanding, history
fails to be about "persons" (in the philosophical sense of
that word); at its best it will be about psychological
"objects"; at its worst, it will be as unintelligible (in
human historical terms) and as bizarre as unadulterated
behaviourism. In no longer being about persons, a detached
historical account can hardly, in the end, be fully under¬
stood as historical by the reader, unless, of course, he
brings previous knowledge or other experience to bear on
what he reads.
The term "committed history" is usually taken to
signify a history that is, for example, intensely devoted
to the support of one "side" in history or propagandization
for some "cause". From the logical point of view, however,
any account which involves valuation -- especially implicit
valuation — can be thought of as "committed". If we were
47. Op. cit., 157.
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to analyse the instances of valuation in an account, and
list all the features of the past that the historian was
"for" and all those that he was "against", a coherent
pattern of commitment to the holders of certain values and
the embodiments of certain processes would become plain to
us. All accounts containing valuational judgments and
language may be considered, logically, to be "committed
history".
Since commitment involves a valuational pattern, and
since every valuational pattern, formed as it is by both
social conditioning and psychological conditioning (and
also by an interaction between the two), is unique with
each individual historian, history is manifestly a concern
of the individual historian as an individual. History
that is done by a working-group or by a committee, and
history where the historian attempts to suppress his
individuality and even work towards a common anonymous
"norm" are examples of attempted suppressions of individual
id
valuation. These types of history do not succeed in
eliminating valuation completely (which in any case would
leave an account that was no longer really history), and
consequently they are still open to the same criticisms as
history that includes a full valuation. Since the valua¬
tional judgments of a historical account are such an
individual matter, and since in many accounts the historian's
AS. The Cambridge modern history is a well-known example
of a large work where the suppression of individuality
on the part of contributors in order to further the
attainment of a unity in the work as a who1e was not
entirely successful.
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valuation is a considerable factor in the reader's under¬
standing of events, that understanding will be best aided
by valuation which is not suppressed or mutilated in the
effort to achieve a spurious "objectivity", but which is
allowed to show itself in its full individuality. Nor must
it be forgotten that suppression of the historian's indi¬
viduality will itself be occasioned by a specific set of
valuational judgments.
The question raised at the beginning of this chapter
was whether a historical account can have a permanent
value or worth (as history). We can say, since facts and
values can be separated in thought, that with regard to
simple factual truths stated, it can; and we can say that
with regard also to the values it contains, it can have a
permanent validity, for the valuational judgments of a
historian will always present us with one way in which the
facts of the past may be understood. Historical events,
with their essential human aspect, must always be seen and
can only be seen charged with values of one sort or
another. It is through the historian's interpretation and
understanding that the reader's own understanding is awa¬
kened, so that written history is not merely a dead
account for him. If history is worth reading, it comes to
be worth reading through the terms of the historian's and
the reader's experience, otherwise a historical account
will only present us with a meaningless concatenation of
physical events. A full, comprehensible treatment of
historical subject-matter requires that the historian have
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access to the complete range of man's values; and these
are the values of our own experience. History is about
men as they take part in social life; and. this must in¬
volve a world of value as well as a world of fact. But
its world of value is not one that is detached from its
study in the way that a social science, for example, may
study the values of a society. History values its subject-
matter comprehensively and not after the fashion of a
particular set of values and a single way of looking at
things; objective detachment involves only one way of
looking at events, and different sciences may look at the
same events differently. History adopts comprehensive
values because it is an activity not of man in part of his
social life but of man in his social"life as a whole. The
discipline of history is not simply an investigation of
men in society; it is also itself an expression of men in
society, and as such an expression it villi actively adopt
the values of its society.
Another class of interpretational judgment is still
to be treated, namely, the class of evaluative judgments.
Evaluation is a problem discovered in several aspects of
the historian's work, notably in description, selection,
the relation of facts to each other with regard to their
significance, interpretation, and the determination of
causal factors. A consideration of evaluation in general,
and, in particular, its relation with the individual his¬




THE ARGUMENT FOR GENERAL HISTORT
1. Generalizations and specialized history
To put the argument in its briefest form, history-
concerns the individual not the general. It is a feature
of history (when we mean to refer to it without qualifi¬
cation) that it deals with, and tells us about, concrete
individual events and situations in the past. It treats
these individual events just as they are and in their own
right, although it is true, and often necessary, that to
his understanding of any event the historian brings know¬
ledge that he has obtained through the generalizing work
of other disciplines. Nevertheless, history does not
obscure the essential particular nature of these events
either by making them subservient to the working-out of
theoretical generalizations and the formulation of gene¬
ral laws, or by merely subsuming them under some scheme
of general theory. That the attention of history is di¬
rected primarily towards what is particular is discussed
elsewhere;"*" in the following pages I wish to look at va¬
rious types of generalizations, which have been held by
some to be an integral part of the historian's work, and
show how they cannot be held to be in accordance with the
concept of history as it has been defined (with reference
1. See above, chap. II, sect. 7, and below, chap. VI.
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to one way in which we definitely need to look at the ex¬
perience of the past). I shall concentrate on generaliza¬
tions themselves in the next chapter; in this chapter my
attention will be given to the proper place in history
of specialized accounts of the past.
As a historical account deals less with individual
past facts and concentrates rather on a task of generali¬
zation and abstraction it becomes increasingly unparadig-
matic of the simple, pure piece of history. I have argued
already that there can be no general laws of history as
such, but only general laws from some other discipline
that are made use of by the historian or general laws in
another field that are discovered and elaborated by the
(generalizing) historian. ~ Since a really extensive use
of generalizations obviously requires considerable know¬
ledge, it is inevitable that a generalizing historical
account will become orientated chiefly to one particular
discipline, if only because of the necessary limitations
of any single person's knowledge. Collaborative writing
of history solves the problem of the individual's limita-
3
tions at the expense of cohesiveness and integration.
In practice an extensively generalizing account
vrill have its title of "history" qualified, to indicate
that it is a specialized account with an orientation to
some specific discipline. It will be called "economic
history", or "political history", for example. Further,
2. See above, chap. II, sect. 7.
3. See below, chap. IX.
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if its connection with individual historical events even
only apparently becomes a tenuous one, then the title of
"history", however it is qualified, may be found alto¬
gether inapplicable. In other words, when an account
ostensibly based on historical fact ceases to deal with
historical particulars such as events, personalities, or
institutions in the past, it should generally no longer
be regarded as a historical narrative or work of history.
As an account consists more and more of general lawTs and
other generalizations which are not of themselves histor¬
ical, so there will be less and less room for genuine
historical content.
2. The argument against general history
In this discussion of specialized forms of history
and general history, it is necessary to take note now of
positions which view all proper historical work as inevi¬
tably "specialized". For the purpose of my argument it is
necessary that the possibility and usefulness of general
history be upheld, since this is what the historian, who
aims at a representative picture of his subject, is com¬
petent as an individual to give us. This is in no way to
rule out the possibility and importance of specialized
forms of history; nor am I saying that the historian who
is qualified in other fields cannot make use in history
of any non-historical, specialized knowledge he may think
relevant to a problem.
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It is maintained by some that there can be really
no such thing as serious worthwhile history pure and simple
(that is, general history), and that when we speak of
history, if we are using the word "history" in any genu¬
inely intellectual discourse, we intend a reference to
some kind of "specialized" history: ordinarily we shall
mean "social history" or "political history".^ Of course,
it is probably these two branches of history with which the
ordinary man is most familiar; and it is these two which
readily spring to mind for most people when the \rord
"history" is mentioned. However, I should wish to main¬
tain that it certainly does not seem to be the case that
the wrord "history" must almost always carry such an im¬
plicit reference to a particular kind of history, and that
we must, if we are truly knowledgeable about history,
necessarily conceive of history only in terms of what we
should usually call a branch of history, such as political,
social, or economic history. Undeniably the word "history"
may actually be used in some contexts to refer in fact to
"specialized" history; but in most cases it is not to be
doubted that "history" really does mean quite simply
history. When the vrord is not being used to refer, by
implication, to a particular branch of history, it must
be understood to stand for "general history".
Another criticism of general history is made indi¬
rectly by Popper in an attack on historicist holism, whose
proponents, he asserts, combine
4. M. M. Postan, in Fact and relevance (Cambridge, 1971),
chap. 5, argues this position in detail.
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the correct belief that history, as opposed to the
theoretical sciences, is interested in concrete indi¬
vidual events and in individual personalities rather
than in abstract general laws, with the mistaken belief
that the "concrete" individuals in which history is
interested can be identified with "concrete" wholes in
sense (a).5
This sense (a) has been previously defined by Popper as
the sense of 'the totality of all the properties or as¬
pects of a thing, and especially of all the relations hold¬
ing between its constituent parts'.^ This combination,
Popper asserts, cannot hold, for history cannot grasp
wholes: 'history, like any other kind of inquiry, can only
deal with selected aspects of the object in which it is
7
interested'.
Although Popper's argument is not directed specifi¬
cally against advocates of general history (but rather
against so-called historicists), it does give some support
to "specialized" history in so far as Popper asserts that
we can only study aspects of an object. Of course, it is
true that we never see the whole of an object at one time,
but the aspect that we see is not always and necessarily
to be identified with a logical aspect falling within the
scope of one discipline. In history, in seeing part of a
whole, we often see a part that contains many of the
aspects of a whole -- a part that substantially contains
the whole. When we are not deliberately pursuing special¬
ized historical studies, the part of the whole that we see





will frequently be, and should be, adequately representa¬
tive of the whole in a way in which a logically marked-off
aspect of the who1e is not.
It has been suggested, then, that to write success¬
ful general' history is impossible, whether for pragmatic
or logical reasons; but I hope to show that this is not
in fact the case. Of course, doubts that general history
is possible, or at least in any way worthy of serious
consideration, do have a very practical foundation. One
reason given for the impossibility of general history is
that, without specialization in history, there is nothing
less than an infinite number of historical facts to be
considered. This argument against general history is
obviously more formidably applicable to the case of his¬
tory written by the individual than to the case where
historical work is being carried out through a collabora¬
tive effort. It may be set out in the following way. The
historian, reflecting on the historical problem that con¬
fronts him and pondering possible solutions, is presented
from the very beginning of his work with one outstanding
problem -- that of dealing with all the material that is
possibly relevant to the historical subject he has chosen.
If his account is to be of any value, it would seem that
consciously or unconsciously, in order to present the
fullest account possible (that account which has taken
into consideration the greatest proportion of relevant
facts), he will decide to treat his topic within the
limits of a specific (specialized) branch of history.
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This specialized branch of history, which will provide
the historian with his initial selectional and interpre-
tational orientation {and naturally justify that orienta¬
tion), will be found in most cases to be related to one
of the social sciences, such as economics, political
science, or sociology; through this self-imposed limita¬
tion the historian's treatment of his topic will result
in the production of economic history, political history,
or social history. Specialized history, it can be argued,
is the examination of a historical period or a historical
position under one theoretical aspect alone, a procedure
that is necessitated by the infinite plenitude of histori¬
cal material.
Nevertheless, even if the arguments against general
history are accepted, and projects of writing general
history are abandoned, it still remains the case that the
S. At least for the sake of simplicity of argument it is
unfortunate that the various types of specialized his¬
tory are not always related to the corresponding social
sciences. This lack of a relationship is especially
the case with political history and social history
which are often the product of the same type of non-
disciplinary procedure as general history itself; the
qualification of their titles refers only to the general
orientation of their subject-matter. Many \*,rorks of
political history have few references, explicit or im¬
plicit, to political science; and social history often
has an equally tenuous connection with sociology or
related disciplines. Because of this, it should be
quite feasible to make further useful distinctions with¬
in specialized branches of historiography in the way
that one may differentiate, for example, between general
political history (history of political facts alone) and
scientific political history (history where political
facts are related to general political principles). The
distinction between the "general" and the "scientific"
forms of history could prove to be an important one,
but it is surprisingly not a distinction that is often
expressly made.
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problem of dealing with a multitude of historical facts is
in no way solved. With a concentration on one aspect of a
historical situation or on one specialized historical
topic, from one single disciplinary viewpoint, the facts
that are relevant will still be numberless. No matter how
apparently limited the historian's subject may be, his
account of it can never be complete. The reason for this
is a straightforward one:
No historian hitherto has had at his command all the
sources which might be relevant to his subject; none
has ever completed his work so that no newly emerging
source could invalidate it.9
No continuing contraction of the theoretical limits of any
subject under review, and no reduction of the real factual
content of the subject will generally result in a simpli¬
fication and resolution of the theoretical difficulties
that are ascribed to 'the sheer immensity of past experi¬
ence'.^" Regarding all historical problems, with only a
very fe\\r exceptions, it may be asserted that for practical
reasons no historian can consider all the possibly direct¬
ly relevant facts; and, with no exceptions whatsoever, we
can say that no historian can take into account all the
factors affecting his work which might well have an indi¬
rect relevance (for example, the reliability of a printed
copy of the transcription of a manuscript, the generally
accepted interpretations of difficult words in a foreign
9. Sir George Clark: "History and the modern historian"
(General introduction to The new Cambridge modern
history) (Cambridge, 1957), xx-xxi.
10. Postan: op. cit., 50.
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language, the accuracy of the dating of archaeological
finds related to historical work), of course he will be
expected to have a fair knowledge in some related fields
and to examine some of the problems bearing indirectly on
his own chosen subject.
Nevertheless, the contention that general history is
impossible has a prima facie justification: many general
textbooks and universal histories, and even intelligent
and serious general histories which are restricted to a
fairly well-defined period or region, turn out to be at
bottom a collection of independent chapters and essays
which can offer, at most, little more than the superficial
connection of period or region as a basis for their claim
to be a single, unified work of history. This state of
affairs, however, need not be a cause of pessimism: it
does not show that a complete, general history is wholly
impossible, '//hat it does show us is that an integrated
account of various aspects of a part of the past is not
ordinarily so easy to attain as might but thought, but
presents the historian with the important problem of how
he provides his subject-matter with a unifying cohesion.
But this problem of the "integration" of an account must
be left until we have examined the reasons that general
history is a necessary part of historical work.
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3. Two arguments in support of general history
Against the contentions of those opposed to general
history two types of argument can be advanced in support
of general history. The claim to be substantiated is that
general history is the most complete form of history: it
can be supported by both a pragmatic argument and a philo¬
sophical argument.
It is true that much historical work centres on
problems that have their origin and their significance
substantially in one disciplinary branch of history; some
of the historian's topics, quite rightly, are highly spe¬
cialized indeed. Historians will frequently choose to
deal, for example, with such specialized and confined sub¬
jects as, in social history, the emergence and growth of
railway labour in Victorian England, or in educational
history, a historical account of the training of teachers
in Scotland, or, in economic history, the growth of the
Staffordshire pottery industry. In a more general way,
the historian will frequently deal too with such.wider,
but still strictly non-general topics as, in social his¬
tory, the electoral sociology of modern Britain, or, in
political history, the Garolingians and the Frankish mon¬
archy, or, in religious history, the Spanish church and
the papacy in the thirteenth century. All these subjects
are very typical of genuine historical interests involving
a limited type of subject-matter, and because of their
limitations they can be dealt with in terms of the relevant
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specialized form of history; and in those terms a complete
account of the subject will be provided.
However, a very important part of the historian's
work does not deal with such unequivocally discipline-
oriented topics as those mentioned above, even in those
cases where the subject-matter of an account is very well
defined or specified. Plainly there are many historical
problems requiring treatment which are of an interdisci¬
plinary nature in that they deal with interactions between
different fields that are not obviously closely related.
For example, a historian may examine and write about a
topic like "art and politics in the Weimar republic", or,
combining religious, social, administrative, and political
aspects of the past, "church, state, and schools in Britain
between 1$00 and 1900", or, joining intellectual history
to social history, "the social context of modern French
thought".
Even when a specialized topic is the subject of a
piece of history, it is not uncommon that the origins or
results of the problem and its resolution are to be found
quite extensively outside any one discipline alone. An
apparently narrow subject like "the disestablishment of
the Church in Ireland and Wales" has its origins in many
different kinds of political, social, and cultural condi¬
tions; and studies of fairly closely defined topics like
"the Thirty Years War" will, in causes, effects, and in¬
teractions, require the historian, if he wishes to present
the fullest account, to conduct his research in almost
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every field of history conceivable. For many seemingly
specialized subjects the historian will require and use
a wider knowledge of the past than can be found within one
single discipline.
Many historians have as their central interests
topics that are not simply an apparent amalgam of different
disciplinary interests, but are, to the degree in which
they present the historian with an interdisciplinary
problem, fully integrated and unified. Where these fully
integrated interdisciplinary interests do occur, it will
be plain that they are not somehow incidental to the work
of a historian (considered ideally) or something to which
history is not really obliged to give its attention: they
are an essential part of historical work. Some historian
will be expected to give a full and properly detailed
treatment of, for example, a topic like nationalism, or a
subject like the historical role of the state in a given
society. Again, daily life in ancient Rome is an example
of a subject embracing many fields and requiring genuine
historical treatment; and people in the past in general,
such as the early Victorians, also provide a centre of
interest for historians. More complex themes like "dissent
and rebellion in the twentieth century" or "the age of the
common man" are also authentic subjects for historical
study while requiring proper elaboration over several
disciplines. And it may reasonably be held that, at least
on the level of theory, intellectual history, or the
history of ideas, is also very often a fully interrelated
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study of different fields. Biography too almost always
demands some sort of general approach and cannot be devel¬
oped satisfactorily in terms of purely specialized history,
since, even when a specialized history of someone's life
is intended (a political biography, for example), an ac¬
count, integrated with the central theme, will to some
extent be required of a person's other interests and ac¬
tivities. To give a better idea of how such topics are to
be dealt with by general history rather than specialized
history, it will be helpful to amplify two examples:
nationalism, and the state's involvement in a society.
Nationalism, with reference to a specific country or
a particular age (as well as nationalism, or types of
nationalism, in general), often provides a subject for the
historian's attention. In itself it is obviously to be
considered both a well-defined and important topic, cer¬
tainly worthy of, and needing, historical treatment. It
is true that certain aspects of nationalism may be studied
by, among other disciplines, sociology, or social psychol¬
ogy, or political science. But nationalism itself is not,
in its fullest conception and in all its manifestations,
an object of investigation in one of its particular in¬
stances for any discipline other than history; nor can it
fall entirely within the scope of any one other discipline.
When the historian comes to examine a certain instance of
nationalism in its own right, he will have to develop his
studies in several fields that are otherwise non-histori¬
cal. The symptoms of nationalism, its origins, and its
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many manifestations and effects are to be investigated in
many areas: culturally, in ideas, in language, in art and
literature; socially, in the development of institutions,
in racial and other forms of discrimination; economically,
in a desire for self-sufficiency, in protectionism and
tariff-policy, in moves against foreign ownership of
industries and resources; politically, in the development
of inward-looking policies, in the adoption of an aggres¬
sive or unco-operative stance towards neighbouring coun¬
tries; and indeed, in many other branches of a nation's,
and an individual's, life.
An examination of the second example will reveal
similar ramifications in a wide variety of fields. A his¬
tory of the state's role is a suitable and necessary sub¬
ject of historical study; and it too will be found to
require a treatment extending in many disciplines. From
the social viewpoint, there will have to be an understand¬
ing of the government's policies and social aims; from the
political viewpoint, the origin and formation of the
government and its administrative functions will have to
be understood; economically, there will have to be an
examination of taxation, finance, and the role of public
utilities, state monopolies and nationalized industries.
And education, religion, and the state's cultural policies
generally will need to be looked at and investigated. The
contributions from many fields to the origins and growth
of the state's involvement in society will have to be
thoroughly examined; and all these different subjects of
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the historian's attention will be given an authentic unity
by their references to the political conception of a state
and to this real state (under study) in particular.
The themes of nationalism and the state's role in a
society provide two examples of well-defined subjects
within general history. They are subjects that must be
seen as part of general history, for they cannot be sub¬
sumed under some discipline as a type of specialized
history. They are subjects that require attention from
the historian, and must be given a proper historical treat¬
ment by him. A concentration on specialized history, a
stipulation that only specialized history is proper his¬
tory, would leave subjects like these either almost com¬
pletely unexamined in their own right or treated in a
one-sided fashion in terms of one discipline alone.
Many events in history are important in more than
one field. For pragmatic reasons alone, therefore, the
historian will frequently require a general rather than
a specialized approach to his problem. But a subject like
nationalism, although its comprehensive treatment within
general history is pragmatically necessitated, through its
own complexity provides the historian with a conceptual
justification for general history. Even when nationalism
is analysed and treated in various specialized fields, the
full meaning of its constituents is only given through a
reference back to the general concept, and so, implicitly,
only found in the interdisciplinary relationships of gene¬
ral history and its unification of human experience.
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Of course, it must in no sense be understood that
specialized history is somehow diametrically opposed to
general history, for it most certainly is not. If I
assert that the historian fulfils himself completely only
through adopting a general and not a specialized approach,
I mean only to say that for a truly comprehensive under¬
standing any specialized treatment (and specialized treat¬
ment is almost always required at some stage in historical
study) is either preliminary to a more general account or
is developed within an already established general frame¬
work: even when it is not directly given in a specialized
account, an extensive general framework is often tacitly
understood.
As I hope I have shown, pragmatic considerations
alone provide an adequate justification for general his¬
tory; but they do not provide the only justification.
General history can also be given a sound philosophical
basis; and this basis is to be found in the very subject-
matter of history. History is about man in society; and
man, as the subject of history, is not man in one of his
activities, but man as such, and therefore man in all his
activities.
History is about man; and man is a single being,
whose aspects and activities are interrelated and inter¬
acting, fused in a single whole. As human activities, we
can only finally understand the activities of man as we
conceive them to be the activities of a whole, with each
in its proper place in a comprehended relation with the
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others. As Cassirer observes:
Man's outstanding character, his distinguishing mark,
is ... his work. It is this work, it is the system of
human activities, which defines and determines the
circle of "humanity". Language, myth, religion, art,
sciencehistory are the constituents, the various
sectors of this circle. A "philosophy of man" would
therefore be a philosophy which would give us insight
into the fundamental structure of each of these human
activities, and which at the same time would enable us
to understand them as an organic whole. Language, art,
myth, religion are no isolated random creations. They
are held together by a common bond.H
For a true completeness of understanding to be achieved,
the activities of man must be seen 'as an organic whole';
and it is the task of history to help us to do this with
regard to man's past. General history should provide us
with a description of man's activities as a whole. His¬
tory cannot ultimately be complete if it simply gives an
account of these activities in discretely considered parts.
When we concentrate on the subjects of purely spe¬
cialized history, we may lose sight of man as a whole; we
may forget about the interdependence of man's faculties
and abilities and activities. Clearly, some specialized
accounts of "aspects" of man are necessary; but a whole¬
hearted concern with specialization can be left to other
disciplines. History has the power to provide us with an
account of the past of man in a way that retains the unity
of that concept of man which we possess. If it forgoes
its opportunities, part of an understanding of the concept
of man will be lost. For this understanding, as one that
is complete, lies importantly in an appreciation of how
11. Ernst. Cassirer: An essay on man (New Haven, 1944),
68. "
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the different aspects of man interact and develop in the
whole, in a comprehension of the organic wholeness of man.
To write economic history, or political history, or cul¬
tural history alone means that we are writing about
economic man, or political man, or cultural man, as if
these were in some way complete and real types of individ¬
ual men. Whenever we write about man in one of his as¬
pects, we must remember that we are only writing about an
aspect, something that is only and essentially a part of a
whole. Because economic man is always a part of man,
because economic history is always a part of history,
concepts of this kind must forever in their innermost
nature remain historically incomplete.
Obviously specialized histories are necessary, but
they are only truly comprehensible with a knowledge of the
background of general history to which they belong; so,
for those histories, it is general history which provides
the first foundation for their understanding. General
history is that study which gives to specialized histories
their completeness, which provides the full background on
which comprehendible specialization in history depends,
which allows to man in his past life that completeness
which is properly and essentially his, and which alone can
provide a final understanding of man in his past.
205
A. The nature of general history
What exactly is the nature of general history? It
is ideally a fully synthesized and unified account of past
events. Far from being impossible of attainment, general
history is the necessarily complete form of an account of
a historical subject. An account of past events in their
social, or economic, or cultural aspect may be entirely
satisfactory as far as it goes, and it may be genuinely
comprehensive in its own field with the disciplinary
limitations that it imposes on itself; as history con¬
sidered simply and wholly, however, it will be inadequate
and incomplete, for history as such, with no qualifica¬
tion, must give us a complete account and satisfy the
desires of both the historian and his readers to know the
past, and understand it, as fully and deeply as possible.
To understand the past fully, it will not be enough for
the interested person to read together, compare and syn¬
thesize the differing specialized works on the same sub¬
ject. For example, in order to gain a genuine historical
knowledge of sixteenth-century England, it will not in the
end be sufficient to take the relevant specialized works
of political history, social history, economic history,
cultural history and so on, and study them together. From
these written histories and the various aspects of actual
history that they describe there must be created a synthe¬
sis that embodies a new- unity, that demonstrates different
relations (and fuller ones) between the various elements
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of history, that tells not solely about the cultural be¬
haviour or political behaviour or social behaviour of
people in the sixteenth century but about their lives as
a whole; this synthesis will form an account that stands
as a (general) history of sixteenth-century England. Some
historians might say that it is really a matter for the
reader himself to make a synthesis of different aspects of
events as they are related in specialized histories; but
if that is held to be the case, then it is evident that
the historian too, if he is called upon to do so, should
be able to construct a satisfactory general history, not
merely because such a synthesis is possible, but because
as a historian he should be more knowledgeable about past
events and hence more competent than the reader to create
the historical synthesis. One of the historian's prin¬
cipal tasks is to enable his audience to understand the
past, and, in their variety (as political, or economic, or
social, for example), past events cannot be completely
understood unless they are presented by the historian in
a way representative of their entirety.
General history presents an account of past events
in their entirety. Ideally a general history will be a
complete account of its chosen subject. It would natural¬
ly be a mistake to suppose that by talking of a "complete"
account some sort of numerical completeness is intended.
Nevertheless, the position that advocates a disciplinary
specialization within history does not seem to take fair
account of what a "complete" history could be. Obviously
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there is a literal sense in which the terra "complete his¬
tory" can be understood: it is logically conceivable that
there could be a work of history which would really tell
us everything, at least about a closely defined problem.
And it is one of the arguments of the relativist against
the possibility of objectivity in history that a "complete"
history is not one that is practically possible. An ac¬
count is always poorer in content than the actuality of
which it is supposed to be an account. But, as Mandelbaum
points out:
The fallacy in this consists in the. attempt to iden¬
tify the knowledge which we may be said to have concern¬
ing some object will all of the characteristics of that
object. Such an identification is fundamentally out of
keeping with the nature of knowledge in any and every
field of human experience. When a person claims to have
knowledge of an object he does not necessarily believe
that he apprehends the nature of every one of that ob¬
ject's characteristics.
If we were to allow for a moment that the possibility
of a literally complete history might be a practical one,
and imagined attempts being made to give the idea real
instantiation, we should come to see that the realization
of such a history -would result in an account resembling in
some respects the map which, in its endeavours to repre¬
sent everything in every detail, would necessarily be a
perfectly detailed, full-size replica of its original. A
full-size, fully detailed map would be an entirely useless
one, of course; and although the making of an analogy be¬
tween a geographical map and a historical account should
not be extended too far, it can be safely used to point
12. Maurice Mandelbaum: The problem of historical know¬
ledge (New York, 1967), 83-84.
203
out that an important part of the value of a historical
account, like that of a map, is founded on its selectivity:
detail that will increase the understanding of the user or
reader is included; superfluous detail, or detail that
might prove an obstacle to comprehension, is excluded or
eliminated, or, as it is often phrased, "placed in a
proper perspective". The result of an attempt to relate
everything in any single historical account would be that,
even if practical success were attainable, as a numerically
complete history, as a total compilation of all the known
facts, the account would, in any case, be of no use to
other historians, or anyone else. The making of a fair
and representative selection of facts is one of the his¬
torian's tasks; we must realize, as Berkhofer writes, that
even if the historian could reconstruct or re-create
the total past, as many historians would at first seem
to wish, he would still need to select from this
melange the facts he would present in his history of
it. Complete re-creation would just mean the histori¬
an's job was yet to be done once again.13
Given the actual situations and contexts of historical
problems, it must be concluded that a complete history —
a numerically complete one, that is to say, containing all
the known facts — is unattainable and would, in any case,
have no practical value. Obviously a "complete history",
for the purposes of historiography, must have a more sen¬
sible meaning.
A successful general history will be a complete
history. To understand the notion of a "complete history"
13. Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr.: A behavioral approach to
historical analysis (New York~j 1969), 14^
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it is necessary to make a distinction between numerical
completeness, as exemplified by the historical account that
would tell us every detail of everything that happened,
and one of qualitative or representative completeness as
this would be present in a history that gives to us a fair
and fully representative picture of a period, say, or a
place, or an institution.
It is part of the task of the historian to present
a thoroughly representative account of his subject, and it
is in its representativeness that the true historical
completeness of an account is to be found. And again,
since the conception of man as an organic whole leads to
the conception of history as the general history that
partakes of and conveys this unity of man, a fully repre¬
sentative work will represent this unity: historically
considered, it must be general history that comes closest
to being truly representative and hence truly complete.
5. Divisions in general history
A narrative of general history is one part of the
past considered as entire. As history it must still be
divided in some way, being restricted to a particular
region or a particular era, for example, or perhaps to a
comparison between two or more periods, or areas, or
historical institutions. In consequence, the advocate of
14. The idea of the representativeness of history has
also been developed previously, in chap. II, sect. 4>
and chap. IV, sect. 2.
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general history may well be confronted with the following
question: If general history is preferable to specialized
history (in so far as it is the culminating synthesis of
the latter), how is it that universal history is not pref¬
erable, for parallel reasons, to general history? If it is
going to be maintained that historical understanding is
attainable only by an examination of past events in a syn¬
thesis of their various aspects, surely, the objection may
run, full historical comprehension can only be attained
through a consideration of all past events together, by
means of what would be a new and higher historical synthe¬
sis -- a synthesis of general histories.
In the end it must be seen that everything has a
bearing on everything else in the past, and by implication,
therefore, in written history too, especially since his¬
torical accounts look to what succeeds past events as well
as to what is contemporary to, or precedes, those events.
It is because of this that in history events contemporarily
remote may be related through various interactions that
took place between events that directly followed them; for
example, a historian of the sixth-century Byzantine Empire
often keeps in mind events in the Arabian peninsula which
led to the rise of Islam in the seventh century, or a his¬
torian of the later Moghul Empire in India could in his
work show an interest in some part of what was happening
in far-off Britain at the same time. Since consideration
of important events will often be necessarily cursory in a
universal history, for certain pragmatic reasons at least
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history can without significant loss of understanding be
divided into sections and treated according to period or
region, or some other general concept. But objections
against universal history in fact go further than this,
for universal accounts often seem to be coupled with
philosophy of history of the speculative kind, which
involves a use of historical material that is hazardous
to history proper. In any case, in the selection of
topics for treatment, the universal historian must exer-
15
cise a truly swingeing choice.
Most importantly, for the problem of how the past can
be most satisfactorily dealt with, history does naturally
fall into certain divisions. The historian is concerned
with certain problems, and these problems are both defined
by certain temporal events and their contexts and made more
readily understandable when those contexts are marked off
from the rest of history. Again, certain periods show for
some purposes a special distinctiveness which justifies
their being separated out by the historian from the rest
of history. On the other hand, it must always be remem¬
bered that periodization is created by the evidence and
the historian's interpretation of it; it is itself in no
way real but is only a means of typifying history. Conse¬
quently the historian must never allow any period to become
15. For a useful treatment of the problem of universal
history, see G. Barraclough: "Universal history", in
Approaches to history, ed. H. P. R. Finberg (London,
1962). Barraclough provides fair criticism of most
types of universal history, but strongly advocates a
new type of world history, or history with a global
perspective, which will apparently still be periodized.
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rigidly conceptualized, and to determine, rather than to
be determined by, our conception of past events. The
process of periodization is an empirical one, which is
1
shaped by the historian.
To soften and blur the standard dividing lines, and
perhaps to spur historians to modify or abandon those
lines, the provision of "overlapping" historical accounts
is certainly adequate.
The allowance of periodization as legitimate and
indeed necessary in history returns us to our original
problem in a different form. If there are acceptable
divisions in history according to period and region, how
is it that further divisions of history according to topic
(divisions, that is, of a disciplinary nature) cannot be
allowed? If the use of periods and regions in history has
certain decided advantages of a pragmatic nature and is
necessitated by the historian's interpretation of the
past, and does not itself lead to any essential loss of
historical understanding as a whole, then disciplinary
division would seem prima facie both to provide us with
further advantages and to be in some cases necessitated by
the historian's approach. How is it that disciplinary
division is essentially detrimental to the completeness
and comprehensiveness of the historical understanding of
a subject?
16. Cf. Gordon Leff: History and social theory (London,
1969)j 150. Chapter VII of this book gives an excel¬
lent treatment at length of the problem of periodiza¬
tion in history.
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Pragmatic considerations are not all-important in
history. A limitation of topic imposed by the restric¬
tions of a particular discipline obviously offers the
historian considerable advantages in procedure, providing
him, for example, with a sure basis for selection and
interpretation. Nevertheless, regionalized or periodized
history retains a greater justification in the past events
themselves than does specialized history. After a certain
fashion it might be true that universal history (of an
ideal form) should be considered as really the only ulti¬
mately satisfactory history. To understand any historical
event completely (again, that is, to understand it in an
ideal way) the historian must at a minimum have the ac¬
quaintance of a surprising number of other quite disparate
events and facts of general knowledge. Indeed this is
true not only of "ideal" accounts but, to a lesser degree,
of "ordinary" competent accounts of history. Nevertheless,
when the unrealizable aim of a genuine and satisfactory
universal history has been abandoned, it has to be conceded
that, say, a general history of France in the eighteenth
century is a historically complete account of a part of
the past in a way in which the intellectual history of the
Enlightenment, or an account of daily life at the court of
17
Louis XV, is not. ' History is the study of man in society,
and neither intellectual matters nor aspects of the every¬
day behaviour of a small, select group of persons give us
17. By making this statement I intend to imply no more
than that such accounts are logically not the final
level of historical statements about a period in its
particular and concrete aspect that the historian may
hope to attain.
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a full picture of man in society during a certain period.
A general history of eighteenth-century France would also
be more complete than a history which attempted to remove
the obstacles of region and period, or at least to straddle
them, but confined itself to specialized topics. The
particular regarded wholly is more complete than an aspect
of the particular even when that is universalized. It is
with the individual man in his full being that completeness
must come first in history.
6. The integration of a historical account
The integration of a piece of history comes about
through the creation of a common focus for the disparate
topics of a single narrative; superficially this seems to
count against the argument for general history: the state¬
ment that any integrated account must have a starting-
point or point of reference which will, or at least often
should, dominate the account through its course appears to
provide a good reason for denying the possibility of
general history. Any point of reference chosen must be
likely to be very specifically defined in its nature; and
it would therefore tend to ground the narrative in some
kind of specialized field.
It can hardly be denied that no historical account
can present us with the story of the past in any ideally
egalitarian way; nor indeed can any account of the world,
or part of it, be observationally neutral. As I have
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pointed out above, the opponents of the possibility of
general history suggest that true general history is
impossible because general history could only be success¬
fully achieved with a numerically complete, total compila¬
tion of all relevant historical facts. In a related way
they seem to hold, although this is true, in many cases,
only implicitly, that general history, if it could exist,
would have to be perfectly balanced in a material fashion:
for example, it would not place economics before politics,
or give to the treatment of culture twice the space accor¬
ded to the treatment of religion, unless this was really
objectively justified. General history would observe as
completely as possible a "neutrality" regarding its various
disciplinary subdivisions, and since such neutrality, even
if it could be developed as a meaningful concept, would
obviously be quite impossible for practical reasons alone,
a satisfactory general historical account would never be
successfully completed.
The ideal of general history, as that ideal might be
conceived by the supporters of sectoral specialization,
necessitates that no special emphasis be placed on the
facts within, and according to, the scope of any specific
academic discipline. But it is evident that in actuality
many historical accounts will be concerned with a particu¬
lar non-historical subject as the main point of interest
and the actual problem with which the historian is quite
legitimately involved: the subject, for example, might be
a strongly political or economic one. Notwithstanding the
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intrinsic nature of such a subject, it should be apparent
that the choice of an economic or political subject does
not entail an economic or political treatment of that
subject resulting in a specialized account of economic or
political history. An economic problem can form the topic
of a general historical account just as a non-economic
problem may be the subject of a work of economic history,
and plainly a similar position holds with respect to other
kinds of apparently specialized problems. And it must be
additionally remembered that many historical accounts will
be devoted to a particular problem which cuts across
subject boundaries. Any account must concentrate in one
way or another on a particular aspect of the past; and for
this reason, if we accept the arguments of the opponents
of general history, it would appear that a successful
attempt to give an account of the past in its totality
must be impossible. The integrating focus of a historical
work will lead to a material bias for which the historian
cannot compensate.
No historian, however, would maintain that in his
work he must not take account of some facts and ignore
others. What is meant, surely, by a good general history
is, for example, an integrally conceived book which may
devote separate but interconnected chapters to different
facets of a particular period or region or problem; or —
and this might turn out to present an even more integrated
view of the past — a book which, starting from one aspect
of the historical events under consideration — social
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life, for example -- may study all the other aspects in a
fair and balanced fashion in relation to this first,
central aspect. It is probably necessary for a good
general history to have a definite point of view or some
discernible orientation in the way it presents its account
of the past; it is not necessary for history to be limited
substantially by a concern with a specialized treatment of
its topic, or an orientation towards a specific non-
historical discipline.
The particular integrating focus of a historical
narrative will frequently be given by a main theme in the
narrative or by a thesis about some problem, perhaps,
which the historian is concerned to advance. What exactly
is meant by terms like "theme" and "thesis" will be
lg
developed later in terms of historical understanding.
It needs only to be emphasized here that, as I mentioned
above, the study of an economic problem need not lead to
an account of economic history, and that similarly, while
possibly specialized in itself, a theme or thesis need by
no means give rise to the production of specialized his¬
tory, even though it is the pivot of the narrative.
7. General history and the individual historian
If it is accepted that general history is the most
complete end-product of historical work, what important
points about general history are there to be noted with
13. See below, chap. VIII, sect. 3.
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regard to the individual historian? For the individual
historian two points of significance arise from the quan¬
tity of material on any one subject at the historian's
disposal. . The individual himself cannot possibly hope to
acquaint himself with all the material that is relevant to
his subject. The quantity of historical material that is
readily available in connection with any one subject (with
no account taken of new material that the historian's own
research may discover) can obviously be used as a contri¬
bution to the argument against the individual historian:
a group of historical workers, it would seem, will be able
to deal more easily with more of the relevant material
than will any individual. It may be that a working-group
will do better; but it will not be much more likely than
the individual to achieve universal coverage of the
material. Although the group will be able to cover very
much more, its real historical knowledge of the historical
situation, although probably greater in quantity, is very
unlikely to be much more representative of the subject
than that of the individual. All in all, given that he
adopts the right approach to his material, the individual
historian is capable of attaining no less adequate know¬
ledge and understanding of a historical situation than
is any group; what is necessary for correct historical
assessment is a proper sampling of available evidence, not
a complete survey of it. Such a proper sampling is fully
within the'individual historian's power. If the group has
the advantage of the historian in some cases, this will be
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balanced by the individual's openness to the workings of
intuition; for example, no group as such can make those
spontaneous connections between seemingly irrelevant facts
that may occur illurninatingly to the individual.
It may be objected that there will still be indi¬
viduals within the group, and so there will still be room
for intuition. However, the scope of the subject chosen
for group work and the method of approach to historical
study will be different from the scope of the subject an
individual historian would select and the method he would
use. Given the different scope of the group's subject and
its different working-methods, the workings of the indi¬
vidual mind alone are likely to prove inadequate.
It must be concluded that, in working on a narrative
of general history, the historian, as an individual who is
largely on his own, will be under a more or less severe
quantitative limitation regarding his use of material, but
that, in most instances, this will not entail a qualita¬
tive significance for the results of the historian's work.
Although an adequate sampling of the actual amount of
historical material will not prove an obstacle to the
powers of the individual historian, it may be that the
different sorts of specialized material, such as economic,
political, or scientific material, encountered in research
will present the historian with more serious difficulties
in his attempts at synthesis. Again, it would seem that a
group consisting of individuals with different specializa¬
tions could deal more satisfactorily with different sorts
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of material than the individual who, relatively speaking,
will be ignorant about the details of most or all non-
historical fields.
In dealing with the difficulties presented here,
however, another aspect of the historian's work has to be
taken into account — that of explanation. The topic of
explanation will be treated in detail later: for the
moment, it must be enough to remember that the explanation
of past events can form an important part of the historian's
work, although it is incorrect to think of it as being the
chief task of the historian and a necessary adjunct to his
work of description. Little specialized knowledge is re¬
quired to describe, but much will often be required to
explain. In a later chapter, however, I hope to show how,
even if the historian might seem deficient in some highly
specialized areas of explanatory knowledge, he can con¬
tribute through his very individuality to historical under¬
standing. And again, the literary considerations of a
historical narrative will ensure that where the historian
may seem to be placed at a disadvantage by his lack of
the requisite specialized knowledge, the artistic and
literary merits of an individual's work as a whole will
outweigh a technically more detailed explanation that is
19
possibly to be found in some hypothetical group's work.
In any case where specialized knowledge is indisputably a
19. For an examination of the affinities between the
historical narrative and various literary art-forms,
and the contribution .of the literary features of a
historical narrative to the understanding of history,
see below, Chap. VIII, sect. 3, and chap. IX, sect. 4.
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necessary requirement, there can be no objection (from
those who maintain the central importance of individuality
in history) if the historian requests assistance from
another individual, or group, possessing the appropriate
knowledge, and incorporates what he learns into his general
account. This kind of incorporation of another person's
knowledge into his account will in no way result in a
diminution of the significance of his own individuality in
that account.
Of course, there are many other problems connected
with general history which do not figure very importantly
among the problems of specialized history, since in the
latter kind of history, the problems the historian chooses
are already limited in a way that frequently entails
certain decisions about some theoretical issues in history.
Such problems as periodization, the choice of subject, the
selection of material, and the orientation of the narra¬
tive can form the basis of important and unavoidable
questions in general history; but in this present context
they are not problems peculiar to the individual historian
as such, and so they need not be treated here. Where
appropriate, I have discussed such problems elsewhere.
The problems of general history that are specific to the
individual historian are, as mentioned above, those of the
quantity of relevant material available to him even on
the smallest topics, and of the specialized material rele¬
vant to many historical problems with which he may have to
deal. Once the proper place of these problems in the
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historian's work has been made clear, it can be seen that
they cannot be used to argue against the primacy of the
individual historian in historical work; nor is a dedica¬
tion to specialized history in any way a pragmatic
necessity for the historian in his effort to write a piece
of history that both is worthwhile in itself and makes a
contribution to historical knowledge and understanding.
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VI
GENERALIZATIONS AND THEIR PLACE IN HISTORY
1. Introduction
It is necessary now to turn to a treatment of the
relationship of history and generalization, and eventually,
in consequence, to the relationship of history and the
social sciences. In this connection an examination must
be made of the arguments against the primacy of the par¬
ticular per se in history and in support of the importance
of the general and the scientific in history. However,
the position that history is a social science, together
with its consequence that, like any other science, it
cannot ultimately be concerned with what is individual
and particular, is not one that can be adopted without
examination as axiomatic. The general character of his¬
tory must be independently justified before it can be
decided that, because of this general character, history
must be considered to be, and henceforward developed as,
a social science. Similarly, it cannot be said, for the
opposing point of view, that history has an important and
essential intuitive element, and that consequently there
is little place left for generalizations and general laws
in a discipline that is forced to deal immediately and
intuitively with the concrete and particular. It must be
established first that history deals with the individual
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and the unique; only then can we assert that, on the basis
of the uniqueness of the particular in history, the practice
of history has an important and essential intuitive element,
and that because of the very personal nature of intuitive
processes, finished historical wrork necessarily partakes of
the individuality of those who wrote it.
For the purpose of this dissertation, it is necessary
for me to establish the primacy of the particular in his¬
tory, and to show that ordinarily the general is not some¬
thing that should be considered a central part of the
historian's field. It is not enough to show that history
is concerned with the particular — which is evident enough
in most cases -- it must be made clear that history is
fundamentally concerned with the particular, and it must
be established that written history is not to be thought of
as a social science.
One point is agreed on by all who discuss the rela¬
tionship of history and the social sciences, by the cham¬
pions of both "artistic" history and "scientific" history:
that is, that the basic "raw material" of history consists
of evidence that relates in one way or another to concrete,
particular facts. Even those who hold that history should
be considered a social science in the fullest sense of that
term must believe that somewhere in the development of the
work of the historian who is a social scientist, there has
to be present (at least logically) the equivalent of an
integrated historical narrative dealing primarily with
particular facts, for otherwise there could be no way of
225
passing directly from quite discrete past facts to full-
fledged generalizations unrelated directly to any specific
historical events; that is to say, the particular must be
related to other particulars in history before it can be
related to the general, and it is the historical narrative,
as it is commonly known, which most satisfactorily relates
the particular to the particular. Of course, this "his¬
torical narrative" may only be implicit at a certain stage
in the historian's work, or, in effect, the narrative
stage may have been borrowed, as "complete", from the
work of another person. Nevertheless, it is true to say
that in any general account there must be implicit one
or more accounts of the particular, which must be seen as
possessing a logical priority (but in no sense a temporal
priority) in development, even if these (possible) ac¬
counts have never been formulated explicitly. The his¬
torical narrative, history as "story", necessarily has a
place in any developed work connected with the past of
mankind.
Historical work as a whole, or, more generally, work
involving historical material, resolves itself, regarding
the degree of transformation of historical fact that has
taken place in it, into what may reasonably be thought of
as a logical continuum."*" It cannot be said that each of
1. It must be emphasized that in the following pages,
when I talk of a continuum, of priority, of stages,
and so on, I am referring only to development logically
considered. There is no intention to postulate any
real order of development. Indeed, I shall make it
clear at more than one point that any logical order in
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the stages which may be discerned in this continuum of
transformation is separate or is clearly delineated. It
is not simply the case that they do not have a clear de¬
lineation because they overlap. Each stage may build on
actual work, or be built on by the same work, so that
there is a continual interaction within the same devel¬
oping material between the various stages of historical
transformation, with the possibility that any stage of
work may be important developmentally not only for the
stage that follows it but also for the one that precedes
it: for example, interpretation of material may lead to
a search for new factual evidence, general principles
(generalizations) may bring about a recasting of the nar¬
rative account of particulars.
It will be useful to give some description, how¬
ever crude and unrefined, of the continuum or sequence of
stages in historical work. We may say that it begins with
the simple collecting of facts, the amassing of data, the
inductive formulation of certain conclusions from the
evidence, the bare presentation and (physical) classifi¬
cation of historical material. It progresses through the
(factual) elucidation of simple data and statements of
fact about the past to the assembling of some sort of in¬
tegrated account, involving among other things the some¬
times hazardous tasks of interpretation and explanation,
and from there to the working-up of historical material
the development of a historical account is continually
confounded in the real process of historical work.
227
into a finished narrative, which presents an understand¬
ing of historical situations that is often dominated by a
central topic, theme, or thesis. In other words, written
history develops through what is initially "technical"
history (or, as it has been called perhaps rather less
respectfully, "dry-as-dust" history) to what one writer
2
describes as "vivid" history.
From the stage of a finished narrative about the
particular, development of historical material may pro¬
ceed further: a study of the past may give birth to that
sort of account which generalizes, as one might say, in
an important wTay, making comparisons with other periods
and other places, coming to general conclusions and making
other sorts of general statements. From here the develop¬
ment of the work may logically progress towards the socio¬
logical or economic or political sort of survey. Such a
sociological, or other non-historical, survey, while it
may have been based on history, may itself be nothing more
than a general essay, or a series of such essays, in so¬
ciology proper. Its overt historical content may be mini¬
mal, and the actual past, as it figures in history, may
become largely an incidental reference: its usefulness for
telling us anything about the past in its particular as¬
pect will often be negligible.
2. Ihor Sevcenko: "Two varieties of historical writing",
History and Theory, $ (1969)• It is worth pointing out
that it is, of course, examples of the finished narra¬
tive, or "vivid" history, and, unfortunately, not al¬
ways the best examples of this, with which the ordinary
man is most familiar and which he considers to typify
written history proper.
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Although it is not to my purpose to discuss the
speculative philosophy of history in this dissertation,
we may in passing note that historical generalizing does
not lead only from history to the social sciences. If
historical material undergoes another sort of generalizing
treatment, for example, that treatment which sees events
in the development of mankind as part of a grand design,
a genuinely historical account will be transformed into an
account of speculative philosophy of history. As with any
proposed development of history into a scientifically gen¬
eralizing discipline, the ultimate result of a speculative
treatment of the past is that past events lose their in¬
trinsic significance and become mere instances of some
greater law, or, more grandly, ephemeral typifications of
some eternal verity.
2. The problem of the limits of history nroner
No-one would wish to deny that any point on the con- <
tinuum of the possible development of historical material
displays a close connection with history (both as past ac¬
tuality and its record) and the work of historians. We
can make this statement, however, without thereby being
obliged to agree that every point along the continuum is
directly a part of the discipline of history or a subject
for the immediate attention of the historian. Many other
disciplines, or significant parts of them, are closely
connected with history and the past, and, although
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they are often directly of very great use to some histori¬
ans in their work, they are indisputably not part of the
3
historian's proper business.
The problem regarding the nature of history and its
relationship with the social sciences, and the status of
history as a possible social science, is one that really
arises from the difficulty of deciding the precise point
at which the development of historical material reaches
its final stage as "history", and beyond which, therefore,
further development is no longer the historian's concern.
Beyond some point it is improper for the historian to
proceed while he still claims to be no more than "histo¬
rian". What follows the final stage of written history
is post-historiographical work, and properly belongs to,
or comes to form itself, some other discipline. Or, if
the historian really is nothing less than a social scien¬
tist, it may be that the final point of the sequence,
where history is fully a social science, is where at last
the historian decisively comes into his own. The result
of holding to this position would be that one would be
obliged to say that the preceding development of the ma-
*
terial of the past is somehow strictly a preparation for
this social science of history, and thus properly the
work not of the historian but of, for example, the ar¬
chivist or the annalist. In order to confirm or refute
3. The ancillary disciplines of history (diplomatics,
for example) are borderline cases here. However, they
are becoming increasingly specialized and independent;
and increasingly the historian simply accents the re¬
sults they give him without criticizing those results
internally.
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such a conclusion, a decisive answer must be made to the
question whether the historian should be an archivist, a
narrator, a social scientist, or even, perhaps, a philos¬
opher. How is the historian to treat man's past?
Behind any suggestion that history should be con¬
cerned with the general rather than with the particular,
or with the particular rather than with the general, there
is always a presupposition regarding the nature of the
task of the historian. If we are to continue to accept
that the historian's basic task is to tell a story, as was
asserted above, then it must be shown that certain func¬
tions sometimes supposed to be proper to historiography
are not in fact compatible with the direct and effective
execution of the historian's task.
In deciding the function of the historical account
it is important not to be misled by the general statements •
that frequently occur in actual examples of written his¬
tory by well-known writers. It is sometimes easy to
misapprehend the point of a general remark. Explicit
general conclusions such as the following are to be found
quite regularly in a piece of history:
There are to-day on the plains of India and China
men and women, plague-ridden and hungry, living lives
little better, to outward appearance, than those of
the cattle that toil with them by day and share their
places of sleep by night. Such Asiatic standards,
and such unmechanized horrors, are the lot of those
who increase their numbers without passing through an
industrial revolution.^
To end a book in this way (as Ashton does) can be very
4. T. S. Ashton: The Industrial Revolution, 1760-1S30
(London, 1948), 161.
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deceptive philosophically. Of course, the point of Ash-
ton's book is not to substantiate a general statement
like "Population growth without technological development
leads to conditions of serious general poverty". The last
passage is given only to stress one main thesis of the
book, that in the nineteenth century England, on the whole,
dealt satisfactorily with the problem of an increasing
%
population because she had passed through an industrial
revolution.
A general point may also be implicit in a passage
of history, as in the following example, in which there
can be understood some such generalization as "In a
situation where two races come into conflict, extermination
of one race by another leads afterwards to the advocacy of
international fraternization by the exterminating race".
If ... the Germans had succeeded in exterminating
their Slav neighbours, as the Anglo-Saxons in North
America succeeded in exterminating the Indians, the
effect would have been what it has been on the Americans:
the Germans would have become advocates of brotherly
love and international reconciliation. 5
I should mention that this passage is very close to being
an example of another frequently occurring type of histori¬
cal generalization, and a type, again, which is deceptive
in its generality. However, a treatment of those general
statements -- mock laws, as I call them -- which have no
empirically determined basis but rest rather on intuitive
attitudes of the historian, and which look delusively very
much like covering laws with an explanatory purpose but
5. A. J. P. Taylor: The course of German history (London,
1945), 15-
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are not laws at all, together with a discussion of their
importance in the historical narrative and their signif¬
icance for the historian's individuality in his work, must
be left until later.^
3. Restricted generalizations
Ideally history is a simple account or narrative
with a certain explanatory content; and, in the first
instance, it must deal with individual events. However,
a historical narrative does not on this account come to
exclude from its content limited generalizations (holistic
particulars and colligatory concepts), or generalizations
which are still specifically restricted in some way, or
even full generalizations (general laws and principles).
Limited generalizations, referring to holistic
particulars or collective entities, such as those that
occur in the following passage, are very much an integral
and central part of history proper, as I intend to show
in a later chapter.
The late-Victorians seem to have been no keener to
rule and develop Africa than their fathers. The
business man saw no greater future there, except in
the south; the politician was as reluctant to expand
and administer a tropical African empire as the
mid-Victorians had been; and plainly Parliament was
no more eager to pay for it. British opinion re¬
strained rather than prompted ministers to act in
Africa. Hence they had to rely on private companies
or colonial governments to act for them. It is true
that African lobbies and a minority of imperialists
did what they could to persuade government to ad¬
vance. let they were usually too weak to be decisive.
6. See below, chap. VIII, sect. 3-
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Measured by the yardstick of official thinking, there
was no strong political or commercial movement in
Britain in favour of African acquisitions. 7
This limited generalization acts as a conclusion or
a summing-up of part of the gist of the book as a whole.
But a historian's conclusion need not always be the
culmination of an argument: generalizing in a limited
way may be functionally important in the development of
the historian's argument itself, as could be maintained
about the following passage.
The essence of the spirit of the thirties was not
apathy but inertia: an incorrigible immobilisme in
State and society, a structural resistance to change,
and especially to any radical improvement. Far from
being apathetic, opinion of many kinds was exasperated
and despondent, made so by repeated experience of
inability to impose any effective control either on
policies or on the sheer course of events. Consciences
were deeply stirred, but they could find no outlet in
constructive action. The sense of helplessness and
drift that resulted may explain the escapist flavour
of the most fashionable cults. What appealed most
was "getting away from it all".°
As I have said, generalizations like these are an important
part of true history; but a further, more detailed exami¬
nation of them, together with an analysis of their nature,
Q
must be put by for the moment.
The type of limited general statement of which
examples have been given involves a conceptualization of an
individual particular as a holistic particular or
collective entity. There is another type of restricted
7. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher: Africa and the
Victorians (Garden City, N.Y., 196$), 462.
$. David Thomson: England in the twentieth century
(Harmondsworth, 196'5 ), 1B1.
9. They are treated below, chap. VIII, sect. 2.
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generalization where individual events are held to be
instances of a single pattern; this is the restricted
generalization in the sense of a formulated general rule.
These generalizations are quite often to be found in works
of history, and particularly in those works that are
statistically orientated. How do they relate to the
possibility that history is a social science? Can such
generalizations be understood to imply that the historian
is not really bothered about anything significantly
individual or with the particular considered in and for
itself, that history is rather concerned with what is at
least a restricted or localized generality? In fact, on
examination it will be found that true restricted general¬
izations, although they are in one way a possible stage
in the passage to universal generalizations, are func¬
tionally important and complete when their proper posi¬
tion in history is defined and elaborated.
The folloxving passage, which is not too obviously
statistical, is a good example of a restricted generaliza¬
tion that is put forward with the status of some sort of
historical law about causes and effects.
Within these decades [[5$ BC - AD 1073 every barbarian
uprising in Europe followed the outbreak of war either
on the eastern frontiers of the Roman empire or in
the "Western Regions" of the Chinese. Moreover, the
correspondence in events was discovered to be so precise
that, whereas wars in the Roman East were followed
uniformly and always by outbreaks on the lower Danube
and the Rhine, wars in the eastern T'ien Shan were
followed uniformly and always by outbreaks on the
Danube between Vienna and Budapest.10
10. F. J. Teggart: Rome and China (Berkeley, Calif.,
1939), vii; quoted by Haskell Fain: "History and
science", History and Theory, 9 (1970), 154.
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In fact, it may not be clear that, as it stands,
this passage is intended to state a general relation of
cause and effect; but, from what Teggart says elsewhere
in his book, it does seem to be meant as a type of general
statement of regularity and relationship. He claims that
correlations are 'historical facts' and 'of great signif¬
icance'.^""'' Indeed, the relation in the events described
is of the form 'such that when the first occurred (in the
T'ien Shan or the Roman East), the second occurred (on
the Pannonian Danube or the lower Danube and the Rhine),
and that, when the first did not occur, the second did
not occur', but the correlation is also a co-relation:
'it becomes evident that the events in Asia and Europe are
12
co-related'. The barbarian invasions are asserted to
have been 'occasioned' by wars in the Chinese border
regions; and the correlation given by Teggart is an exam¬
ple of how 'in the ancient world causes were follox\red
13
uniformly by effects'.
Clearly Teggart's statement is not a general law;
but it usefully demonstrates in what way a restricted
generalization, however rigorous it may be in itself, is
by its nature inadequate as a lav/. Despite apparent as¬
pirations, through the precision of its correlations, to
seem "scientific" in form, in Teggart's presentation it
is not in any sense a general law. If it is like anything
11. Teggart: op. cit., viii.
12. Ibid., 239.
13. Ibid. , 2LI+.
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in the physical sciences, it must be deemed to resemble,
for example, the summing-up in an account of a series of
experiments. A general lav/ in the physical sciences must
be more than a summary of a complete finite set of actual
occurrences, more, that is, than a description of a purely
concrete, constant regularity in an actual limited set
of individual events: it must be a formulation of a certain
state of affairs or a statement about certain conditions
in the world that is, ceteris paribus, valid for all times
and all places."^ Similarly, in the social sciences a
general lav/ must be more than a summary of a limited set
of events: it must make a statement having a universal
validity. If history were unreservedly to be a social
science, it would have to meet this requirement about
general laws, and its own laws would not be permitted to
carry restrictions regarding a particular region or a
particular period, and still be considered as "laws".
How exactly is it that the above example of a gene¬
ralizing statement does not attain the status of a lav/?
An answer may be sketched in terms such as these: a law
in the fullest sense must not refer to any specific region
(the Roman Empire) or any specific period (the first
century BG and the first century of our own era) as in
fact Teggart's statement does. If a generalization is to
have the status of a true general law, such references
14. Cf. Stephen Toulmin: The philosophy of science
(London,. 1953), passim. Toulmin distinguishes between
the abstract, formal' statement of a general law or
principle and empirical generalizations (or historical
reports about the discovered scope of a general law).
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to the particular must be removed. We could make an at¬
tempt to write such a generally valid law. Since precise
descriptions omitting specific references would obviously
be unwieldy in this instance, we could formulate some
such law in what would naturally be a makeshift, but not
necessarily disallowable, fashion. It would begin, per¬
haps: "In conditions like those existing in Europe between
5S BG and AD 107 every uprising by peoples like (that is,
corresponding in significant respects to) the barbarians
in Europe at that time follows the outbreak on certain
(specified) frontiers of an empire like the Roman Empire
at that time, or in certain (specified) regions like the
Chinese T'ien Shan at that time." The statement would
continue by making many relevant qualifications to this
first form of a general law. In other words, if we intend
to formulate a law, we shall have to give a restricted
generalization rather like Teggart's, and then say, with
many qualifications, that in conditions similar to the ones
outlined, parallel events will occur.
Nevertheless, what sort of practically satisfactory
general law could a procedure like this produce? What can
it mean to talk of conditions "like" those in Europe be¬
tween 5S BG and AD 107? How are we to know which features
of a historical event to pick out as the ones that matter
in this regard? Questions like these raise the problem
of the "relevant aspects" (as I call them) of a situation.
However, the relevant aspects that a historian finds in a
situation are used by him with an explanatory function
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given meaning by the whole structure of his individual
understanding of his subject. Discussion of this problem
must therefore properly be left until I come to treat the
nature of understanding in history.
4. The place of generalizations in history
We may say that Teggart's statement quoted in the
last section is a generalization referring to a number of
barbarian uprisings that took place over a considerable
period of years. The number of uprisings (an exhaustive
total) that took place in these years, and examined and
made use of by Teggart, is in fact forty. That the study
from which the general statement was made was exhaustive
is not pertinent to a consideration of its status as a
real generalization or general law. We could say that,
for Teggart's general statement to be true, it would have
to be the case that if evidence for another barbarian up¬
rising around the Danube came to light, concurrent condi¬
tions of the uprising would have to correspond with the
conditions stipulated by the statement. In this case
there is obviously a certain possibility, perhaps only a
small one, but all the same a very real one, that histo¬
rians, or archaeologists, or classicists will discover
that there occurred between the years 5$ BC and AD 107 a
barbarian uprising in Europe that was unknown to Teggart
and his sources. If all the circumstances of the uprising
were found to agree with Teggart's thesis, then it would
239
still be agreed that his general statement was true. In
fact, through this new example, it would receive further
confirmation: it would be further verified as a true
statement about the general condition of Rome and the
surrounding regions at a certain period, and as a true
generalization. Although we would not describe it as a
law, we could still accurately describe it as a historical
generalization, referring to features of specific past
facts that are already known.
A historical generalization is about known facts of
the past and nothing more; a law not only refers to known
facts, but also makes claims about the unknown. From em¬
pirical generalizations nothing can be deduced about
counter-factual statements or about future counter-in¬
stances. One can imagine that archaeologists from another
civilization in the future, unfamiliar in some ways with
various aspects of the culture of the Christian era, might
formulate it as a "law" that buildings appearing to serve
a certain religious function, which were called "churches",
are always oriented in a certain geographical direction.
This they would have deduced from the results of their
excavations. We today know it to be the general "rule"
merely, for there are exceptions, that the sanctuary of
churches is in the east. When the archaeologists of the
future eventually come across one of those few churches
of which the (traditional) east end is not the (real) east
end (and, given the frequency of the actual occurrence of
such churches as we know it, it could be some considerable
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time before they did come across one), they could well be
thoroughly puzzled; yet, because of their misapprehension
of their general "rule" as a full "law", they might deny
that this building could have been a church at all despite
its apparent similarity of form to previously discovered
churches.
In fact there are two possible ways of understanding
TeggartTs statement: we may understand it as a scientific
generalization, or as a generalizing historical statement.
If we examine the consequences of looking at it in each
of the two ways possible, we should take note of one impor¬
tant characteristic not shared, by the historical statement
and the scientific statement. This difference is to be
found in the differing significance, on the one hand, of
the result of the invalidation of the historical general¬
izing statement, and, on the other hand, of the result of
the invalidation of the scientific generalization. Thus,
outward invalidation through the discovery of a counter-
instance (that is, one which could not be satisfactorily
explained away -- for example, either by having special
features of its own, or because new attendant conditions
had some effect) would have a different significance in
the two instances. A statement which begins "All but one
of the uprisings in Europe between 5^ BC and AD 107 ..."
is no longer wholly a "pure" generalization, for, with an
unqualified exception included, even the possibility of
discovering the general principle relevant to the situation
seerns to have been abandoned; and if more than one set of
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events in conflict with the general statement is discov¬
ered, the generalization may soon cease to be a worthwhile
statement of probability, and may be of little use even¬
tually even as a "guide" for the social scientist. One
instance alone, with no relevant mitigating explanation,
is enough to ruin any claim by the statement to univer¬
sality and to the status of a full, certain generaliza¬
tion, if this is understood to mean a statement in which,
hopefully, a general principle of uniformity of some kind
is embodied empirically; Teggart, it should be remembered,
claimed that causes were followed uniformly by effects in
the ancient world. The same statement considered as one
involving generalizing on the part of the historian, will
probably be less impressive with one, or more than one,
counter-instance to be taken into consideration, but, from
the point of view of historical knowledge, it will be al¬
most equally interesting and of almost equal importance
and usefulness; and, with account taken of exceptions, it
is still historically important and useful precisely be¬
cause the historian is not concerned to come up with hard-
and-fast generalizations in his work. A rough generaliza¬
tion is still satisfactory for historical purposes because
the historian is still dealing with what is logically
particular, for example, the collective entity of the
Roman Empire.
It has been pointed out by several writers that such
generalizations (here including general laws) as those
putatively allowed to history do not require the complete
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absence of counter-instances in order to retain their valid¬
ity; that is to say, considered only on the level of the
individual and particular (the level of instantiation),
lav/-like statements in history stipulate no more than a
probability or a tendency. Hempel, for one, came in his
later writings to emphasize the satisfactoriness of state-
15
ments of probability as explanations. Thus the power of
prediction that is held by some thinkers to be necessary to
the concept of explanation enables the foretelling of only
a probable outcome rather than the certain outcome of an
event. There are intended to be, perhaps, certain prima
facie similarities between the laws of history and the laws
of physics, where events on the macroscopic level can be
formulated with certainty according to general laws and
principles, while the microscopic or sub-microscopic events
that constitute them can only be the subject of statements
of probability. Or, in another fashion, it may be intended
that historical laws are seen as analogous to those of hered¬
ity in biology, where, regarding the frequency of their oc¬
currence, the characteristics to be distributed among a
large number of future plants or animals can be stated with
a high degree of accuracy, although nothing of that sort
can be predicted about any actual future individual. Or
again, as relevant here we may recall the well-known example
of marriage statistics, where accurate explanatory statements
15. Compare "The function of general laws in history",
Journal of Philosophy, 39 (1942), with the title essay
°f Asuects of scientific explanation and other essays
(New York, 1965); this book also contains a revised
version of the first paper.
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and predictions can be made about annual totals (including
references to general explanatory concepts), while nothing
can be said about the possible or likely behaviour of many
individuals.
Such analogies as these are, in their import, direct¬
ly contrary to the central conception of the subject-matter
of history. What is important for much historical work is
precisely individual behaviour; so much historical work
concerns particulars that, if there are going to be laws
used and formulated in history and held to be part of the
very core of that subject, those laws must have an absolute
and certain reference to individuals (or other historical
particulars) and not simply to the tendencies of individ¬
uals, reserving accuracy for a historically macroscopic
level. If it is maintained that covering laws are both
central to history and can be satisfactorily about proba¬
bilities, then it will have to be held too that the histo¬
rian's final attention is to be given principally to the
general and only subsidiarily to the particular, since,
with the use of probable general laws, statements about
particular hard-and-fast facts and the explanation of past
events may often prove to be false. The central concern
of history with the individual and particular is the rea¬
son that one counter-instance does in fact invalidate a
general historical lav/.
In conclusion it may be said that the statement of
Teggart's about certain correspondences between the events
occurring in the Roman Empire and those occurring in the
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Chinese empire should be phrased less severely and regarded
as a simple generalising statement about particulars and
not as a real (scientific) generalization. With regard to
the dichotomy of the particular and the general in the con¬
sideration of history and its purposes, it is a historical
statement about the particular; and it is a statement about
the historically particular because it can be understood to
be about holistic particulars. For example, Teggart's
statement can be understood either as describing a condi¬
tion of a certain particular entity (namely, the Roman Em¬
pire and its sphere of influence), or as stating what was
going on in a particular region during a restricted period
of history in purely summary form.
5. History as a social science
Generalization may also be a result of historical
work in the form of the full general law. As their high¬
est-level generalization the social sciences have the gen¬
eral lav/ or principle, and the establishment of general
principles is ideally one of their chief aims. However,
few general laws have definitely been established in the
social sciences; and most established general statements
take the form of generalizations including one or more
specified elements.
A social science is intended to give its workers
scope to work wTith generalizations and (at its highest
level) within a general, abstract scheme. History does
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make use of generalizations, including the generalizations
of the social sciences, but it does not do so exclusively,
and it does not regard the general as the highest level it
may attain itself. A social science also works towards
the establishment of generalizations and general laws, and
this history for the most part does not do, although it
may make a generalization "in passing", so to speak, and,
more often, it may make remarks -- "mock laws" -- that
have the appearance of (but are not) general laws or "sci¬
entific" generalizations.
Historians are primarily involved in a treatment of
the particular. To talk of history as concerning single
and individual events, persons, institutions, and so forth,
does not mean that history can only be a matter of annal-
istic or archival wrork and nothing more. History must in
fact be more than this. Full generalizations need not be
excluded from historical accounts; however, they do have a
different relationship with history proper from the sort
of generalization which naturally belongs to history --
the use of holistic particulars and colligatory concepts,
or the generalizing statement like Teggart's already cited.
All the same, history is not concerned primarily with the
general, because the purpose of history is to tell us
about the past as such, the past that actually happened.
General statements, that is to say, full "scientific" gen¬
eral laws and generalizations, are not concerned with the
past alone,- or with the past as such; once they have been
formulated, they relate as much to the present and the
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future, and even to the hypothetical, as they do to the
past. It is true that many general laws have their origin
and rationale in the past, but, with respect to their the¬
oretical intent, this is something that is purely inci¬
dental.
If the ultimate purpose of history were to formulate
general laws regarding human behaviour, it could not be
interested in the past as such. It must be understood
that we cannot talk of "general historical laws" as some
special and distinct body of general laws; if genuine laws
of this type did exist, they would have to be "general
laws of human behaviour in the past" or their equivalent.
Yet, in so far as they would be general laws about beha¬
viour in the past, their very reference to the past would
preclude their being true general laws, for it would mean
that no validity was being claimed for them with regard to
the present and the future. General laws are valid for
the past, the present, and the future, since they cannot
take account of time that is merely relative to the ob¬
server. Any "historical" character they may claim can be
of no account for their theoretical status. Both in fact
and in theory general laws must tell us not about the past
as such, which is the subject of history, but about cer¬
tain sorts of human social behaviour, which will of course
include, but not exclusively or essentially, past beha¬
viour. Indeed, to fulfil its task in a proper way, any
new science of history,, as a social science concerned with
the general, would be fully justified in its activity of
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formulating laws and other generalizations if it looked
for its primary evidence in many other fields than the
historical past. If this were the case, a "historian"
would be compelled to study, for example, not only con¬
temporary events but also future plans and predictions
as matters ancillary to his historical studies and, more
importantly, as genuine focal points of interest for his¬
torical study itself.
I have shown elsewhere that history is concerned to
present a true account of past events. That is its prin¬
cipal and, when necessary, pre-emptive purpose as it
should be manifested in any individual historical narra¬
tive. If other purposes are involved in any actual work
of history they may in their own way be fully acceptable
purposes; nevertheless they are not necessary to, or in¬
herent in, the narrative work in its historical aspect,
that is to say, they do not help the historian to give a
more truthful account of the past. Ultimately, therefore,
such purposes must be considered extra-historical. It is
because of this fundamental concern of the historian with
the truth about the past that we can say that it is no
part of the historian's work to set about proving, for
example, any sociological, or political, or economic the¬
sis that is not bound specifically to some limited tempo¬
ral or spatial context -- to the history of some period or
region, or to the comparative histories of some particular
periods or regions. In any case, it is not inherent in
the nature of history that it should be a discipline with
21+6
a function secondary to any social science. For the bet¬
terment of human knowledge there is an obligation to con¬
sider the past in its own right, and therefore history,
and historical knowledge, must be esteemed equally with
other social disciplines and their knowledge.
6. History and the social sciences
I have said that historians need not concern them¬
selves with non-historical theories of the social sciences;
that is to say, the individual historian should not con¬
cern himself with these theories in their own right. Yet
obviously he must be interested in them as an aid to his
o™ understanding of history; and if it should so happen
that in his historical research a historian discovers a
particular theory of the social sciences to be proved
wrong, then clearly it would be an obligation on his part
to point this fact out publicly. All the same, it is no
concern of his to set out deliberately to prove or to dis¬
prove any genuine theory of the social sciences, as if to
do this were itself a real historical activity.
By reason of the nature of their subject-matter --
human affairs -- the social sciences have a considerable
and important bearing on written history. A more diffi¬
cult question regarding any intrinsically historical char¬
acter possessed by the social sciences concerns those
hypotheses and theories of the social sciences that do
have a historical context and are, in fact, generalizations
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about historical facts. If the historian believes that he
should concern himself with these, it must be with regard
to their historical truth, or with regard to how far the
assertions made by social scientists are actually borne
out by historical facts. If he does look at theories of
the social sciences, he will do so from the point of view
of history and not from the point of view of the social
sciences themselves: in other words, his purposes in look¬
ing at the historical aspects of theories in the social
sciences will include, for example, the intention that
historians (and others) should not be misled, rather than
that social scientists should be corrected. The historian
as such should not concern himself with the internal value
of general statements for the social sciences, or with at¬
tempts to formulate the ultimate, hoped-for generaliza¬
tions and general principles that some social scientists
are seeking.
Historical generalizations in the social sciences do
bear some resemblance to the passage of Teggart's previous¬
ly cited. The historical generalization of this form dif¬
fers from the generalization of a social science in so far
as the first may be considered, logically, as an end in
itself and indeed, from the point of view of historio-
graphical theory, should be treated as a statement about
the historically particular. In its function it may be an
end in itself, or a means to the establishment of some
similar general statement, that is to say, a historical
statement on the same logical level, or it may take on the
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role purely of one step in an argument about particulars.
In the social sciences, however, a historically restricted
type of statement like Teggart's must surely only be a
stopping-place in the formulation of a higher generaliza¬
tion, or, alternatively, it must be a practical derivation
from a general law (of a higher logical order) that has
already been formulated.
The individual historian is concerned to describe
and explain specific and particular events in the past.
History is about the individual and particular; and it
cannot be considered a social science without a change in
the definition of its subject-matter, nature, and purpose.
Nevertheless, in his efforts towards a greater understand¬
ing of past events the historian can, and should, make use
of the findings of the social sciences, just as, for exam¬
ple, among other disciplines, he makes use of the discov¬
eries of the physical sciences. Even so, it is important
for the historian to differentiate between using the find¬
ings of the social sciences and using the methods of the
social sciences, for these methods have not been evolved
for the purpose of dealing with the particular for its own
sake. Yet to say this is not to say that the methods of
the social sciences should never be used by the historian:
in the appropriate circumstances they may be of relevant
practical value for historical work, but without being in
any way the historian's primary methods. And it should be
remembered that although the historian, as a historian,
does not add directly or immediately to the findings, or
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theories, or conclusions of the social sciences, he may-
yet supply the social scientist with important data. Of
course we must always bear in mind what Bury wrote:
Mistory supplies the material for political and
social science. This is a very important function;
but, if it were the only function, if the practical
import of history lay merely in furnishing examples
of causes and effects, then history, in respect of
practical utility, would be no more than the hand¬
maid of social science.-1-"
We must remember that history is a discipline in its own
right, with its own standards and its own aims.
Although as a whole the historian's methodology may
not be a satisfactory one after the manner of the method¬
ology claimed by political science or economics or sociol¬
ogy, he may certainly be contributing, by means of his
proper historical work, to the development of the social
sciences. It is certainly better that history should con¬
tribute indirectly to the social sciences and retain its
disciplinary independence, than that it should attempt
itself to become a full social science -- a state that it
could only achieve imperfectly and to the disadvantage of
its true subject-matter.
The historian may well make use of the social sci¬
ences in order to deepen his understanding of the pro¬
cesses at work in societies, for these are the processes
at work in history. He understands these processes as
consequences of particular historical events. In appro¬
priate connections he may also make use both of any of
16. J. B. Bury: "History as a science", in Varieties of
history, ed. Fritz Stern (London, 2nd ed~ 1970), 214.
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of the empirical findings and of any of the theoretical
principles of the social sciences that he considers suit¬
able in order to formulate and justify his own descriptions
and explanations of specific historical actions, events,
and situations. Although history itself is by no means
a social science, the profitable use of the work of the
social scientist is unquestionably a legitimate part of
historiographical procedure; but it must always be empha¬
sized that in relation to historical work as written his¬
tory the general character of the various social sciences,
as that is shown in what they offer to history, is ancil¬
lary to the particular character of history proper. For
the historian it is not the particular historical event
that is somehow auxiliary to the proofs and theories of
the social sciences.
7. Conclusion
What I have said in this chapter may seem to have
rather a remote connection with the problem of objective
history and the individual historian. However, it must be
made quite clear that the subject-matter of history is the
particular and not the general. So long as it may be
thought that historians are concerned primarily with gen¬
eralizations and general principles and their instantia¬
tion in the past, that history is, or should be, a social
science, much of what I have to say in the next chapters
on explanation and understanding, and on history as a form
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of literature, might be disbelieved, for it is necessarily
dependent on the thesis that a very large part of history
is particular and complex and not general and analysable
in a scientific way.
Before proceeding with a discussion of explanation
and understanding, a brief recapitulation of what I have
said about the place of generalizations in history may be
in order. The particular and an account of the particular
are always present at some stage in investigations of the
past of man. A subservience to general principles would
destroy history as such, for a complete generality must
destroy temporal reference and thus eliminate precisely
the past character of history -- that character which
makes history what it is. Lower-order generalizations and
generalizing statements must be understood differently
according as they are meant for historical work, or as a
stage tov;ards a better general lav/, in which case their
importance will derive not from their reference to past
facts but from their presentation of empirical evidence
that may be used to support or construct a general theory.
When historical generalizations only state probabilities
the intrinsic significance of any actual historical par¬
ticular is again disregarded: in this case no claim is
made that the generalization will be found to apply to any
actual Particular. In short, history cannot be about the
past as such at the same time as it is thought of as a
generalizing activity. Of course, limited generalizations,
of holistic particulars or colligatory concepts, are quite
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a different case: logically they are still about particu¬
lars, and they still have a full and unequivocal reference
to a particular "piece" of the past.
The point I have tried to make about general prin¬
ciples, general laws and generalizations is not that they
have no place in historical work (for they do), but that
historical work cannot be defined exclusively in terms of
the general. History is the story of past events, and it
is plain that to provide us with a true story of these
events it must deal primarily with the particular. In the
following two chapters I intend to make clear the signifi¬





1. Three types of historical explanation
Ever since history began to be written, from the
first historical accounts of Herodotus and Thucydides down
to the present day, the function of the historian has been
conceived as the ascertaining of what happened in the past
and the relating of past events in such a way that the
reader may see not only wrhat happened but also why it
happened. Through the changing conceptions of the nature
and purpose of history the task of the historian has been
seen as the description and explanation of the past. In
their examination of the past historians, unlike social
scientists, are not primarily oriented towards particular
types of human behaviour but rather towards actual in¬
stances of thought and action. Because of this concern
with the concrete instance, which for the historian, of
course, has the final character not of a mere instance, as
of some greater class, but of an event which has a full
existence in and for itself, the historian must explain
events but must also proceed even beyond simple explana¬
tion. Explanation alone may easily remain a cold and
sterile abstraction, leaving the facts of history dead for
the reader and the historical events narrated devoid of
their essential qualities -- their human aspect and their
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existence as part of a greater and more understandable
whole. The greatest task of the historian is to impart to
his reader historical understanding. The isolated and
objective factual explanation must regain its historicity
and human quality by being integrated into a meaningful
whole; only through the integration that underlies the
historical understanding of the whole can discrete his¬
torical facts and explanations come to form what is truly
and completely a piece of written history, a historical
account.
The problem of historical understanding must be left
for treatment in the next chapter. It is necessary to
examine first some problems of historical explanation,
since explanatory statements form a part of historical
understanding, and are determined by and contribute to the
individual interpretation of a particular historian.
Explanation in history does not conform to any sin¬
gle pattern. It is probably true to say that there are as
many types of satisfactory historical explanation as there
are types of explanation in everyday life. Certainly all
types of explanation are found in the works of historians,
and are accepted in their own right when they form the
basis of a historical discussion; that is to say, in criti¬
cizing another historian's argument no historian ever
disallows a proffered explanation on the ground that it is
of a logical type unacceptable in historical work. For
example, a historian does not reject some rational explana¬
tion of an event just because it is a rational explanation.
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(Of course, he may feel that the rational explanation
requires supplementing in other terms; but that is a
different matter.) Historical explanations are criticized
internally., and their schematic terms are inevitably
accepted, although arguments that are intended to contra¬
dict or amplify them may take other logical forms.
In an attempt to achieve a certain simplicity of
exposition, my treatment of explanation will be confined
to a brief survey of three rather basic and clearly de¬
fined forms: rational explanation, covering-law explana¬
tion, and "explanation how".''" Each of these types of
explanation has been held by different thinkers to provide
the basis for a proper logical understanding of explana¬
tion in history; the first two types have been especially
emphasized by philosophers, while "explanation how" has
been the particular favourite of historians for, supposed¬
ly, providing the key conception of wrhat they do when they
explain something. It should be noted that there are
other forms of explanation that could easily be defined:
teleological explanation, explanation in terms of specu¬
lative theories, and (as it may be called) the "accident
theory" of history, which, although it offers genuine
explanations of events, offers none that are historically
significant or worthwhile, are examples that spring readi-
2
ly to mind. However, since I am not concerned to examine
1. Cf. R. F. Atkinson: "Explanation in history", Proceed¬
ings of .the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 72 (1971-72).
2. These are intrinsically more disputatious forms of
explanation: teleologica'l forms of explanation may be
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explanation in its own right or for its own sake, the
first three types, which are in any case the most commonly
discussed, will provide a sufficient indication of what
the historian can be doing when he is said to be explain¬
ing something.
That I intend to offer no intensive criticism of
the explanation-models offered by philosophers of history
may appear to be a serious shortcoming. But the subject
of this dissertation does not require any extensively
detailed internal criticism of the forms of historical
explanation. For the most part internal criticism of
various theories of historical explanation seems to be
intended either to facilitate an acceptance of a theory as
universally valid for actual examples of history or as
prescriptively valid for historians, or to refute that
theory altogether. I am concerned neither to advance any
one theory as universal nor to refute it. My claim is
only that each theory of explanation correctly describes
some actual instances of satisfactory explanation in his¬
tory. Therefore all that the next few pages attempt to do
is to give in outline the nature of historical explanation
and to substantiate satisfactorily claims that no one form
of historical explanation offers a complete description of
what historians do when they explain something.
reducible to other forms; speculative history seems to
involve explanation of another "higher" order (e.g., the
theological); the "accident theory" of history will
give standard explanations of many events, but will
also suggest that many events happened, really, by
chance, or emphasize simply that things happened in one
way rather than another.
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Explanation in history is very much an open-textured
concept, in some respects like the familiar philosophical
example of "game". Perhaps the most that can be said of
it in general is that it supplies a justification for the
historian's statement of some fact in terms that answer
the question "Why?" ("Because of what?" or "For what rea¬
son or motive?" or "To what end?") or "How?" ("Through
what circumstances?" or "In what way?"), or a justifica¬
tion in terms that appeal to the characteristics of a
holistic particular or colligatory concept. To show that
historical explanation is not a closed concept it will be
necessary to demonstrate how each single form of explana¬
tion is not a satisfactory way of describing all that goes
on under the description of historical explanation.
The covering-law theory of explanation, as that is
applied to history, is one that is discussed frequently
and intensively by philosophers at the present tirne.^"
There can be no dispute that the theory is certainly
applicable in many cases, and that historians, whether
knowingly or not, do make use of covering laws in their
explanations or give explanatory accounts which can be
represented or re-interpreted in ways that conform to the
covering-law model. However, historical explanations are
not all of one single type, either overtly or potentially
3. Holistic particulars and colligatory concepts belong
rather to the concept of understanding than to the
concept of explanation. See below, chap. VIII, sect. 2.
4. The discussion starts, of course, with the paper by
Carl G. Hempel, "The function of general laws in his¬
tory", Journal of Philosophy, 39 (1942).
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(through analysis), and the covering-law theory gives an
adequate description of only one sort of explanation.
W. B. Gallie, in Philosophy and the historical understand-
ing, provides a clear exposition of why the covering-law
theory cannot give a complete account of all satisfactory
historical explanations. His arguments may be summarized
£
in the following way. Firstly, because historical situa¬
tions cannot be reproduced experimentally, it often cannot
be decided whether a law applies exactly to a situation.
Secondly, in order to get laws to apply in a situation, it
is frequently necessary for a historian to hypothesize an
unobserved or unrecorded factor in the situation he is
trying to explain. Thirdly, many covering-law explana¬
tions turn out on examination to be indicative merely of
the necessary conditions, rather than the sufficient
conditions, of the explicandum. And fourthly, many expla¬
nations only remind us that 'a particular action is quite
in keeping with what we know of the behaviour and purposes
and standards of the agent, and perhaps of his age and
7
circle as well'. The case against the consideration of
covering-law explanations as the type of explanation in
5. (London, 1964).
6. It should be noted that in the way he discusses the
historian's application of covering laws, Gallie
constantly seems to be supposing that, if the his¬
torian did use them, his generalizations would be made
in an easily observable fashion. This is comparatively
rarely the case when the historian does make use of
covering laws; such laws are usually deeply embedded
in his account, or in the thinking behind the account,
and may often only be recovered with some difficulty
and labour.
7. Cf. Gallie: op. cit., 105-107.
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history is made very well. Since covering-law theorists
have not yet, and indeed would not be able to have, over¬
come the objections that are raised above, and since these
objections have their origin in history as it actually is,
and as it must be treated, the arguments must stand: not¬
withstanding the fact that covering-law theory can account
for an important proportion of explanations in history, it
does not supply us with a complete account of all histori¬
cal explanations.
Covering laws are not uncommonly used both explicitly
and implicitly in explanation by historians. Criticism of
the covering-law position as presenting a complete picture
of explanation in history has led unfortunately to an
equally untenable, extreme, opposed position. Donagan, for
example, writes:
The most striking fact about the Popper-Hempel theory
is that few of the innumerable historical explanations
found in the writings of historians even appear to ac¬
cord with it. Of the few that are ... put forward [[as
resting on covering laws} I shall argue that the puta¬
tive covering laws they contain are either spurious or
untrue.8
This argument of Donagan's comes in the end to rest on the
mistake of believing that everything in history is a matter
of rationally explicable behaviour. Covering laws may at
least adequately explain the effects of natural events in
history. Natural catastrophes, for example, usually have
considerable historical significance and need to be ex¬
plained (as to their initial results for human life) sci¬
entifically. And covering laws may also not infrequently
C. Alan Donagan: "The Popper-Hempel theory reconsidered",
in Philosophical Analysis and History, ed. William H.
Dray (New York, 1966), 142.
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be able to provide a successful account of rational actions
without the direct intervention of rational explanation
proper.
The theory of rational explanation has found its
most recent complete statement in W. H. Dray's Laws and
9
explanation in history. Dray's position is basically
that historical explanations tell the reader what the
rationale (in the end in terms of the individual) of his¬
torical actions was. Or rather, his position is that
rationality is not the only basis of the historian's ex¬
planations, but it is the source of that type of explana¬
tion which is characteristically historical. To say that
rational explanations are characteristic of history and
not in some way essential to history successfully avoids
the rather strong conclusions about the final subject-
10
matter of history of thinkers like Collingwood. However,
in actuality they are only characteristic of history in so
far as part of the subject-matter of history consists of
the ambitions, intentions, attitudes and so forth of indi¬
viduals. Where such matters figure largely in a narrative
(as happens frequently in history), it is natural that many
explanations will be couched in the same sort of terms.
For ordinary purposes we expect the explicans to be of the
same nature as the explicandum: where the two have differ-
\
ent natures we shall find ourselves presented with a
specialized treatment of a subject, such as that to be
9. (Oxford, 1957).
10. See above, chap. Ill, sect. 3.
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found in a psychoanalytic biography. Rational explanations
are no more characteristic of history as such than this --
that a very large part of the historian's subject-matter is
concerned with rational actions, and so naturally finds the
explanations of these in similar, related terms. They may
be used where the historian thinks them appropriate and
helpful (and naturally, where he believes them to be
genuinely explanatory), and where, given the way we usually
look at human actions, we should normally expect, and be
satisfied by, an explanation of the rational type. So many
historical events are open to a wholly or largely non-
rational explanation, however, that it would be better not
to describe rational explanations as "characteristic" of
history, since the use of such a word suggests a certain
primacy for that sort of explanation, as if, for example,
a rational explanation was only to be put to one side or
overruled in cases where it was clearly unacceptable or
impossible to formulate acceptably, or as if rational
action as such were to be identified as the true subject-
matter of history. Rational explanations are not the only
sort of historical explanation, nor are they the principal
sort, nor even primus inter pares (as characteristic of
historical explanation). They are only one sort of expla¬
nation open to the historian's use, and the historian will
use rational explanation when he believes that it provides
the most satisfactory account of whatever it is he has to
explain. -Naturally, the incidence of rational explanations
will vary between the narratives of one historian and those
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of another. If rational explanation predominates in, or
is almost entirely absent from, a particular narrative,
this will not be an indication that it is characteristic,
or uncharacteristic,of history: it will rather be a mark
of the historian's own philosophy of life, and how it is
that he thinks human actions and everyday events in
general (not just in history) are to be explained. The
type of explanation chosen — the extent, for example, to
which rational explanation predominates over causal expla¬
nation -- will tend to be a consequence of the historian's
own world-view or philosophical standpoint. It will be an
expression of the historian's own attitude about, among
other problems, how valid, or effective, or meaningful
a person's reasons for his actions really are. But this
point I shall develop more extensively below.
One practical point that can count against an un¬
hesitating adoption of rational explanation in history
needs to be mentioned here: it is that explanations in
terms of rationality can most readily lead to factual er¬
ror on the part of the historian. For example, an agent's
ambitions for the most part have to be deduced from evi¬
dence; rarely does the historian meet an explicit documen¬
tary statement like "My aims in this matter are such-and-
such." The historian has to gather what a man's ambitions
were from what other people said about him, or, even more
commonly, from what the man did and the way in which he
did it, and from what actually happened and similar very
11. See sect. 3.
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indirect evidence. If the historian is interested in the
most acceptable and most satisfactory explanation avail¬
able, he will be little inclined to pursue one sort of
explanation to a point where his conclusions seem doubtful,
but will give his explanation as far as possible in terms
of the material evidence that is available. Explanatory
reconstruction of rational factors in historical events
from indirect evidence is very often correct. However, if
the historian wishes to formulate rational explanations of
events and actions to the greatest extent possible, from
evidence of a non-rational type he may be led to postulate
plausible statements of rational explanation which —
however likely -- nevertheless have no factual support and
may be quite untrue. Rational explanations are at their
best when they are constructed from directly rational
evidence. When, for example, hypotheses about rational
behaviour are formulated from external evidence of actions
the chances are increased that such rational explanations
IP
will be both very plausible and quite untrue. The
acceptance of false rational explanations can have serious
effects for historical research: they may distract other
historians in their own work in the same field, and later
historians will not only have to prove their own theory
about events but will also have to disprove specifically
the plausible but false, rational theory.
12. A good instance is provided by Bryce's explanation of
the coronation of Charlemagne in $00; Barraclough
totally refutes it and points out that for Charlemagne no
idea of assuming the imperial title as 'the most appro¬
priate expression of the "universal" power of the
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The third principal type of historical explanation,
"explanation how", is the hardest of the three types to
define rigorously. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that
some historians at least prefer to disregard more conten¬
tious theories of explanation, maintaining that as his¬
torians they do not provide explanations of events in any
strict sense that may be laid down by theorists, but that,
when they appear to be explaining something, they are
simply providing for their readers a more extensive des¬
cription of events; that is to say, they give more details
of attendant conditions, of significant circumstances that
may have had an influence on events, of those aspects of
an individual's personality that seem relevant to the way
he acted, without ever making an explicit link of "cause"
and "effect". Explanation that is offered in terms of
more detailed description is one of the factors that goes
to make writing a historical narrative a truly literary
pursuit; and, given an increasingly detailed description,
the reader comes to reach a historical understanding of
past events through a grasp of the whole rather than by
means of analytic explanations.
Simply because there is no postulation of cause and
effect in the historian's "explanation how", the philos¬
opher can hardly consider this type of explanation -- the
extended and deepened description -- to be explanation at
Frankish monarchy, lay behind the events of 800; the
imperial crown was not (as Bryce maintained) "the goal
towards which the policy of the Frankish kings had for
many years pointed".' (The mediaeval empire: idea and
reality (London, 1950), 9.)
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all from the logical point of view. However, this con¬
sideration should not obscure for us the importance of
descriptive explanation in history and its significance
for both causal and rational explanation. Explaining how
is, in many instances, to be seen as that part of the
historian's work which leads him from description to
explanation. An explanation cannot be formulated unless
we have a detailed description of what is to be explained;
but the details of that description and their arrangement
will already partially determine the explanation that is
to be given. And a detailed description without any
accompanying explanation (in the strict sense) will in any
case suggest to a reader the possible applicability of
certain explanations rather than others.
The difficulties which descriptive explanation --
"explanation how" -- can present in practice should not be
minimized. Nevertheless, the "how" of an event seems
initially less disputatious and somehow more objective and
discoverable than the "why" of an event. Some historians,
as I have said, would like to halt the development of their
work at saying how events took place, presumably thinking
to allow the reader to formulate explanations which he
will find satisfactory in terms of his own favoured
theories or his philosophy of life. More constructively,
descriptive explanation can be seen as a bond of compre¬
hension between description and what may be termed expla¬
nation proper (causal or rational explanation); it seems
to demand this stricter sort of explanation, since that
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past events happened in the way that they did rather than
in some other way is a fact that requires ultimately to be
explained by the historian or by someone else.
The realization of the necessity for saying how past
events happened -- which, in some ways, can be seen in
itself simply as description -- has the consequence of
showing us that Pure historical description is inadequate
for the full conception of written history, and that the
historian's task must inevitably include explanation. The
description or explanation of how events came about is, of
course, an indispensable part of any intelligible narra¬
tive, for it is only in this way that discrete historical
facts are linked up. Yet "explanation how" is itself
incomplete without "explanation why", in so far as it
already presupposes, or contains within itself, causal or
rational explanation. That is to say, the historian
cannot describe how certain events happened without in¬
cluding in his account descriptive statements that contain
implicitly in themselves rational or causal features which
should prove to be the sources of possible full rational
or causal explanations. It is because of this that des¬
criptive explanation can most usefully be seen as the
bridge between description and explanation proper: it
presents us with a future explanation, even though any
explanation is still implicit in an account that appears
to be a simple description of events.
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2. The role of explanation in history
Quite clearly many historians see the function of
historiography in the historian's telling of a story,
believing that any explanation is to be conceived princi¬
pally in terms of saying how something happened. A. J. P.
Taylor, for example, writes:
What Hexter likes in history is explanation. He
argues that every "How?" can be turned into a "Why?"
Here, I think, like most historians who try to explain
what they are doing, he is forcing a card. He is
asserting that the history he likes is History.
I favour the sort of history that answers the ques¬
tions, "What happened next?" and "How did it happen?"
The Whys will then look after themselves.13
Nevertheless, we must not forget that all historians
explain (in a full sense), and some do so extensively.
They do not offer explanations only as subsidiary to a
general narrative story: some accounts are themselves
conceived as explanations of greater or lesser events, and
without this explanatory function they would have no point
as stories. Genuinely historical accounts have subjects
like the causes of the War of Jenkin's Ear, or the causes
of the French Revolution, or the origins of the First
World War; and topics like these are unquestionably of
frequent occurrence in history. Historians do not simply
never do more than tell stories, as if telling stories
could always be an end in itself.
When attention is focused on the purely narrative
aspect of history, it is easy to conceive a historical
13. Review of The history primer by J. H. Hexter, The
Observer, 17 December 1972.
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account as a piece of writing that simply tells us the
story of what happened and goes no further than descrip¬
tion; and it is true that many accounts conform to this
conception. Consequently, it is very easy to regard
explanation in a historical account as subsidiary to
description, and logically as almost an incidental part of
the historian's work; reacting perhaps to too much philos¬
ophizing about their work by non-historians, historians
themselves are sometimes disposed to regard explanations
in this light. The clearest philosophical exposition of
this view has been put by Gallie.
Historical understanding is the exercise of the ca¬
pacity to follow a story, \\rhere the story is known to
be based on evidence and is put forward as a sincere
effort to get at the story so far as the evidence and
the writer's general knowledge and intelligence allow.
But to follow an historical narrative always requires
the acceptance, from time to time, of explanations
which have the effect of enabling one to follow further
when one's vision was becoming blurred or one's credu¬
lity taxed beyond patience.
This, I maintain, is the peculiar and all-important
role of explanations in history: they are essentially
aids to the basic capacity or attitude of following,
and only in relation to this capacity can they be
correctly assessed and construed. 1^-
Explanation is simply ancillary to a descriptive story; it
is not significant in itself, but is to be employed merely
as a useful aid towards understanding history (which, for
Gallie, means following a descriptive historical narra¬
tive). The actual type of explanation the historian uses
has no significance within history: the debate, for exam¬
ple, between rational explanations and covering-law
14. Op. cit-. , 105. For. a criticism of expressions like
"the story" (more commonly, "the truth about the past"),
see below, chap. VIII, sect. 9«
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explanations ceases to be a vitally important one for the
discipline of history. Logically, explanations in history
may be of a causal or a rational type; nevertheless, what
really matters for philosophical discussions of history is
the practical function of an explanation as it is found in
the narrative. So it is that Gallie writes:
Once we consider their pragmatic aspect, however, we
can hardly avoid the conclusion that the characteristic
function of explanations in history is an ancillary one.
It is, to repeat, to enable us to follow a narrative when
we have got stuck, or to follow again more confidently
when we had begun to be confused or bewildered. Hence
explanations in history, like the explanations we ask
for or volunteer to fellow spectators at a game, are in
the nature of intrusions: they are not what we primarily
came for -- the play, that is the basic thing. Or, in
old-fashioned logical parlance, explanation is a
proprium of the basic activity of following an histori¬
cal narrative: but a proprium to whose relative impor¬
tance or complexity or bulk within any given narrative
no a priori limits can be set. This view seems to imply
that, unless or until it needs to be "righted" -- as
well as logically endorsed -- by a helpful explanation,
every historical narrative is, in an appropriate sense,
self-explanatory.15
If Gallie means us to take literally his statement
that explanations are characteristically offered us (in
even the most descriptive of histories) when we are ' stuck'
or 'confused or bewildered', it can only be said, unfor¬
tunately, that this is most certainly not the case. On
the one hand, historians offer us explanations in passing
all the time; with regard to most of the explanations they
provide for their readers, it cannot be said that the
narrative would be harder to follow without them, or that
confusions are cleared up (or that clearing-up is even
attempted) by them. Perhaps it needs to be explicitly
15. Ibid., 107-108.
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noted all the same, of course, that explanations are some¬
times offered oxuite clearly with an elucidatory intention.
On the other hand, explanations may often be as bewilder¬
ing as the events they purport to explain. In some cases
they may even be more bewildering. For example, an ac¬
count of how the First World War started and the general
conditions in which it could occur is less bewildering
than a full explanation of the actual "causal chain"
(within those conditions) which brought it about. At this
point it can be said of explanations in history that many
of them, but by no means all, are undoubtedly subsidiary
or ancillary to the narrative, or story, and serve not at
all to clear up confusion but to provide an ever more de¬
tailed description and to "deepen the picture". And some¬
times explanations occur simply because the historian's
natural curiosity leads him to offer an explanation of an
event without any commitment of himself thereby to a gene¬
ral theory of the logic or function of explanations in
history.
Nevertheless, as I mentioned, explanations are often
in the course of an account offered by the historian with,
as Gallie says, the purpose of clearing up confusion and
to help us to follow the story more easily. The comments
Gallie makes on this function of explanation need there¬
fore to be remembered as telling us what the purpose of
some explanations is in a historical narrative. Notably,
the need .to explain arises most obviously when the tex¬
tual critic or the historian is compelled to depart in
some marked and important way from the received text or
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from the historical interpretation which has been tradi¬
tionally, or which would be most naturally placed upon
it ... whenever he departs from the commonly received
account of certain famous events, or whenever his inter¬
pretation or assessment of events that he is presenting
for the first time runs counter to our natural custom-
born expectations and habits of judgment.
... A sense of implausibility in the received account,
a suspicion that many possible motives and opportunities
for action have hitherto been neglected because of bias
or unimaginativeness or both -- such are commonly the
beginnings of an historical explanation, which will con¬
clude by endorsing a much more acceptable account of
what must have happened.1°
It must also be made clear, especially when a certain
rigour is demanded of the historian's explanations, that
the historian's use of explanatory words is often not in¬
tended to convey the same intensity of meaning or to claim
the same exactness as the scientist's use of those words.
Historical explanation is not all that it might seem to be
from the language it uses.
As they occur in historical narratives such words as
"hence", "thus", "therefore", "because", etc., evidently
lack the clarity and fixity of meaning which they pos¬
sess in formal logic and in the natural sciences. Very
often in an historical narrative a "therefore" or a
"because" serves simply as an aid to the reader, urging
or reminding him to hold together under his attention a
succession of incidents which, in fact, need no explana¬
tion at all. ... In sum, what appear to be explanatory
sentences -- or what might be taken to be such by over-
zealous logicians -- can often perfectly well be
16. Ibid., 114-15. Two incidental points may usefully
be noted here: firstly, Gallie does not distinguish
between explanations internal to the narrative (e.g.,
'A' happened because 'B' happened) and justifications
by the historian of an internal explanation (e.g., his
statement that he believes that 'A' happened because
'B' happened, because it accords with such-and-such an
interpretation). At some points the two explanations
shade into each other; at other points they are very
far apart and quite unconnected. Secondly, Gallie
seems to confuse explanation with interpretation when
he suggests that explanation gives us an account of
"what" must have happened (rather than "why" or "how"
events happened in the way that they did).
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replaced by a number of narrative sentences which no
one would dream of regarding as explanations.17
Gallie, admittedly, gives a good account of the
pragmatic aspects of some historical explanations. Even
so, what he says is by no means an exhaustive account of
all valid explanations in history, pragmatically or
logically. Many historical explanations simply are not
found just when we need an aid in following the narrative;
reasons for the provision of an explanation in a historical
account can be very varied. As Gallie says, an explanation
may be given so that we do not get stuck, or lose the
sense of the narrative; but it also may be provided, not
because the narrative is difficult to follow, but simply
because the curiosity that impels a person to find out
what happened in the past will also be likely to impel him
to find out why it happened. An explanation may be given
to place an event, such as a revolution, in its class, in
terms of a general law, to showr hovr its causes resembled
the causes of other members of its class. One may be
furnished to show how an event differed significantly from
other members of its class, that is, to show that it is
not subsumable under a general law. An explanation may be
supplied in order to deepen the historical picture; perhaps
of little significance in itself, it will enable the
historian to give full details of subsidiary events within
the structure of his narrative. Most often in history an
explanation will be offered because the description of an
17. Ibid., 110-11.
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action or an event just seems incomplete without an expla¬
nation: an event will be puzzling in itself without being
problematical as part of a narrative. That, for example,
the Labour government devalued the pound in 1949 is an
event that, with no explanation offered, I can take in my
stride in a historical narrative as it fits into its des¬
criptive context; yet an explanation would normally be
expected. Certainly, most persons with an interest in the
post-war years would be curious for an explanation, in
terms of causes and purposes, personalities and economic
factors. Certainly, I expect some sort of explanation
from a historian of most events like that; a historian can
neglect to explain some events, but he cannot neglect to
explain all, even though his reader should remain uncon-
fused. It may be that many explanations have no pragmatic
function internal to the historical narrative; it could be
the case that there is some inner compulsion in man's na¬
ture which leads him to follow the question "What?" with
1 ti¬
the question "Why?".
Explanation has a different and more functional rela¬
tionship with some descriptive narratives. The second
point to note with regard to what Gallie has said is that
l£. Although it is only of marginal relevance, it may be
noted here that American historians are concerned more
extensively with explanation than are English histori¬
ans, both in their practical work and, consequently, in
their thinking about their practice. This concern with
explanation is certainly one reason that Americans see
history as a discipline close to, or even as one of,
the social sciences. With a greater concern for his¬
torical description of the particular, English his¬
torians are readier to see as significant in a histori¬
cal narrative at least some of the features of other
types of literature.
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not all historical accounts, especially those of the
"monograph" type (which are often examples of "narrative"
even in Gallie's narrow sense of a lengthy story with
sequential development) but also those of book-length, can
be classified simply as descriptive narrative, as Gallie
seems to be suggesting. Many historical narratives are
not only explanatory in part but also explanatory consid¬
ered as a whole. As I pointed out above, a history book
may well be principally about the causes (or origins) of
a historical event like the First. World War. Obviously a
work with a topic of such scope will seem to be definable
as descriptive; and it is most certainly the case that it
tells a story. But the point to be made is that the des¬
cription or the story is not an end in itself; it is not
the story of what happened, as a history of the war itself
might be. It is thus not a narrative that is complete in
itself and needs no external reference: it is the story of
why or how something else happened, and in so far as it
tells us what happened, this must be seen and can only be
understood, and is even only conceptually complete, in
relation to something external to the story. The narra¬
tive as a whole is -- in the end -- not descriptive but
explanatory; in effect, it is a very large-scale explana¬
tion. Once it is realized that explanation can figure so
largely and so dominantly in historical work, it is no
longer possible to hold that explanation in history is
an activity of the historian that is primarily a subsidi¬
ary one.
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I should now make clear what I consider to be the
consequences, at least with respect to the individual
historian, of what I have said about explanation in
history. To sum up, historical explanation may take many
forms -- rational, causal, "explanation how", teleological
and so forth -- all of which are to be found so frequently
in historical narratives and are so regularly accepted by
historians that they must all be considered legitimate in
history. With Wittgenstein's points about a concept like
"game" in mind it should be easier to understand that all
instances of a concept, all our uses of one word, need not
share a common property. While some examples of "explana¬
tion" will have something in common, and any one example
must share something with some other examples, any two
"explanations" may have nothing in common, except (and
perhaps this is not as trivial as it sounds) that we refer
to them by the same word.
Historical explanation cannot be defined in terms of
one logical form, and it cannot be understood in terms of
one single function, such as Gallie's notion that it
primarily helps us to follow a story. Written history
itself is neither primarily descriptive nor primarily
explanatory.
3. The historian's choice of explanation
The multifarious nature of historical explanation,
its character and purpose, have considerable consequences
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for one of the historian's main tasks, selection.^ If
there were one form of historical explanation recognized
as the type of historical explanation, in either logical
or functional terms, the historian's methods of selection
would at once become much more straightforward and the
chances of an immediate attainment of an undisputed
objectivity much greater. If historical explanation were
understood to be rational explanation, the historian who
was seeking to explain some event would know what sort of
evidence he was looking for to provide him with material
for an explanation: he would above all be looking for
factual evidence about the characters of the protagonists,
about their motives, ambitions, intentions, about their
real place in, and influence on, the course of events.
Or, if the historian is obliged to explain things in terms
of general laws, if historical explanation is of a
scientific, covering-lav; type, he will again knov; what he
is looking for: seeing an event as a member of a particular
class of events, he will knov;, from his knowledge of
general principles believed to be applicable to historical
studies, that he is searching for causes of a particular
kind, which will provide him with the explanation he
wants. Or, if it is not the logical but the functional
form of explanation that is significant for history, the
historian will knov; that he must provide that explanation
which fulfils its function best: if it is a case of helping
19. The problem of selection has already been discussed
in another context above, chap. IV, sect. 2.
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the reader to follow a story, the historian \\Till ask him¬
self which explanation will clear up the reader's confu¬
sions most effectively.
The necessity of providing any one explanation of a
certain type makes the explanation given by the historian
one that is open to objective criticism, leaving much less
scope for a historian's bias to have a deleterious effect.
If explanation in rational terms is demanded, for instance,
with the result that the historian says something like
"The event X happened because the individual A wanted
power", the critic can only ask two questions, "Did A want
power?" and "Was A in such a position that what he wanted,
and his attempts to attain what he wanted, could influence
events?". These questions can be settled by recourse to
material evidence and general principles of, among other
disciplines, psychology and political theory. (Sometimes
it will only be clear in theory how such questions might
be settled, since for practical reasons such as insuffi¬
ciency of evidence they may remain in dispute.)
Once it is granted, however, that satisfactory his¬
torical explanation can be of different types, the critic
can ask the very complicating third question, "Although it
is true that A wanted power and seemed to be in a position
to influence events, are A's ambitions a true explanation
20
(or the real explanation) of event X?" Nov/ it is the
20. The best-knov/n examples of the sort of problem that
is involved here are provided by the "great-man" inter¬
pretations of history. Some historians quite evidently
believe that great men are innately and necessarily
exceptional persons; others believe that events make
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case, obviously, that on many occasions both in history
and in everyday life we cannot answer this question by
having recourse to factual evidence or objective princi¬
ples. It is up to the individual historian to decide
which sort of explanation he is to provide according to
his own principles (notwithstanding the fact that in many
cases the type of explanation that will be expected by his
readers is made clear in the kind of subject-matter the
historian is studying). The type of explanation which
predominates in the work of a particular historian is
representative of that individual's own world-view, his
own philosophical standpoint. Different types of expla¬
nation do not of necessity mutually falsify each other on
the level of the particular event: individual explanations
find their place within the whole explanatory scheme of
the historian. Just as in discussions of the problem of
determinism one does not argue the case of free will versus
determinism in each particular instance as if there were
something actually present in the factual evidence about
any instance of behaviour which might help us to solve the
question on each occasion (rather, one argues the case in
general terms, using particular instances as illustrative),
and just as a free-will explanation stands or falls on the
great men when circumstances are propitious. In a
generic way, one can find this difference in point of
view existing, for example, between social history and
biography. In social history individuals figure only
to a small extent and seem in most cases to have their
actions, if not dominated, at least determined by
events; 'in biography- individuals (of necessity) figure
to a large extent and seem unequivocally to be the
masters of their actions.
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principles underlying it, so a tenable rational explana¬
tion of a historical action cannot be set up against an
equally tenable covering-lav/ explanation and supported by
an appeal to the factual evidence. When an explanation is
coherent and factually well-grounded then it can be ac¬
cepted or rejected, only as its underlying principles are
accepted or rejected. Even in scientific studies the
scientist ultimately decides between explanations that are
equally satisfactory according to his own worid-view; as
Kdrner has pointed out:
What is required for a urational explanation" depends
on the scientist's conception of what constitutes a
"good" theory -- e.g., that such a theory must be
mechanistic, statistical, teleological, etc. These
conceptions or attitudes are articulated by normative,
regulative or programmatic principles for the construc¬
tion of theories and are not captured by any analysis
of the formal structure of theories and their relations
to experience. They are rooted not only in logic and
observation, but also in the scientist's view of the
world as a whole, i.e., in his metaphysics.21
Since no one type of historical explanation is in¬
herently preferable, logically or functionally, for his¬
torical work, the type of explanation the historian chooses
for any action or event in his account is very much a per¬
sonal choice of the historian. Sometimes, it is true, the
option of choosing between a rational and a causal explana¬
tion of the same event will not be open to him, and his
choice will be determined by the nature of the factual
evidence; very often, however, an explanation will be de¬
termined by the historian's own principles, by his ideas
about the metaphysical character of man and the world.
21. Stephan Ifdrner: Fundamental questions of philosophy
(Harmondsworth, 197~1), 90.
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Although in many cases what happened in the past will
suggest to the historian the type of explanation that is
suitable in a wray in which we find one type of explanation
rather than another suitable in our present everyday
experience, this cannot be the sole determinant of the
explanation-type in history. In many instances it will
simply not be clear which tjrpe of explanation is the one
demanded by the context of events; in these cases the type
will be determined not by the real past events which are
to be explained, but by the philosophical scheme implicit
in the narrative. In these circumstances one simply can¬
not talk about the explanation (among a number of different
types of explanation offered with reference to a single
historical event), as if the other explanations were wrong,
or inferior, or somehow figurative or metaphorical, or
mere aids to understanding. If there is internal coher¬
ence in a narrative, one can only choose to quarrel with
the explanation-scheme, not with any single explanation
v/ithin a scheme. One cannot talk of a "correct" explana¬
tion except within what can only be described as a meta¬
physical scheme.
4. Significance
The significance or importance of different events,
individuals, institutions, and other subjects of histori¬
cal study plays an essential role in written history. In
a historical account it is essential to the explanation of
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the particular and the understanding of the whole that all
events are not narrated as if they were equally important.
For example, event A will be seen as crucial, event B
clearly has an important bearing on affairs, while events
C and D are, despite appearances, entirely peripheral to
the situation; individual X personally affected the course
of events, whereas individual Y simply swam with the tide
and can thus be discounted, and so forth. The selection
of material that is "significant" in any particular
account, and which it is hoped will provide the explanation
of events, depends in the first place on what the historian
believes is significant in the world, or on what he thinks
can be significant in the world; and this, to a marked
extent, will depend on the historian's personal scheme of
values and not only on the relationship of one event to
other events that preceded or followed, or were simulta¬
neous with, it.
Now, it is obviously easy to believe that, if
objective history is to be possible, there must be an
objective significance and an objective importance pos¬
sessed by the constituents of the past, so that the degree
of importance (if one could somehow measure it with a
certain exactness) would be one that was constant and
objectively established. It might be held, for example,
that the French Revolution is a clear instance of an event
that is undoubtedly of immense significance in any scheme
of history, and consequently must possess an objective
significance. The soundness of this sort of evaluation,
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in respect of significance, of the French Revolution is
thought of as a paradigm of what might be achieved by
historians in their evaluation of many other events. Yet,
even when it is asserted that the French Revolution is
significant in history, we may insist on having an answer
to the question, "In what history?" The answer, of course,
is likely to be: "In world history", or "In the history of
the world", since it will be readily conceded that the
French Revolution could have little or no significance in
a social history of India or a cultural history of China
or a general history of black Africa; nor is it of central
importance even in a history of the United States although
it figures largely in some ways in American history. So
it might be agreed that the French Revolution certainly
has what is basically a European significance, but, all
the same, it has such an enormous significance in European
history, and as an event had so many effects in the world
beyond France, that it must be held to be, in an unquali¬
fied way, "historically significant". If it is acknowledged
that the French Revolution has a significance for world
history, this significance must be seen as non-relative
(to any particular region or topic of history) and as
indisputable, just because of the vastness of its conse¬
quences. Thus it will be maintained that it has an
objective significance in history because it is indisputably
significant, and significant for the history of the world
as a whole (although not necessarily for every part of
it). However, this argument does not take into account
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that although it can be maintained that the significance
of the French Revolution is not relative to any area or
topic, it cannot similarly be held that its significance
is not relative to time. The importance of the French
Revolution is relative to the world history of today. Of
course, it may continue to have an indisputable signif¬
icance, although in two thousand years' time it will be as
remote from the people of that era as the Peloponnesian
War (which still has a significance in world history) is
from us today, while two thousand, years after that it may
get no more than the equivalent of a lengthy footnote in
contemporary histories of the world. Even though its
academic significance may be maintained, its real signif¬
icance must diminish with time. Yet even its academic
significance may not be permanent, for history itself
shows how easily whole civilizations may be swept away
with only the barest of memories remaining. All signif¬
icance is intrinsically transient, although it may happen
contingently that the historical significance of some
events is never lost. Historical significance is always
relative to something within history, such as an area, a
topic, or a period of world history. If there is to be
objective significance it cannot be thought of as a
significance that is non-relative: it will always be rela¬
tive to something, it will always be in its own nature
impermanent, and, consequently, there will always be some
conceivable, relevant historical context in which its
significance may be entirely denied.
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In order to counter possible objections, it may be
observed here that if knowledge is conceived as in some
way socially determined or defined, then significance,
where some historical event has a significance for a
particular society as a whole, will be non-relative and
absolute in the requisite sense. However, it should have
become sufficiently clear by now that my own conception of
"objectivity", "significance", and other terms that can
be interpreted in a socially relative way, demands for a
term like "absolute objectivity", and would demand (if it
were possible) for a term like "absolute significance",
22
an absoluteness that is not intrasocietal but intersocietal.
However, although the significance of an event is
always relative, this does not mean that the attribution of
relative significance cannot be objective and absolute. It
must be continually borne in mind that words like "signif¬
icance" and "importance" are words that require to be
related to something, that is to say, they are inherently
relative, and where the relational complement necessary for
their full meaning is not given it must be understood. We
may talk of "significance" and not qualify it in any way,
but the relation is always implicitly there; "importance"
is always in or for something or to somebody, even if
ultimately for mankind as a whole. Significance in history
is relative to the constituents of the historical account.
It is dependent on the historian's evaluation of events,
and is a significance related to those events and the
22. See also above, chap. IV, sect. 3.
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historian's interpretation of them. The historian selects
a first set of events, say, as significant for a second
set of events; his attribution of significance to the
first set in relation to the second set may be objectively
correct, but it must not be forgotten that the second set
of events too is a result of the historian's process of
selection. Significance, although relative, is, as it is
attributed, objectively open to criticism, because it can
be disputed 011 factual grounds either according to the
historical events themselves or according to the historian's
terms of reference. Significance is in no way some strange
(factual) property of certain historical events; signif¬
icance is given to an event by the scheme in which it is
placed, and, of course, in relation to the other events of
that scheme it does possess a genuine objective signif¬
icance. But without such a scheme and the relations it
engenders there can be no significance for any event.
Further comments on how a scheme of past events as a
whole is to be understood must be left until the next
chapter. The point of discussing "significance" above must
be related most directly to the problem of selection.
3
Selection cannot be "objectively" determined by a supposedly
single type of historical explanation, and it cannot be
decided through a postulated possession by at least some
historical events of an "intrinsic" significance that
somehow cannot be ignored. That an event is intrinsically
part of our own history, and a significant part of it, does
not mean that it must be intrinsically significant. To
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believe that significance is in some sense genuinely
"real" is to make a confusion between written history and
history-as-actuality.
5. Selection and balance in the historian's work
Selection is inextricably intertwined both with
evaluation and description on one side and with explanation
and understanding on the other. These logically separable
activities cannot in practice be separated and ordered in
such a fashion that we might be enabled to say, for
example, that the historian should evaluate all the
material available to him, and then, secondly, select from
this material, before, thirdly, proceeding to give a simple
description, and, fourthly, interpreting and explaining
what he has described. It must be emphasized that, in the •
practice of history, all these activities take place
together: the activity of studying and writing history
cannot be broken down analytically in actuality. Obviously
the historian will often concentrate on one activity; but,
all the same, no ordered procedure can be laid down.
Evaluation and selection, for instance, are clearly
determined by ideas which the historian may bring to his
primary material, and such ideas should apparently belong
to the (seeming) last step of historical work, the
synthetic understanding. Description simply considered is
bound to include a way of describing that is already partly
explanatory and interpretational. Failure to achieve a
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complete comprehension of what was happening in the past
under study will (or should) lead to a search for new
primary material or a new evaluation of this material.
Explanation in history, it has been made clear,
cannot be defined in terms of any one explanation-model;
thus, the selection of historical material, its evaluation
and interpretation (which will be determined in many cases
by the type of explanation to be given) cannot automatically
result from objective theoretical requirements. The
historian cannot know from his knowledge of historical
explanatory principles alone to select from all the evidence
at his disposal material of a socioeconomic nature, say, as
a causal factor, rather than statements about the conscious
intentions of individuals, as a rational factor.
As the historian chooses the type of explanation to
be preferred in a certain context, so the selection of
material will ultimately be a personal matter, determined,
first, socially, and, second, psychologically. What v/e
select from the past as the subject of research, what v/e
find v/orth looking at in detailed study (and what we choose
to leave behind) is not only in broad outline but also in
many of its details determined by the current interests
and preoccupations of society and the individual. 'We
preserve from the past that which interests us,' observes
Raymond Aron; 'historical selection is guided by the
23
questions which the present asks of the past.'
23. "Relativism in history", in The philosophy of history
in our time, ed. Hans Meyerhoff (Garden Gity, H.Y.,
1959), 157.
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Regarding any chosen subject-matter, selection will
be determined initially, obviously, by the historian's
topic, by the way in which the historian believes events
are to be explained and by the historian's value-scheme.^
The broad pattern of the selection of material determined
by these factors will provide a framexrork for the details
of the historical narrative. And, when once the general
principles of selection are clear, the way the historian
selects and evaluates his material can be criticized
according to those principles: historical selection,
therefore, is open to objective criticism.
Within the framework of general selection the details
given can be judged under two broad headings: inclusion
and exclusion of facts, and balance. Again, these two
headings can only be considered separately for certain
analytic and theoretical purposes. In actuality, the
process of inclusion and exclusion of facts will be taking
place along with, and will be inseparable from, the process
of achieving a balanced account.
The inclusion and exclusion of facts is selection
proper; that is to say, it refers to the choice of
material made by the historian. The historian must select,
24- See above, chap. IV, sect. 2. Value-judgments and
their consequences cannot be entirely excluded from
historical accounts, even by the most conscientious of
historians. They are bound to enter into the selection
and interpretation of facts. The historian must
include some facts and exclude others; and he must
choose to link up the facts included in his account in
one way rather than another. The methods he chooses
■ in his historical work, the facts he selects, the
connections he perceives, will inevitably be decided to
a certain extent by his general outlook and the part
values play in his own life.
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and include in his account a statement of, those facts
which he believes to be intrinsically important for what
he is saying. If he is to be honest his account must deal
with those facts that seem to run counter to his argument
as well as those that support it. In this respect,
selection is not philosophically problematical; that is to
say, there need be no doubts about the possibility of
objectivity in the account the historian produces: given a
knowledge of the historian's thesis, his explanatory
scheme, and his general terms of reference, what is
included in, and what is excluded from, his account is
open to objective criticism; and, in an objective way,
changes and improvements can be made to the account.
The selection of facts that the historian makes is
also determined by the balance that the historian seeks to
attain in his narrative. By my use of the term "balance"
I mean to imply nothing more than that the selection of
material made by the historian should in a real way
fairly represent the whole. The balance of an account
will in its turn be determined in two ways: first, the
balance must be one that is adequately justified by the
historical evidence. To begin with, and if there are no
countervailing considerations of which account must be
taken, the historian must attempt to keep the relative
stature, as he presents it, of the discrete elements of
his subject-matter, of individuals and events, in a proper
correspondence with the relative stature which they
possessed in past reality as that is given in the evidence,
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to the degree to which the historian may satisfactorily
understand that reality through his sources. Two points
need to be made here. Firstly, in order to achieve the
aim set for him above, the historian will not attempt
merely to mirror an importance contemporary to the events
themselves; if he were to act in that way, he would be
disregarding the historian's necessary use of hindsight,
ana the important consideration that historical importance
is determined by the future of an event as well as by its
past. Secondly, no sort of actually existent importance
is to be attributed to the events themselves: the impor¬
tance they are given is initially to be found in the
evidence for them. The evidence may be so interpreted, of
course, that the significance represented through the way
the account is balanced is nothing like the significance
that is immediately apparent from first considerations of
the evidence. Such interpretations must obviously receive
adequate justification, and in the end they can only
receive such justification through the evidence.
The second of the ways in which balance is determined
is of a functional character: the historian will strive to
achieve that balance in his account which is most conducive
to a full and satisfactory historical understanding of
events. He must so develop and present the material he
selects that the events and characters of the narrative
are interrelated in such a way as to work towards an
optimum understanding, on the part of the reader, of the
events as the historian believes them to have happened and
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of their significance as that will ensure that the happen¬
ings of the past will be most satisfactorily and usefully
understood. By reason of this balance, necessitated by the
goal of comprehension, the historian will often be unlikely
to include facts -- even those that might seem to have
clearly stood out in the past — which could well confuse
a reader and give him a false picture of events: for
example, a particular event might be a good corroborative
instance of some general assertion made by the historian,
but since the historian has already given some instances
that testify to his assertion, the citation of this addi¬
tional instance will be no more than repetitious in the
context, and since other aspects of it may divert the
reader's attention from the point in question and even come
to muddle him, the fact, while of some importance, could
most usefully for the historian's purposes be omitted or
played down.
Selection is determined initially by broad schematic
considerations, and then by a necessity to achieve within
these considerations not merely a balanced representation
but, more, a balanced interpretation of the past. It needs
to be stressed that the historian's aim is the attainment
of a balanced, interpretation, for a balanced representation
wrould do no more than provide an account of past history-
as-actuality that retained all the imperfections of a
purely contemporary understanding of events. This rela¬
tionship of selection and interpretation can be profitably
developed to refute any argument for the notion of some
294
sort of fixed selection of past events as "historical".
The selection by a historian, in his study of a historical
situation, of certain events to be used in description and
explanation, and his omission of others, is not, in even
the most comprehensive and exhaustive study, a definitive
selection. Future historians may choose to select and.
omit different events in their studies of the same
historical topic. As Aron has written:
[Slelection is not to be understood [as] an initial
step taken once and for all, but a continuing orienta¬
tion of historical work. Selection is not just the
decision to study or ignore this or that fact; it is a
certain way of construing facts, of choosing concepts,
arranging complexes and of putting events and periods
into perspective.23
Evaluation, which can be considered as the step that
logically follows selection (while not literally following
it in actuality), develops the initial significance which
past events possess in the historical evidence, and
modifies or supersedes it, creating a new significance for
the events of the past and one that is related at least in
part to the ideas and aims of the historian. This
evaluation need not in theory compromise objectivity, so
long as the historical significance attributed to events
is clearly and legitimately related, in so far as it must
be, to the interests of the historian, and so long as the
historian is not making use of methods that cannot be
considered permissible in history, or serving purposes
that must be considered extra- or even anti-historical.
Ideally, the historian will not be asserting any immediate
25. On. cit., 158.
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"objective" or "absolute" significance about certain
events, but will be claiming a significance that is at
least partially only relative to his thesis. Consequently
the full attributions of significance made by the historian
are to be accepted or rejected only as his thesis as a
whole is accepted or rejected. If a historical thesis can,
through the evidence, be proved by events, then the events
that support it may be seen as significant if the thesis
itself seems an important one. But to start talking about
a historian's thesis leads us to the topics of interpre¬
tation and understanding, for it is time now to consider




THE HISTORIAN AND HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING
1. Explanation and understanding
By separating explanation and understanding in order
to treat of them in different chapters I may seem to be
establishing a greater division between the two concepts
than is warranted. Before proceeding with an examination
of understanding, therefore, I ought to try to clarify in
what way and to what degree explanation in history, on the
one hand, and historical interpretation and understanding,
on the other, must be considered distinct. With many
writers the use of the term "explanation" probably covers
both of those features of historical writing that I attempt
to distinguish as "explanation" (proper) and "understand¬
ing". One can offer a broad distinction between the two
in the following terms. Explanation is an analytic activ¬
ity; logically, it depends on a breaking-down of the his¬
torical whole -- and by my use of the word "whole" I mean
no more than that any particular part of the past is a
single intricate complex of facts -- as far as possible
into discrete elements which may then be individually
examined and the causal and other factors that underlie
them elucidated."'" Understanding, on the contrary, is the
1. The analytic nature of explanation is emphasized by
the realization that explanation can only be considered
effective according to the depth and degree of its
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historian's grasp of the whole; in conveying his historical
understanding, the historian attempts to enable his readers
to understand the particular period, or region, or topic
with which he is dealing in its real unity as a complex
process. Interpretation is the activity of somehow coming
to relate the discrete events and analysed elements of
history to the historian's single understanding. The clear
separation of explanation and understanding stresses the
importance in history of the synthesizing activity as well
as the analysing activity. As Louis 0. Mink has said:
[History] cultivates the specialized habit of under¬
standing which converts congeries into concatenations,
and emphasizes and increases the scope of synoptic
judgment in our reflection on experience.^
Again, it must be stressed that to give features of
development by an instance of written history a logical
order is in no way intended to suggest that this order is
to be seen in the reality of historiographical practice.
With regard to explanation and understanding, the two
processes are interdependent: the analysis of the past
will develop and change the historian's understanding, and
his understanding will determine in significant ways much
of his explanation. Explanation and understanding, analy¬
sis and synthesis, will often be found occurring simply as
one integrated activity in historical work.
analysis: large-scale explanations will simoly stimu¬
late a demand for further, more detailed explanations.
2. "The autonomy of historical understanding", in
Philosophical analysis and history, ed. William H.
Dray (New York, 196'GT> 191.
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In pulling together and completing his work of wit-
ten history the historian, through the final arrangement
and structure of his account and the relation and disposi¬
tion of factual and evaluative elements, makes known to
the reader that understanding of events which is at once
both personally his own and, as he believes, peculiarly
informative, enlightening or innovative about the past
events examined. One dominant feature of the finished
historical narrative is that the historian will be seeking
to explain adequately to his audience "what is going on"
(as it might be phrased) in the historical events he is
describing. Some writers are obviously making reference
to this activity when they talk of the historian "telling
us the truth about the past" or "saying what was really
happening". Unfortunately, the use of phrases of this
kind ascribes to the interpretation and understanding of
history a factuality equivalent to the factual quality
of the physical and mental historical events themselves.
I mentioned earlier that historical understanding
is one area in history where the historian with his indi¬
viduality "comes into his own". It will be necessary for
me at this point to enumerate and comment on some of the
aspects of the "understanding" of history. I intend to
do this under six heads: holistic particulars; mock laws
(as I have called them); the relevant aspects of a his¬
torical situation; the question of intuition; the place of
values in understanding; and the historian's thesis and
comprehensive interpretation.
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2. Holistic particulars and colligatorv concepts
I have already introduced the concept of holistic
particulars in a previous chapter under a discussion of
generalization, but without exploring their nature and
function in detail. These historical particulars would
seem to be of tv»ro main types. One type is the corporate
3
individual: this bears some relation to the legal concept
of such entities as companies and societies, but in history
it extends further to include such formal entities as the
Catholic Church or the Holy Roman Empire,^ informal col¬
lective entities like the liberal movement of the nine¬
teenth century or the conservation movement of today, and
abstract entities like the Papacy or the Presidency of some
country. For the most part, these will not be the creation
of the historian, although occasionally in his study of the
past the historian may discern an informal grouping of
individuals, for example, wThich he may be the first to
christen a "movement" or a "party" of one sort or another,
and treat logically as a particular. For the most part,
entities of this nature are already established, and so
3. In "The historical individual" (in Dray (ed.): on.
cit.) Danto refers to "social individuals"; but these
include such entities as "the Thirty Years War". What
characterizes the corporate individual, in contrast to
Danto's concept, is that it can be described as an
agent, and be the subject of the language of agency
(e.g., "The Catholic Church achieved such-and-such" or
"The Presidency exerted an ever-stronger influence");
to such entities are attributed meaningful actions
rather than simple lifeless properties.
k. Formal entities also include geographical entities
like Africa or Scandinavia, political entities like the
United Kingdom, national entities like Poland or Armenia
(where political or geographical continuity may be lost).
300
do not create any initial conceptual problems for his-
5
torians. Much more interesting is the second type of
holistic particular, the idealized individual, for this,
although it will often not be a new creation of the his¬
torian, will still be in some significant respects dif¬
ferently conceived by each historian who refers to what is
ostensibly the same particular. To what, then, do I refer
by the phrase "idealized individuals"? Examples are
frequent in historical works: such concepts as the medi¬
eval student, the Hungarian peasant, the towndweller of
the thirteenth century, the statesman of the twentieth
century, will be widely recognized. The idealized indi¬
vidual is not intended to refer in any way to any partic¬
ular actual individual who might be thought to answer to
the initial description. Consequently, the properties and
attributes of the idealized individual will not be found
complete in any real individual. There is a certain
correspondence here between the historical idealized
individual and the statistical average individual; when
we have a working knowledge of the latter, and find that
it is a useful concept in practice, we obviously never
expect to find in reality a family with, say, 2.62 chil¬
dren; but the caveat must be entered that, in regard to
the method of its establishment, the idealized individual
in history must not be thought of as necessarily sharing
the basis of its formulation with the average individual
of statistics. Even where a historical concept has been
5- For a brief discussion of holism and individualism
see Appendix B.
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wholly derived from statistical work it had to be inter-
preted in order to become historical. All the same, the
idealized individual does share some of the usefulness of
the statistical concept in that it provides a "picture" of
a certain accuracy so long as it is understood that any
actual individual will only approximate to the ideal; but
in many significant respects it will be a meaningful
approximation which occurs. The concept of the idealized
individual is historically useful in two \^ays: first,
because it is something like an average, it gives us
knowledge about the group, as a whole, of the individuals
referred to -- in this case the idealized individual
"stands for" all the members of a group of individuals
sharing common interests, often a similar standard of life,
and a similar way of thinking, with like ambitions, and
fears, and grievances; second, because it tells us about
the group as a whole, it can, in some contexts, if the
historical narrative is developed in a certain way, give
important information about how an actual individual
encountered in the past differs from the "norm" and sug¬
gest how some of the attributes of this individual may not
be those of all the members of the class as they are
6. For an examination of the statistical construction of
average individuals or "real types", see G. G. S. Murphy
and M. G.Mueller: "On making historical techniques more
specific: 'real types' constructed with a computer",
History and Theory, 6 (1967). The inadequacy for his¬
tory of many statistically based real types is clear
from the statement by the authors that their process
'can be of no help to the intellectual historian who
wishes to discover the essential ideas of a society,
ideas which serve to prescribe conduct and make for
changes in customs and laws'. This side of history is
closed to statistical inquiries: 'a real type cannot
handle that type of inouiry'.(2b) Of course, it is not
just the intellectual historian who is interested in
ideas.
represented in the idealized individual. The creation of
an idealized individual enables the historian to tell us
things about real individuals by enabling him to direct
his attention to those features of real individuals which
he may believe to matter on the relatively wide scale of
much history considered generally, or for the purposes of
the particular historical narrative in which it is found.
At least today, part of the concept of the idealized
individual is established statistically, so with respect
to this part, there can be no doubts that it is clearly
and freely open to the most straightforward objective
criticism. But whereas in sociology and other social
sciences a norm is expected to be established according
to "scientific" principles, in history a large part of any
concept of the individual may be established through what
can only be described as an intuitive grasp of what was
typical. I shall try to say something about intuition
below; here, by 'an intuitive grasp of what was typical'
I mean an understanding of history, founded on a sound
historical knowledge and developed in any particular
instance by extensive study and research, which enables
the historian to grasp as a whole the appropriate concept
of any abstracted individual rather than to develop a
concept analytically as a sort of logical construction.
What distinguishes the good historian is that his intuitive
conception turns out to be exceptionally accurate and fits
into an intelligible and coherent historical picture. The
claim that the nature of much of the historian's procedure
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is intuitive rests not on the untrue assertion that an
analytic basis for any particular conception of an ideal¬
ized individual cannot be discovered, but on the manifest
truth that, in order to create an analytic basis for a
concept like the idealized individual, we have to make
explicit facts and ways of thinking that would not have
been explicit, or even implicitly present, for the his¬
torian. The argument in support of this kind of intuition
is not that historical statements cannot be analysed
satisfactorily, but that the historian may not work in the
way analysis suggests, but in quite a different way. To
talk of a historian working in a "logical" sort of way,
even if a logical structure is only understood to be
implicit in the form of historical method when that is
analysed in a certain way, is to give an erroneous picture
of the way many historians actually work. The results of
historical intuition are not simply implicitly analytical
but have been produced by a procedure that is quite sepa¬
rate and non-logical. To strive for an adequate logical
analysis of much historical procedure can be a vain pur¬
suit in the philosophy of history, for it may mean that
the true nature of actual historical method (in its in¬
tuitive aspects) is completely ignored. Philosophers may
find methodologically horrifying the statements made by
some historians about the intuitive approach to history;
yet some notice must be taken of, and attempts made to
clarify, what, for example, A. J. P. Taylor means when he
says that
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Namier used to complain that I had green fingers.
I sensed what had happened, whereas he had to confirm
every detail from the records.7
Whatever can be done logically with some elements of his¬
tory, it is not something that is done or needs to be done
by the historian. It must be emphasized that no exclusive
assertion is being made here: although history need not be
done logically, it is true that some historians certainly
do use logical and analytic methods in drawing their
conclusions about events of the past and in forming con¬
cepts like holistic particulars and colligatory concepts.
Colligatory concepts, to which we may now turn, are
best described by citing directly certain passages by
Professor Walsh, who reintroduced such concepts into the
philosophy of history to explain the character of a very
important feature of many historical narratives.^ He
points out that historians
do, in fact, explain events by pointing to ideas which
they embody and citing other events with which they are
intimately connected, even though they know that many
of the agents concerned, had little if any conscious
awareness of the ideas in question. And their justifi¬
cation for doing this is the fact ... that ideas can
exert an influence on people's conduct even when they
are not continuously before the minds of the persons
who act on them. ...
It seems clear to me that this process of "colligat¬
ing" events under "appropriate conceptions", to use
7- A. J. P. Taylor: "What history is about" (a review of
The historv orimer by J. H. Hexter), The Observer,
17 December 1972-
B. Dray's idea of explanation through classification,
of events as a "social revolution", for example, should
also be remembered in the context of colligatory
concepts. See his "'Explaining what' in history", in
Theories of History, ed. Patrick Gardiner (New York,
1959).
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Whewell's term, does form an important part of histori¬
cal thinking, and I should myself connect it with what
was said ... about the historian's aim to make a coher¬
ent whole out of the events he studies. His way of
doing that, I suggest, is to look for certain dominant
concepts or leading ideas by which to illuminate his
facts, to trace connections between those ideas them¬
selves, and then to show how the detailed facts become
intelligible in the light of them by constructing a
"significant" narrative of the events of the period in
question. ...
... In saying that the historian attempts to find
intelligibility in history by colligating events accord¬
ing to appropriate ideas I am suggesting no theory of
the ultimate moving forces in history. I say nothing
about the origin of the ideas on which the historian
seizes; it is enough for me that those ideas were in¬
fluential at the time of which he writes.9
Two points in this passage might lead to misunderstanding
in connection with my own argument and must therefore be
cleared up now. While broadly agreeing with the useful¬
ness of colligation and the way in which Professor Walsh
defines it, it should be noted that "explanation" refers
in the passage to what I should call "understanding",
since the sort of explanation which colligation provides
is not the strict analytic sort, but the looser type of
explanation that is provided through the historian's
interpretation. Indeed, Professor Walsh, writing on the
subject of colligation in a later essay, comes round to
this view, and states that the activity of colligation is
concerned 'more with interpretation than with explana¬
tion'."^ Colligation, I would claim, belongs to that
historical understanding which is a synthetic grasp of the
9. W. H. Walsh: Philosoohv of history: an introduction
(New York, I960), 61-63.
10. "Colligatory concepts in history", in Studies in the
nature and teaching of history, ed. W. H. Burston and
D. Thompson (London," 1967) , 75-
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whole; and I believe that it is useful to distinguish the
two concepts of explanation and understanding with a
certain degree of sharpness. In the severe terms of
strict explanatory analysis many colligatory "explanations"
would show up rather poorly: their truth and effectiveness
depend on their place in the who1e. Additionally, where
Professor Walsh talks of a "significant" narrative, there
seems at any rate to be a suggestion that significance
comes through the interpretation of historical events in
the light of a colligatory concept; it must be emphasized
that colligation is only one way of providing a framework
for "significance", or, as I should prefer to put it for
the purposes of my own argument, it is only one way of
achieving a historical understanding, or one contribution
towards such an understanding.
The criticism of colligatory understanding as that
concept is set out in the passage above is that its nature
might be understood in too restricted a fashion. When
colligation is linked with rational explanation, any
colligatory concepts that the historian may find useful
seem obliged to have their origin in the ideas of the
time (that is, ideas that are contemporaneous with the
historical subject), even though it is not necessary that
the personages involved in the account should always be
conscious of those ideas. Yet this would seem to be an
unnecessary restriction; and it seems too to be one that
falsifies -the nature of some examples of colligatory
understanding as they are to be found in actual historical
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narratives. It is undeniably the case that some colliga¬
tion rightly has its origin in the ideas of the histori¬
an's time and not in the ideas of the period of history
studied. A very broad example of this can be given: it
may be that a history of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries has been written with reference to the colliga-
tory concept of "the age of reason". This is clearly a
concept with its origin in the time studied, for many men
of that time both acted according to rational principles
and acknowledged them as rational principles. But it may
be that another era has been written about as "an age of
decadence": this would be a very important colligatory
concept, yet it is only infrequently the case that those
who act decadently and those who live in a decadent period
consciously acknowledge at any time their decadence and
think in explicitly decadent ways. Occasionally a few
individuals do so (the fin-de-siecle attitude, for in¬
stance), but their actions in this regard are never typi¬
cal of their age. By no means is a near-universal and
conscious acknowledgment necessary for this type of colli¬
gation, but isolated and individual examples of consciously
acknowledged decadence must surely be an inadequate justi¬
fication for the colligatory concent used, both because of
their small number and their untypicalness, where concep¬
tual contemporaneity is required. Many persons (and those
who are truly typical of their age) behave decadently
without acknowledging or, more significantly, without being
able to acknowledge that they behave thus; and often many
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individuals believe that they are living in a decadent age
but are really quite wrong. Some colligatory concepts
connected with a historical period are open to a correct
adoption by individuals of that period; other colligatory
concepts, however, require the hindsight and judgment of
history or, sometimes, a development of knowledge unknown
to contemporaries before they can be linked with a certain
historical period. As Professor Walsh points out:
[l]t is apparent that the summary description we offer
of past periods of history ... are often framed in terms
which are intelligible to us but would have little or no
meaning for the persons whose activities and experiences
they purport to sum up.H
And, as with other explanatory features of written history,
colligatory concepts look to the future of the events they
refer to as well as to their present and past.
Colligatory concepts are the i^ay in which an indi¬
vidual historian utilizes his own judgment with regard to
the historical events he is studying. There should be no
problem of objectivity in their regard. Either the con¬
cepts are well-known and accepted, and the historian will,
perhaps, be throwing new light on them by adducing new
facts to support or refute them; or they will be new
concepts in those cases where the historian feels that a
worthwhile understanding of some historical period can be
achieved through a new colligation. Like the historian's
thesis about a subject or period a new colligation will be
open to objective criticism because its concepts v/ill be,
or should be, supported by factual evidence and a clearly
11. Ibid., 75-
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followable interpretation. Colligatory concepts must be
based in the end on certain facts about the past.
Colligatory concepts are related to holistic partic¬
ulars since they take some characteristics of the attitudes
of a period and make of them one "idealised" attitude that
is held to be typical of the period. For the class, as a
whole, of holistic particulars and colligatory concepts,
only the "idealized individual" should create doubts about
the possibility of objectivity. Regarding this type of
particular, based as it is partly on objective criteria
like statistical evidence, but often to a larger extent on
the individual historian's own intuitive grasp of affairs,
it must be maintained that in the case of each historian
who uses the same term each concept will differ consider¬
ably from those of other historians because the different
experiences, the different interests, the different atti¬
tudes, and the different methods of each individual his¬
torian can only result in the formation of a uniquely
detailed concept. Does this not seem to create an irre¬
mediable subjectivity for concepts of this nature?
It must be agreed that a concept like "the medieval
student", as used by different individual historians, will
contain some very significant subjective elements. How¬
ever, subjectivity in history does not of itself entail
subjective history, as I hope I have shown to some extent
in what I said about the place and effect of value-judg¬
ments in a -historical narrative. The idealized individual
is best seen as a functional concept: it can be, for
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example, a useful element in further research, or it may
furnish a picture of certain abstracted salient charac¬
teristics of many individuals of a period. It must not be
understood to "represent" any sort of physical reality.
In itself it is as seriously distorted and detached from
reality as the statistical average individual who, it
seems, must only possess things in fractions. The ideal¬
ized individual is not an objective concept and is best
not understood as an objective concept. It must be under¬
stood in the context of the narrative in which it occurs,
and in its relation to the purposes of that narrative and
the understanding of the individual historian who formu¬
lates and uses it. It is only in this context, and not in
any sort of isolation, that it can be judged.
The idealized individual and, more generally, the
holistic particular and the colligatory concept are in a
sense summative concepts; and they provide us with under¬
standing of part or the whole of a period or with partial
understanding within a period. They offer an important
contribution to the understanding rather than the explana¬
tion of history. They have a significance that is not
merely found in the past alone but in the relationship of
the past to the present -- indeed, to that particular
present of the historian whose concepts they are.
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3. Mock laws
A further contribution to historical understanding
is made by.those statements which I have chosen to call
"mock laws". They are both of very frequent occurrence in
historical work and also very characteristic of narrative
history. To a degree they have a suminative function
although it is a loose and not a logical one. Their form
makes it easy for them to be mistaken for examples of true
covering laws. It is this similarity to true laws that
prompts my choice of name, and this choice is reinforced
by the tendency of historians to use in conjunction with
them a quasi-deductive language. Before I proceed further
with a discussion of mock laws it would be well to give a
few examples of them: these that follow have all been
culled fairly easily from well-known historical writers.
Invention ... is more likely to arise in a community
that sets store by things of the mind than in one that
seeks only material ends. The stream of English sci¬
entific thought, issuing from the teaching of Francis
Bacon, and enlarged by the genius of Boyle and Newton,
was one of the main tributaries of the industrial
revolution.12
A political community has a way of life like a school
or a trade union; and the individuals, so far as they
are members of the community, are shaped by that way of
life, even while they are helping to change it.13
The lofty and fervent mind of Charles was not free
from the stirrings of personal ambition: yet these may
be excused as being almost inseparable from an intense
and restless genius, which, be it never so unselfish
12. T. S. Ashton: The industrial revolution, 1760-1830
(London,- 1962) , 1$ .
13. A. J. P. Taylor: The course of German history (London,
1945), 14.
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in its ends, must in pursuing them fix upon everything
its grasp and raise out of everything its monument.^
Men are loath to wait on observation and experiment
before they attempt to explain the nature of the
physical world, and it seems equally impossible for
them to accept it unexplained. The triumphs of reason
had been too startling in the seventeenth century for
intelligent men to accept unquestioned the dogmatic
theology of an earlier age.^9
It is a paradox that no important peoole or forces
in France of 1789 wanted revolution. Revolutions may
begin, as wars often begin, not because people
positively want them. They happen because people want
other things that, in a certain set of circumstances,
implicate them in revolution or in war.l"
The general statements in all these examples have the
appearance of laws; and one could well imagine the passages
above being used as examples of hovr historians explain
events. But the use of general statements like those
above as covering laws in explanation would be quite
unwarranted, regardless of whether the historians' asser¬
tions are true; and so these passages provide no support
for the covering-law position. This is because the general
assertions made are not based on the same sort of reasoning
and logical processes that go towards the formation of the
general statement of a true law. Statements like those
above are no different in their logical grounds from the
statements of common sense; of course, historical state¬
ments are rather better off with respect to the historical
past than those of common sense because the}r are grounded
14. James Bryce: The Holy Roman Empire (London, 1918), 42.
15. J. H. Plumb: England in the eighteenth century (1714-
1815) (Harmondsworth, 1950), 29-
16. David Thomson: Europe since Napoleon (Harmondsworth,
1966), 24.
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in a sound historical knowledge. It may be that they can
be analysed in a scientific v,ray, and obviously in other
kinds of contexts, since nothing can be deduced from their
form alone, they might be intended as exact statements of
general covering laws. But the mere possibility of a
scientific analysis does not entail an underlying scien¬
tific formulation. Mock laws are not worked out by a
rigorous logical deduction. For the historian such state¬
ments are made with an immediacy and spontaneity which
does not belong to those statements that are the results
of a process of logical reasoning. They result from an
immediate perception of what is significant for the his¬
torian in a certain situation. Despite their form they
are not "scientific" laxvs, and indeed the historian would
be unlikely to make any claims on their behalf in that
direction. To interpret them as a type of exact covering-
law statement is to misunderstand them in a way which it
is clear that no historian has intended them to be taken
in. The "commonsense" rather than "scientific" aspect of
these statements is also made clear when we consider that
for the historian they are often examples of the "grand
statement", or sometimes of the sententious aside; the
worst examples are nothing more than platitudes.
The lav/like appearance of these mock laws is enhanced
by the apparently deductive way in which the historian
makes use of them, as if the particular statement that
followed them were merely an illustration of the general
point they seem to present. And yet -- paradoxical as it
314
may sound -- where these mock laws occur in a narrative,
it is not the particular that is illustrative of the
general, but rather the general statement that is illus¬
trative of the particular instance. By this I mean to say
that it is the statement about the particular instance
that is always foremost in the historian's thought. The
historian realizes, because of his historical knowledge,
that the instance is somehow typical of certain tendencies
in history or even simply in life; and on account of this
inherent typicality he finds it appropriate to make a
"general" statement which has the function of bringing out
the significant aspects of the particular, and making what
is especially significant in the particular more readily
understandable by presenting it in an abstract and general
way. The general statement declares the historian's
belief or knowledge that certain tendencies, for example,
are typically found in similar circumstances. He would be
unlikely to claim an exact basis for his statement: if he
were asked to justify it he could merely cite supporting
examples, and, if pressed, might ultimately rely on a
statement of how he personally "saw things". The general
statement also acts as a summary of the relevant aspects
of what is to come as they are instantiated in the partic¬
ular: it might be said that it tells us what to look for
and take particular notice of in the detailed description.
If the historical account lacks the logical order that
seems to be required, that is to say, the order in which
the summative general statement follows the detailed
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particular description, this should not be taken as indi¬
cating the presence of something like a covering law which
the historian adduces at the beginning of his reasoning in
order to support his own detailed description and explana¬
tion of events. The order that suggests a movement from
the general to the particular, as if there were some quasi-
scientific method to be discovered, should be understood
as a literary or rhetorical device, intended, through its
abstract and general form, to make the historianTs point
or the historian's interpretation of events much more ef¬
fective and more immediately comprehensible to his readers.
4. The relevant aspects of a situation
It should be emphasised that many of the general
statements of historians are genuine "sound" generaliza¬
tions that may have been reached in a logical way by the
historian himself or may have been taken from the findings
of other disciplines. But those general statements which
are not based completely on a strict factual analysis de¬
pend in some degree for their effectiveness on finding or
arousing a certain sympathy in the reader. Indeed, his¬
torical understanding as a whole comes at the last to de¬
pend in part on some sort of sympathy arising between the
historian, his subject-matter, and his reader. Explana¬
tion proper does not require the existence of any such
sympathy: if its own terms are granted, it should depend
for acceptance simply on a cold, logical assessment. Such
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general statements of the historian as mock laws seem to
be examples of explanation, but the}'- do in fact contribute
to historical understanding; they require the presence of
a certain sympathy in the historian's audience with the
historian and his subject. In a different way, those
details of an event which the historian picks out and
claims as the "relevant aspects" of a situation for his
explanation are not strictly entirely explanatory but
depend for their acceptance by an audience on the existence
of true sympathy. How sympathy is important for true
understanding in history is a point that I shall develop
later in this chapter; in this section I shall concentrate
on the problem of the relevant aspects of a situation.
Mock laws have the appearance of covering laws, as a
basis for explanation, but are not covering laws. What I
refer to as the "relevant aspects" of a situation provide
the basis of a proffered explanation: considered in them¬
selves the explanations provided are genuine — the problem
they present is one of selectivity, of how the historian
is able to decide which are the relevant aspects of a
situation for an adequate explanation. Because of the
complexity of history, almost all explanations of the
covering-law type select intensively; and it is the feature
of selectivity presented by covering laws that I wish to
examine here. It will be useful to return to an example
I used in chapter VI, the passage of Teggart's relating to
correlations between events in the Roman and Chinese
empires.
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I gave as an instance of a possible general law
derived from the statement of Teggart's a rather clumsy
formulation which would begin, perhaps: "In conditions
like those existing in Europe between 58 BC and AD 107
every uprising by peoples like (i.e., corresponding in
significant respects to) the barbarians in Europe at that
time follows the outbreak on certain (specified) frontiers
of an empire like the Roman Empire at that time, or in
certain (specified) regions, like the Chinese T'ien Shan
at that time." Such a statement would require many quali¬
fications before it could be considered to have attained
any sort of final form. Nevertheless, the formulation of
any useful general laws in history, with all the complex¬
ities of actual concrete situations to be taken into
account, wrould require the statement of a restricted
generalization like Teggart's with a subsequent heavily
qualified statement that in conditions similar to those
outlined significantly similar events will occur.
However, we must then ask what sort of practically
satisfactory general law could be produced by a procedure
of this kind. What could it mean to talk of conditions
"like" those in Europe between 58 BC and AD 107? How are
we to tell in what way and to what extent a similarity in
conditions will be found relevant and applicable in his¬
torical work. In this context a defender of historical
laws might elaborate on the possibilities of historical
regularity by suggesting the consideration of the "rele¬
vant aspects" of a situation, readily admitting that no
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historical situation in its entirety is at all like any
17
other. However, a consideration of the importance of
general history shows that historical situations can only
1$
finally be understood as quite integral situations.
A "relevant aspect" -- for example, economic, political,
or demographic -- may be nothing more than a convenient
foundation on which to build a generalized explanation
that fits the situation. Conditions may only be consid¬
ered "relevant" when it seems that they are having an
effect which is thought to be an "appropriate" one for
them. There may be many other potentially relevant as¬
pects in a situation which in fact are held to be irrele¬
vant, because, apparently, the historical researcher simply
considers them to be so; and he thinks in this way possibly
on account of a belief that, if they had an effect in the
actual situation he is studying, it ought to have been a
quite different effect.
When we examine a historical situation we may believe
that events are satisfactorily and fully explained by a
certain prevailing set of conditions. It should be pointed
out that on an intuitive level, in the attempt to reach
historical understanding, this way of thinking is wholly
17. In an attempt to deal with the unique complexity
of ordinary historical situations some thinkers have
put forward the notion of a general law with only one
instance. If a general law necessarily having only
one instance is meant -- and it may be claimed that,
because of the unrepeatable, unique and integral nature
of historical events, a historical "law" would have to
have only one instance -- I fail to understand the idea.
IS. See above, chap. V, sect. 3; for the understanding of
complex situations, see this chapter, sect. 5 onwards.
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acceptable. Indeed, it is a typically historical way of
understanding the events of the past. However, if at¬
tempts are made to transform the methods and justifica¬
tions of intuitive understanding into those of scientific
explanation, the historian's way of working will collapse,
and claims about "relevance" will seem either arbitrary or
self-justifying. Consequently, when we look at actual
historical situations, a little imagination will show us
that there is frequently a fair range of different and
sometimes contrary events that could have come about and
been satisfactorily explained, if they had happened, by
other actual conditions prevailing concurrently with the
set that has been chosen as relevant for explaining what
actually happened. The occurrence of an event is sup¬
posedly explained by the presence of certain causal con¬
ditions in the situation; other similar historical events
are cited to prove the point, and various generalizations
may be used to justify the historian's reasoning. Yet it
is obvious that in many instances the non-occurrence of
the actual event could be as easily explained by the pres¬
ence of other causal conditions in the actual situation,
linked to other, acceptable generalizations and "similar"
historical examples.
Some illustrative instances of what could be done
may be given. If the course of past events had been dif¬
ferent a historian might find himself explaining how it
was that Britain did not enter the First World War; among
conditions also present in our actual past he could point
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out that there was no desire for war on the part of the
general public, and although Britain was supposedly a
guarantor of the neutrality of Belgium in a treaty that
was, it should be noted, almost a century old, she ac¬
cepted that the hostile attack of Germany was directed not
against Belgium itself but against France; in any case,
that Germany had no immediate quarrel with Britain was
obvious. Or perhaps: In general the Dominant Minority's
efforts to impose a philosophy or religion upon the Inter¬
nal Proletariat by political means are apt to be unsuc-
19
cessful; thus the attempts of Henry VIII, without any
large-scale feelings for religious reform on the part of
ordinary people, to set up on purely political, or even
personal, grounds a so-called "Church of England" were
doomed to fail from the beginning, and the traditional
Catholicism of the people quickly reasserted itself. Or,
as a last example: That Constantine should toy with Chris¬
tianity might be permitted; that he would ultimately come
to reject it was clear from the beginning: no emperor
could afford to place in jeopardy his political future and
the internal security of the Empire in order to embrace a
religion followed perhaps by a mere tenth of the imperial
population, and, more significantly, one that counted for
nothing among those with power.
19. Cf. A. J. Toynbee: A study of history, V, 646. This
is not, of course, intended to be a hard-and-fast rule.
The point is that it could be held as a "satisfactory",
and even "decisive", explanation of the endurance of
Catholicism in England. (The occurrence of many his¬
torical events appears a fairly evenly balanced outcome
of its "causes" and needs therefore little explaining.)
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We might say, then, that certain existing conditions
become the "relevant aspects" of a situation not so much
on account of their value for a strict and rigorous expla¬
nation as because the results of these conditions, or, more
properly, the development of the situation as a whole, runs
parallel to the development of a previous situation so that
some of the conditions under examination are similar to
conditions that existed in the previous situation. Conse¬
quently, what may be taken by some people as being an at¬
tempt at a full-fledged "scientific" explanation is really
an instructive point, emphasizing certain salient charac¬
teristics as an aid towards an understanding of the situa¬
tion. So it may be that apparent general laws and general¬
izations are really statements only about some similarities
existing between certain situations, in no way exhaustive
of all the historically noteworthy features of those situ¬
ations, and possibly indicative of results that are only
accidentally similar. The problems here, however, will
become clearer when it is shown in what way many examples
of apparent generalizations are peculiarly tied to the
"vision" and understanding of an individual historian.
5. The historian and intuition
Up to this point I have been discussing what may be
called factors in historical understanding; in the remain¬
der of this chapter I intend to look at aspects of histori¬
cal understanding as a whole. I shall do this through an
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examination of intuition, of the contribution of values to
understanding, and of interpretation and the historian's
theme or thesis (in so far as that is a dominant force in
his history).
By the term "intuition" I mean to refer to a process
of dealing with concrete historical events as a whole as
opposed to a procedure of analysing them through explana¬
tion or by means of a complex abstract model. The com¬
plexity of many historical events is such that they are
able to resist successfully any exhaustive analysis, even
when the historian restricts severely his terms of refer¬
ence, so that even the most rigorous treatment cannot be
described as complete or indisputable; yet the historian
often seems to "explain" the events of the past success¬
fully. Often this is done, as I have indicated, by pick¬
ing out "relevant aspects"; but exactly how are these to
be selected? A historical procedure like the selection of
relevant aspects can only be credibly described as the
result of the historian's intuitive grasp of the situation
he is studying.
In any discussion of explanation and understanding
in history it is essential to take into account the sig¬
nificant, and indeed fundamental, role of intuition in the
historian's treatment of his material and the development
of his historical account. It is especially in the pro¬
cess of intuition that historical methodology shows how
distinct it is from scientific methodology. For illustra¬
tive purposes this methodological difference between
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history and science can be put in a way which is perhaps
fairly crude -- and, in order that it should not prove
over-simple, it is not to be developed in much detail --
but which does make the difference very clear. The methods
of science can be set down and made explicit in every de¬
tail in primers, manuals, and similar books of instruction.
In their entire extent these methods can be imparted to
different individuals quite explicitly through teaching:
the instructions to be followed in the consideration of
any problem can be written out in clear and unambiguous
20
language. When the methods of history are set out in
some particular fashion in an attempt to make them fully
explicit, it must be held on a final consideration that
the account still lacks a vital "component"; even the most
detailed textbook of historical technique has the appear¬
ance of an aid to historical work rather than a manual of
21
instruction. The doing of historical work requires a
sort of practice that the doing of scientific wrork does
not: scientific practice consists most often of a series
of attempts to master increasingly detailed, or complicated,
or difficult techniques in an effort to ensure that the
results obtained through using them are always correct;
historical practice is most often a series of exercises on
20. Instructions may only be formulable after the problem
has been solved. And part of the language involved may
of course be symbolic. What matters, however, is that
instructions are completely formulable in explicit ways.
21. I am thinking of such very standard, accepted works
as Introduction to the study of history by Ch. V. Lan-
glois and Ch. Seignobos, and more recent books such as
An introduction to the study of history by V. H. Gal-
braith.
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the same or similar subjects carried out to develop a his¬
torical way of thinking in order to ensure that successive
accounts are "better", that is, they should be more deeply
developed, have greater insight, and show a better synthe¬
sis of the basic materials. To put it simply: one of the
main principles underlying scientific criticism is cor¬
rectness -- in the end one judges scientific accounts as
right or x^ong; one of the main principles underlying his¬
torical work is improvement -- in the end one judges the
accounts of historians as better or worse than others. Of
course, we also require correctness in a historical account;
the point is that we tend to take mere factual correctness
for granted (except in connection with historically remote
subjects): we do not praise a narrative to any marked ex¬
tent for being accurate, because we expect something more
than factual correctness from good history. Indeed, it is
the idea of improvement, of providing a "better" account,
without making very many factual corrections to the under¬
lying "bare" account of the past, that often leads histo¬
rians to treat what is substantially the same subject over
and over again. Once it is granted that an account is
factually correct and coherent, it is best to think of the
understanding of events, as that is evident in the works
of different individual historians, as better or worse.
The inability to make an analytic determination of
the historian's method regarding his understanding of the
historical past requires us to attempt some formulation,
however provisional, of a theory of intuition. For the
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discipline of psychology the intuitive grasp of the whole
22
is an accepted and attested concept. In the philosophy
of history it seems certainly to be a less acceptable con¬
cept since so much theory of explanation is formulated
either in terms of a covering-law model or in terms of a
purely analytic rational model. The difficulty with an
attempt to elucidate the notion of "intuition" is that
what may be required for a successful definition is an
explicit statement of a process that by its very nature
cannot be made explicit. Therefore I can only hope to
give some idea of what intuition is in two of its forms
for history and suggest how the results of intuition in
history may be tested or verified.
The nature of intuition is partly expressed when we
say that the talented historian has a bent for his work or
that he is able to bring a creative insight to the solving
of historical problems. This way of talking is not, of
course, exclusive to history; we can speak of the natural
scientist in this way — of his having a gift for his work.
To say that the historian requires historical intuition is
therefore to say more than this. The concept of intuition
becomes clearer when we examine how it is that people "go
wrong" in science and in history. It is true that not all
people make good scientists, even after they have made se¬
rious and lengthy attempts to master the theory; this,
however, is an inability to understand how- method is put
22. See especially J. S. Bruner: The process of education
(Cambridge, Mass., I960), and E. S. Tauber and M. R.
Green: Prelogical experience (New York, 1959).
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into practice or to learn completely what it is they are
to do. Where it is and how it is that such people have
gone wrong is something that can be easily and pointed out
by a competent person. When we say of someone that he
does not have a bent for mathematics (or physics, or geol¬
ogy)? we mean that he has not mastered the method or the
theory; his failure to do so is made evident through nu¬
merous mistakes that are easily and decisively identifi¬
able at different points in his work. The case with
history is quite different. If an individual does not
have a bent for historical work -- in this case, that is
to say, if he is unable to write a competent historical
narrative -- certainly we say that he has been unable to
master the technique of writing history; and this too is
clear in an examination of the piece of history that he
has produced. The inability to be a good historian, how¬
ever, is not exhaustively manifested by the mistakes to be
found in a finished account in the way that the ability to
be a good scientist is. Even when all the mistakes in a
narrative have been examined and discussed, the critic
still wants to say something more: what is left, although
it is "correct", still somehow seems wrong. And what may
be wrong about a piece of history is not simply to be
found in the isolated mistakes of the description of
different events or their explanation, but in the whole
conception of the narrative. The inability to be a good
historian (as with some other pursuits, like philosophy)
is made evident not only through making too many mistakes
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at different points in the historical account, as is the
case with science — it is also to be found in a general
faultiness of the very structure of the account, that is
to say, in a faultiness of understanding regarding the
relational meaning of different elements of the narrative,
or the way people behave or behaved, or the general con¬
ceptual structure of a historical period; or it may be
found in a defective coherence or interpretation, or in an
unsoundness created by a thesis that is untenable or even
incredible, or by an attempt to make a point about past
events that is nothing short of fanciful. So it is that
a historian who is substantially accurate with respect to
facts and small-scale factual description and explanation
may never be a first-rate historian, although he is a
competent research scholar, simply because he is unable to
achieve that use of intuition which is essential to his¬
torical understanding and a grasp of the whole rather than
merely of discrete facts.
When a historical narrative seems unsatisfactory to
the critic, it can be much harder to determine completely
just how a historian has gone wrong. The solution to the
problem of how he has done so is often to be found in the
narrative as a whole: the very conception of the narrative
is itself defective. The defects of an account can only
be brought to light in this case, not by pointing out that
the historian has gone wrong at this point, and at that
point, and at this other point, and so forth, but by a
comprehensive and constructive criticism of both the
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particular narrative and its subject. That is to say,
just as the single mistake is corrected by a supplying of
the true statement, so the faulty narrative may only be
finally corrected by the exposition, through a very exten¬
sive criticism, of what amounts to the true account. A
further emphasis to the point that it is the account as a
whole which must be considered in history is given when we
remember that not infrequently historians do not accept
other historical accounts unless they have "worked through"
the subject themselves. As Louis 0. Mink has written:
Historians generally do not adopt one another's
significant conclusions unless convinced by their
own thorough inspection of the argument.^3
The difficulties inherent in an account of intuitive
historical thinking, or, more precisely, the difficulties
of giving a precise and explicit elucidation of historical
methodology and its application in interpretation and un¬
derstanding, often seem to be working against the possi¬
bility of objectivity in history. Yet an intuitive process
of thought is one ongoing requirement in the work of the
historian, one which concerns his whole method and which
must coexist with an analytic and logical way of reasoning
about the elements of a historical account and their ex¬
planations. The historian needs intuition throughout his
work, but he will need it the more when he moves away from
a "pure" description (at least as that is theoretically
possible) towards a discussion, in some of their aspects,
of the "how" and the "why" of events.
23. Op. cit., 179.
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It must be remarked that the importance of intuitive
thinking in history can lead certain individuals, especial¬
ly historians, to make a type of extreme statement which
would result in intuition being accepted as almost the
only way of thinking in history. For example, Professor
Trevor-Roper says: ^History has its rules, but they are
not "scientific": they are tentative and conditional like
2Zl
the rules of life.r ^ Such an extreme statement is a
reflection of the "scientific" extreme: the realization of
the importance of covering laws in history can lead to an
assertion that the covering-law model is the only accept¬
able model of historical explanation; and a statement like
Trevor-Roper's may well be nothing more than an over-
reaction to "scientific" statements about history. Such
extreme and categorical assertions, whether by historians
or philosophers, should not be disregarded: understood as
having a partial rather than complete application, they
can be very informative and helpful in understanding writ¬
ten history.
All the same, it is with the "rules of life", with
the everyday understanding of common sense, that intuitive
thinking is intimately connected. A common-sense way of
thinking has an importance and centrality in historical
work such as it can seldom have in scientific work. It is
the "rules of life", as he has come to know them, which
finally enable the historian to understand human beings in
human situations.
24. "The past and the present", Past and Present, 42
(February, 1969), 4.
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The historian seeks to make comprehensible accounts
of human situations and the roles of the persons involved
in them. To talk of persons and situations is to refer to
two principal aspects of history in which intuition is
involved. I intend in the pages that follow to give a
brief description of the two types of historical intuitive
thinking -- rational intuition and situational intuition.
6. Two types of intuition
What is never to be forgotten in any discussion of
history is the way in which individuals' thoughts figure
largely in the events of the past considered historically;
so many (although by no means all) historical events
involved the conscious actions of different persons. To
achieve a proper historical understanding of the past, we
must understand these individual human actions themselves
and not simply their effects; and a full understanding of
actions requires an attempt to discover the thoughts of
the agent. It is plain that rational explanation and
understanding are important in history; but, as I pointed
out in the last chapter, it should not be thought of as
the necessarily predominant or characteristic way of
explaining and understanding history.
From the beginning I should make clear the distinc¬
tion between rational explanation and rational intuitive
understanding. Both concepts, of course, involve the
"thought-side" of actions -- intentions, desires, hopes,
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and fears, for example. The distinction between the two
can be simply brought out by showing that when rational
explanation answers a question such as "Why did X do such-
and-such a thing?" the answer "Because he wanted to achieve
such-and-such an aim" will be based on explicit and gene¬
rally accepted evidence regarding X's ambitions; whereas
when rational intuition is brought to bear on questions
like "What was X's aim?" to wrhich the answer cannot be
directly found in any explicit evidence, the historian
still finds himself able to make some very cogent statement
about X's aims.
Rational intuition is what is often referred to by
some writers as "empathy": "empathy" properly means an
actual identification with, usually, one individual, but
the efficaciousness of such a process in history does not
depend, for example, as it does for Collingwood (who does
not use the word "empathy" itself) and others, on the
historian's thinking what Caesar was thinking before he
crossed the Rubicon, although this may certainly contribute
to it. There can be no dispute that rational intuition
frequently derives from a more general identification with
a historical period and its characters. As Higham has
written:
No amount of scientific analysis or synthesis can
take the place of that crucial act of hirnan empathy by
which the historian identifies himself with another
time and place, re-enacting the thoughts and reliving
the experience of people remote from himself.25
The importance of rational explanation and its intuitive
25. John Higham: History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965),
143 •
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elements (although they are not explicitly identified as
such) is also clearly indicated by Dray:
To understand a human action ... it is necessary for
the inquirer somehow to discover its "thought-side"; it
is not sufficient merely to know the pattern of overt
behaviour. The historian must penetrate behind appear¬
ances, achieve insight into the situation, identify
himself sympathetically with the protagonist, project
himself imaginatively into his situation. He must
revive, re-enact, rethink, re-experience the hopes,
fears, plans, desires, views, intentions, &c., of those
he seeks to understand. To explain action in terms of
covering law would be to achieve, at most, an external
kind of understanding. The historian, by the very
nature,of his self-imposed task, seeks to do more than
this.2°
The general attitude expressed in these passages regarding
the understanding of thoughts as well as the description
of overt actions in history is quite in accord with the
theory of rational intuition that I wish to put forward.
Most importantly, however, it needs to be noted -- and
this is a point brought out by much of the philosophical
discussion which generally goes under the heading of "the
27
problem of other minds" -- that the everyday understand¬
ing of another person's thoughts and hopes and fears and
desires, as this is commonly accepted, does not require
that we in some way "step into his shoes" or even "get
inside his mind", as is suggested when it is said that the
historian should "penetrate behind appearances" or "pro¬
ject himself imaginatively". The historian need not set
out vainly to achieve a more rigorous understanding of
26. ¥. H. Dray: Laws and explanation in history (Oxford,
1957), 119.
27. See especially John Wisdom: Other minds (Oxford,
1952), and J. L. Austin: "Other minds", in Philosophical
papers (Oxford, 1961).
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another person's thoughts than that which turns out to be
eminently suited to the situations of everyday life.
The intuitive element in the concept of empathy is
recognized by many writers, for one of the most basic and
common criticisms of its use in history, and the social
sciences too, is that it is a "methodological dodge", an
attempt to create an adequate explanation where there is
what would ordinarily be considered to be inadequate
substantiation for the explanatory claims of the historian.
And there is the additional criticism that empathetic
understanding by itself does not constitute knowledge.
Ernest Nagel writes that
the fact that the social scientist, unlike the student
of inanimate nature, is able to project himself by sym¬
pathetic imagination into the phenomena he is attempting
to understand, is pertinent to questions concerning the
origins of his explanatory hypotheses but not to ques¬
tions concerning their validity. His ability to enter
into relations of empathy- with the human actors in some
social process may indeed be heuristically important in
his efforts to invent suitable hypotheses which will
explain the process. Nevertheless, his empathic identi¬
fication with those individuals does not, by itself,
constitute knowledge. The fact that he achieves such
identification does not annul the need for objective
evidence, assessed in accordance with logical principles
that are common to all controlled inquiries, to support
his imputation of subjective states to those human
agents.23
Both sorts of criticism fail to comprehend that empathetic
understanding is a type of understanding that does not
and could not set out to conform to the norms of scien¬
tific explanation. "Projection", for example, is not a
sort of amateurish way of discovering the generality that
23. "The subjective nature of social subject matter", in
Readings in the philosophy of the social sciences, ed.
May Brodbeck (New York, 1968j~, 44.
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underlies the particular instance: it is not a way of
coming about a covering law that could be reached more
surely by a more scientific and regular approach. Empa-
thetic understanding is based on objective evidence:
intuitive reasoning derives from the objective world as
much as does scientific explanation. The evidence, how¬
ever, stands in a different relation to a logical and
analytic explanation than to an intuitive grasp of a
situation. Thus, as Dray argues, it is wrong to hold that
to allow the legitimacy of empathy is 'the granting of a
licence to eke out scanty evidence with imaginative
29filler'. y Both rational intuition and situational intui¬
tion are subject to tests, even if they cannot be subjected,
as scientific explanations can be, to a type of analytic
verification. And after an examination of situational
intuition, I shall suggest in what way the results of a
historian's intuitive reasoning can be subjected to tests.
Situational intuition is principally required by the
historian on account of the indisputable and irreducible
complexity of historical events. It is indeed the com¬
plexity of history that is one of the roots of the problems
connected with the concept of explanation in history. Any
historical event is both itself complex, and part of a
greater complex whole; history cannot be seen as a mere
conjoining of simple events. Covering-lav/ theory rests at
least partly on the supposition that if a historical event
is broken down into its (presumed) "constituent elements",
29- Op. cit., 129.
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the historian will be able to see causes and effects which
can be analysed and dealt with as if they existed simply
as a sort of historical equivalent of individual atomic
facts. Thus, if the historian has these simple events to
examine, he will be able to distinguish some that are
merely "prevailing conditions" or "attendant circumstances"
or the "context" of discrete events, some that are truly
of an active causal nature -- perhaps necessary, perhaps
sufficient, conditions some that could have been dif¬
ferent with no relevant or significant change in the cir¬
cumstances as a whole, and some which, if they had been
different, might have changed the whole course of histori-
30
cal events. Through analysis simple particular events
could be seen as similar to those of other times and
places, and members accordingly of one or another general
class. While the complex event cannot be subsumed under
some generality, the event broken down into simpler ele¬
ments may be examined as it can be understood to fall
under several relevant generalizations. The practical
realization of such an ideal analysis must remain for the
30. My use of such language is not intended to imply any
philosophical position regarding the development of
history. "Changing the course of history" is a phrase
that is often encountered in discussions of the past;
it is a better expression than "changing history", a
phrase that is also met \\rith, but it is difficult to
know exactly what it is supposed to mean. Except with
the "accident-theory" of historical explanation, where
course-changing events are obviously conceivable, any
event, since it is held that it can be explained fully
in terms of its antecedents, must be part of the "course
of history"; the same must be held to be the case with
respect to the effects of that event, for they must also
be amenable to a satisfactory explanation. Of course,
"changing the course of history" is a figure of speech;
but this is something that should not be forgotten.
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most part an unattainable goal: it is not the case that
the integral complexity of a historical event can be
broken down into smaller units, while still retaining in
these smaller units the significance that belongs to the
whole in its integrity. The historical whole is not
simply the sum of discrete simple events: it also includes
the relations existing between its different elements,
and the events of written history embrace in addition the
historian's valuation and evaluation of them. The result
is that, as he studies the past,
the historian tries to understand a complex process as
a function of its component events plus their interrela¬
tionships (including causal relationships) plus their
importance, all interpreted in a larger context of
change.31
The historical whole is a complex, and it is only genuine¬
ly considered and understood as a whole. The scientist
will frequently abstract, because it is the abstracted and
simplified situation in which he is interested for theo¬
retical purposes. The historian will not abstract, except
on comparatively rare occasions, because it is the con¬
crete, individual situation with which he is concerned,
and he is potentially interested in every feature of that
situation in itself and not, like the scientist, in each
feature only in so far as it may affect his general scheme.
It is the case in everyday life that explanation is
regularly obliged to deal with complex situations. It is
important to remember, as I have pointed out in my dis¬
cussion of 'explanations-in history, that explanation can
31. Mink: 00. cit. , 18l2.
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take several forms, or -- to put it in another way — that
the word "cause", in history as in common sense and the
language of everyday life, is not as precise in its use as
it is in the physical sciences; a question "Why?" may not
be seeking an answer in terms of a scientific causation at
all. In addition to bearing in mind this loose, common-
sense application of the concept of cause, we must also
remember the common way of selecting causes in everyday
life; as Patrick Gardiner points out:
Common sense is selective; and it selects as the
causes of events those features that can be utilized
for their production (or, alternatively, prevention).
And so, when a causal statement of this type is made,
it is not supposed that it will always hold in all
possible circumstances, or that the cause mentioned
is the "true" or the "real" cause in the sense of
excluding the relevance of any other conditions. ...
p]he condition chosen as the "cause" [is] only one
among many conditions that [are] also relevant. What
we choose to regard as the cause of an event is
largely dependent upon its practical value.32
Although the historical and common-sense concept of cause
is less precise and harder to define than the scientific
concept, it should not on that account be regarded as a
concept that is inferior to the scientific concept.
The everyday and historical concept of cause can be
used in a way which means that there is a kind of true,
but implicit, generalization lying behind its use. Even
so, to say that the everyday use of cause can involve an
implicit generalization should not be understood to mean
that whenever we talk of a "cause" we are always referring
to generalizations that in some fashion are held "ready
32. The nature of historical explanation (Oxford, 1952),
11.
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for use" somewhere, perhaps, "in the backs of our minds".
The generalization that we "use" is implicit in the famil¬
iarity of a situation; if we find an everyday sort of
explanation convincing, it is often because it appeals to
our familiarity with certain sorts of situation. In this
connection it will be worthwhile to quote Gardiner once
again; as he clearly states, the element of familiarity
present in everyday explanation
is important, because there is always a tendency to
over-intellectualize the implications of our ordinary
speech, and this in turn is liable to lead to the belief
that much of our thinking and reasoning is more system¬
atic and formalized than it really is. There are cases
where, it is true, generalizations are brought out into
the open, but on the commonsense level this is the ex¬
ception rather than the rule, and it depends on the
complexity or recondite character of the explanation
provided.33
However, between the explicit generalizations and
covering laws of science and the informal and implicit
generalizations and familiarities of everyday life and
much of history there lies a greater difference than Gar¬
diner appears to believe in his discussion of them. It
should be plain that many explanations placed in the cate¬
gory of "informal" generalizations -- but not all, for the
genuineness of some as examples of the use of covering
laws can be straightforwardly made explicit -- should not
be thought of as similar or closely related to precise and
explicit generalizations. They are in fact quite distinct
and belong not to some branch of covering-lav; theory but
rather to what I should call "situational intuition". The
33. Ibid., 26.
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recognition of familiarity and the perception of "relevant
aspects" in a situation are given to us not through ana¬
lytic explanation but through an intuitive understanding
of a situation as a whole. As Maurice Mandelbaum writes:
The psychological processes of historical understand¬
ing may present problems of significance to the psy¬
chologist, but, from the point of view of experience,
there can be no doubt that we possess the power to
apprehend the connections between events. This under¬
standing is implicit not merely in academic historical
works, but in many of the common experiences of every¬
day life.34
It is misleading, however, to talk of apprehending "con¬
nections" as if they were actually there in the real
world. For intuition, strictly, these are neither imposed
on events by the mind nor perceived as objectively exis¬
tent. What provides the apprehension of a connection is
not the perception of a historical situation as consisting
of linked but separate events, but the perception of a
course of events in the wholeness that it really possesses.
What is present in actuality is not a connection but a
continuity; the use of a term like "connection" may ensure
that we continue to conceive of a historical situation as
consisting of events that are in some way atomistically
discrete.
It may be granted that once familiar or relevant
aspects of a historical situation are known the situation
may be subsumed under some general type, but in an ana¬
lytic description alone there is no indication how such
aspects are selected out of the considerable complexity of
34. The problem of historical knowledge (New York, 1967),
271.
340
history. In the case of a good number of historical situ¬
ations they may be seen as familiar or unfamiliar quite
clearly according to the aspects under which they are
examined; and relevance or irrelevance will be determined
by a consideration of the outcome of events. Familiarity
or relevance, therefore, is not the result of an analysis
of certain events or certain personalities; rather, analy¬
sis can take place only when familiarity is recognized or
relevance seen. Logically, the historian realizes that
such-and-such an event is familiar and then examines how
it is familiar; in actuality, the two processes will prob¬
ably occur together. The character of the whole is grasped
before it can be analysed; therefore such an analysis
cannot be held even to be implicit in the comprehension of
the whole. It is a talent for recognizing familiarity,
relevance, and resemblances in the whole that marks out
the first-rate historian.
The concept of intuitive reasoning itself cannot be
satisfactorily analysed. Indeed, if it could be, it would
cease to be intuitive; that is to say, once the "stages"
or "elements" of such reasoning had been made explicit, it
would become another type of logical, quasi-scientific
reasoning. If intuitive reasoning could be explicitly
described, it would then become possible for it to be used
in an explicit, logical way; but intuition is by its na¬
ture implicit in a mode of reasoning, and therefore cannot
be made explicit, even for purely theoretical purposes of
analysis. If intuition does exist, then it must remain
unanalysable.
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It is evident that there are many examples of under¬
standing in history where the character of the whole is
grasped in a certain way before the parts of that whole
are analysed; that is, the analysis of a situation, say,
by a particular historian is made in terms of its whole
character as he has comprehended it: if the whole situa¬
tion had been grasped in another way, a different analysis,
although not necessarily a conflicting one, would have
come about. The individual historian's intuitive grasp of
a historical situation as a whole, as it is made evident
in his understanding of that situation, leads to an analy¬
sis of it in terms of certain particular features; it is
not, in many cases, a process of logical reasoning,
whether implicit or explicit, based on an analysis of
particular features, that leads the historian to a conclu¬
sion about the situation as a whole. Simply considered,
the historian often says to himself something like "This
situation I am looking at is familiar to me"; and then he
goes on to ask himself "How is it a familiar situation?"
He does not examine the elements of a historical situation
and then conclude that the situation as a whole is familiar.
The recognition of familiarity is a spontaneous, immediate,
total occurrence (although it may sometimes be delayed,
just as our recognition of a face as familiar may only
happen when it has been studied for a while). Indeed, as
with one's recognition of persons, that "sense of famil¬
iarity" may be lost in a consideration of discrete elements
separately. Familiarity inheres in the whole.
342
The understanding that comes with situational intui¬
tion is often grounded in familiarity. Familiarity is
grasped immediately in the whole and can only be subjected
to analysis later. Simple familiarity, as that is commonly
understood, is based on the surface features of a histori¬
cal situation, but it is a kind of familiarity too that
often leads to the perception of relevant aspects in a
situation; to see the relevant aspects of a situation often
depends on the recognition of the underlying complex struc¬
ture of a situation. A type of generalization is present
here, in so far as the structure of any situation is some¬
thing abstracted and not concrete. Nevertheless, the
abstracted structure will not necessarily be seen in terms
of some model under which it may be subsumed as an instance.
Rather, the abstract structure will be holistically compre¬
hended as similar (but only rarely identical) to the struc¬
ture of another situation. The concepts of relevance and
familiarity as they apply to history have their foundation
in the extensive historical knowledge of the historian,
and they are to be understood in terms of a (loose) simi¬
larity between historical situations and not in terms of
an abstracted and generalized identity.
Situations can only, as a rule, resemble each other
to a degree that falls short of identity, because as es¬
sentially complex wholes none of their parts (xvhich
possibly have significance) may be eliminated by the his¬
torian in the name of some theory in an effort to create
identity between the skeletal situations that are left.
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Many details may later be found to be relevant when at the
beginning they did not seem inherently to be of the sort
that should have had a bearing on events; and no histori¬
cal situations are alike in every detail. The unique
complexity of a historical situation must frequently be
understood holistically and intuitively, and so is not to
be considered really subsumable under some general law.
7. The confirmation of the results of intuition
The arguments of historians that are based on an
intuitive process of reasoning cannot be subjected to the
same sort of logical verificatory analysis as "scientific"
arguments; that is to say, many explanatory historical
arguments resist the analysis that will substantiate them
in a scientifically satisfactory way. Such arguments
cannot be made to conform, even implicitly, to a pattern
of so-called standard scientific explanation. Naturally,
this has been seen as a source of weakness by those who
feel that scientific methods, and the way in which the
results of scientific methods are verified, are the only
way of establishing statements with any general claim to
factuality and objectivity. Many historical arguments, of
course, will be found to conform implicitly to a scien¬
tific norm; but it will be clear that the historian did
not have a scientific pattern of inductive reasoning as
either a basis or an aim in his own way of thinking. A
scientific pattern will often be seen in this type of
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historical explanation only when the whole argument has
been set down and may thus be comprehensively reinter¬
preted. Naturally, those that have a "scientific" pattern
of argument implicit in them can be verified in a "scien¬
tific" fashion. But when a historian gives to his readers
an account that contains a non-scientific, fully intuitive
understanding of events, irreducible to any scientific
pattern, how may the details of that intuitive argument
be confirmed?
I wish to contend that many historical "explanations"
are not to be subjected to any rigorous logical analysis,
except as it is necessary to show that the historian's
arguments are properly coherent. The understanding of the
historian is to be verified in another way, in many cases,
not so much as true or false but as better or worse.
According as it is confirmed or disconfirmed, an account
and the understanding of events it presents will be more,
or less, probable. The historian's interpretation, his
arguments, his linkings of events, his imputations of mo¬
tives and so on, will not be verified or falsified by
examining the historian's immediate arguments, but by
examining particulars in the actual past which the his¬
torian does not seem to have considered directly or at
all. In essence, the testing of a historian's arguments
is not carried out by a possible scientific process of
verification, by means of a rigorous logical analysis of
the historian's reasoning; they are tested by looking for
corroboration from instances which the historian, who is
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necessarily selective and cannot consider all the evidence,
has not been able to take note of. Perhaps, with regard to
tests, this is the closest history may come to the testing
of scientific hypotheses through the repetition of experi¬
ments. In the historical instance, the historian's intui¬
tive explanations and hypotheses are put to the test by
seeing whether they do apply to circumstances in the actual
historical situation to which they should apply. If the
historian argues for example that so-and-so was a cruel
individual and cites certain instances of behaviour that
support his contention, instances of behaviour to which he
has not referred must also bear up his argument or at least
not seem to falsify it. Many historical interpretations
and explanations stand or fall not on the logical basis of
their formulation (for there may not be such a logical
basis as that term is ordinarily understood) but on their
functional applicability to events and situations and be¬
haviour that they are supposed to cover. Obviously, in
science too a functional applicability is necessary for the
acceptance of a certain hypothesis; but a logically induc¬
tive basis is always required of scientific hypotheses
even if the formulation of an empirical argument according
to the terms of the underlying inductive theory or of a
complex theory in terms of simpler principles should fol¬
low the idea of how things are to be explained (for intui¬
tion and insight have their place in science too).
It is true to say.that hypotheses in scientific work
are not often simply the result of a process of logical
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induction and generalization, that, rather, the theory can
be prior to any confirming observations. Popper, for
example, sees the confirmatory function of observations as
their primary function in science: observations help us to
test our theories and to eliminate those which fail to
3 5
stand up to tests. ^ Certainly, with regard to history,
as Goldstein writes:
The historical reconstruction is not inferred from
the facts (as is commonly suggested) but is postulated
to explain the facts.36
The important difference between science and history here
is that at some point a statement couched in terms stipu¬
lated by inductive theory is required of the scientist as
it is not required of the historian. And, in science, if
a proffered "explanation" consistently cannot be supported
by an adequate (scientifically acceptable) theory in addi-
37
tion to confirming observations, it becomes suspect. For'
historians, however, confirming instances together with an
examination of the original argument are usually enough
for the acceptance of most explanations and interpretations.
35- Gf., for a brief statement, The poverty of histori-
cism (London, 1957)> 97-9$. Popper, it may be men¬
tioned, discounts inductive generalizations in science
too readily; clearly the scientist may be stimulated to
form a theory, through consistently observed regulari¬
ties, which will be an inductive generalization about
those regularities. Such theories do not form a major-
concern for most historians though.
36. Leon J. Goldstein: "The inadequacy of the principle
of methodological individualism", Journal of Philosophy,
55 (1956), 474-
37* For believers in psychical phenomena this may seem to
be the case with, for example, extra-sensory perception.
A body of apparent confirming observations is unsupported
by a scientifically acceptable explanatory theory.
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In his examination of another historian's argument, a
historian will almost necessarily think about possible
confirming (or falsifying) instances, since he will be
comparing that historian's knowledge and interpretation of
a period with his oxvn, and his own knowledge will differ
significantly in detail. But historians are generally
unperturbed by any lack of explicitly stated supportive
logical theory.
The reasoned logical argument is not often required
of a historian even when it is implicitly present in the
formulation of his argument. What is most often demanded
of his argument is that it should be credible; and credi¬
bility regarding explanation and understanding in history
is to be found not so often in an argument that is devel¬
oped in a sound, logical way as in an account that gives
the widest and deepest explanatory coverage of events.
For the scientist's evaluation of an argument — no matter
how the hypothesis first came into being -- the key ques¬
tion is "Is this argument well grounded in general theo¬
retical principles and proper inductive methods?" while,
for the historian's evaluation of his subject, the key
question is quite a different one: "Does this argument
work?" The historian's argument is justified by its
functional applicability to further detailed considerations
about the situation which first gave rise to it.
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S. The role of values in historical understanding;
Any account of historical understanding must take
into consideration the place of values in history. Values
3 S
have been treated in detail already. It is necessary
here only to give what amounts to a recapitulation of what
was said and to make some additional comments.
The role of values in understanding depends to some
extent on their evocation of a certain sympathy on the
part of the reader, on their creation of a measure of
agreement between the reader's value-scheme and the his¬
torian's. To be fully effective, the historian's valua¬
tion will find itself mirrored in that of the reader. In
this regard, historical understanding comes to depend on
what I have called value-alignment between historian and
reader.
As I pointed out when I was writing about relativism,
if the historian's values and the reader's values are
similar, that is to say, if they are in alignment, the
historian's full account will be accepted; if the two sets
of values are quite incompatible, the account, bearing as
it does a valuation interwoven with fact, will be rejected
as presenting an integrated understanding of the whole.
Since valuation is essential to historical understanding,
the historian's account, to be fully understood by a
reader, must be accepted as a whole, that is, including
its valuational structure.
3$. See above, chap. IV.
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Values are necessary for historical understanding
because, quite simply, an account deliberately stripped
of any values in pursuance of a false objectivity would
not be a historical account. History is about man in his
social life, who lives and who is understood not through
facts alone but through values; any value-less account
would at its best be simply a rather bizarre example of
the more extreme sort of behaviourism. "Social man" is a
concept that depends for its completeness on the world of
values, and, of course, especially on moral values. For
the immediate problem here, whether the values are those
of the period studied or those of the historian's society
or come from another time and place altogether is not an
important question; in the context of understanding, values
may be considered simoliciter. I have already shown, I
hope, that values do not in principle compromise histori¬
cal objectivity, for objectivity in history is an objectiv-
39
ity of fact; an objectivity of value is not conceivable.
The facts of history are objective, but its values cannot
be, since values are always and essentially mediated
through the individual. Although there cannot be an
objectivity of value, values do contribute to the creation
of historical understanding; thus through values histori¬
cal understanding comes to share in an essential individ¬
uality.
Values play a part in historical understanding as
they play a part in the understanding of everyday life.
39. See above, chap. Ill, sect. 7, and chap. IV, sects.
4 and 7.
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As one cannot conceive of understanding those everyday
situations in which we take an active part in a manner
which excludes values from contributing to our understand¬
ing, so, because historical situations share in the same
social quality as those situations in which we find our¬
selves involved in the present, they may often not be
understood unless values are allowed to enter into the
accounts that are given of them. History is centred on
the concept of man in his social being: that this concept
depends on a world of value as well as a world of fact is
a point that hardly needs to be laboured. That values are
implicit in social life has been recognized by philosophers
even if, as happens in some theories, they may suggest
that moral and other valuational concepts of human and
social life are not innate and derive only from a need to
hold society together. Psychologists and sociologists,
however, hold it to be an empirical fact that by their
nature men are not indifferent to the world and, do not
stop with a sheerly factual view of their experience.^
Any human conceptual scheme entails that, whether they do
it implicitly or not, men are continually regarding things
as good or bad, as pleasing or displeasing, as desirable
or hateful, as virtuous or vicious. And philosophers have
pointed out that valuational activities or activities of
feeling are specifically man's activities, that is to say,
activities that give man his unique place in the world;
the consequence is that in any account of man feeling as
40. Cf. Wolfgang Kdhler: The place of value in a world of
facts (London, 1939).
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well as thought must be given its rightful place. As
Cassirer has written:
Sociability as such is not an exclusive characteristic
of man, nor is it the privilege of man alone. But in
the case of man we find not only, as among animals, a
society of action but also a society of thought and
feeling. Language, myth, art, religion, science are the
elements and the constitutive conditions of this higher
form of society. They are the means by which the forms
of social life that we find in organic nature develop
into a new state, that of social consciousness.41
In fine, human social life is to be seen as depend¬
ent on the activities of thought and feeling; it involves
both reasoning with facts and judging with values. Values
must be considered necessary to history because it has as
its subject human social life; both the historian and his
reader are members of society, and, in consequence, the
presence of values in a historical account is inescapable.
The most perfect historical understanding (from the valua-
tional point of view) will occur when the values implicit
in the historian's interpretation concur with the values
of the reader; the reader will be shown the facts in terms
of his own values, and will thus be able to concentrate
directly on the historical facts themselves and on what
the historian is saying about them. This state of affairs
may be considered to exemplify the purest form of value-
alignment -- an important feature of historical under¬
standing where values are involved to any great extent in
a historical narrative. Values frequently provide a sig¬
nificant contribution to historical understanding, not
simply because history is about man's social life and
41. Ernst Cassirer: An essay on man (New Haven, 1945),
223.
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consequently about values, but also because it is written
and read by man with a social consciousness and fully as a
social being. As information history tells an individual
about the past, and he must relate this -- even if he does
so unconsciously -- to his own social and cultural past
through his social self. History is not simply a study of
social life, but, as it is written and read, it is an
expression of human social nature; as such an expression
it may adopt all the values that are commonly adopted in
social life. The understanding of history is not a simply
passive reading of past facts and values, but an active
expression of an attitude towards the past. Through
values we come to achieve that full understanding which is
present in a genuine incorporation of history into our own
experience.
9. Interpretation and the historian's thesis
The historian is judged by his general understanding
of whatever topic he has chosen for himself, as this is
given in the finished account which he presents to his
public. This understanding is most often attained through
what is fundamentally an intuitive grasp of the situation
as a whole; the historian's intuition will be finally
determined by his own individual experience of life and
his own individually developed historical knowledge. In
consequence, the understanding of his topic that the his¬
torian achieves will in many points as well as in the
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whole be an individual and personal one; where explana¬
tions of a scientific type are in evidence these will
often be purely supportive of the historian's individual
thesis.
The individual understanding manifested in a partic¬
ular historical account is based on an interpretation of
historical facts. Interpretation itself embraces several
of the historian's activities. The historian will inter¬
pret facts through his valuation of thern: his attitudes
towards the historical individuals and occurrences that he-
studies will affect the way in which he sees the factual
details of the past, and his selection and arrangement of
them, for they will be seen to fit, or not to fit, some
particular form of explanation. Facts will also undergo
evaluation: they will be seen as significant or unimpor¬
tant, as "key" events, as symptomatic of general tenden¬
cies, as strange, unexpected aberrations, as mere
irrelevancies. And interpretation will sometimes also
involve the hypothesizing of facts. The way in which
facts are seen and interpreted will to a significant
extent be summed up in, and indicated by, what I call
the historian's "thesis", which may be described as the
statement containing the point the historian washes to
make about his subject-matter or the way in which the his¬
torian believes the events of his narrative should be
seen. The thesis vail indeed both express the historian's
attitude to the events as a whole and be indicative of how
events and personalities may be seen in detail. It is the
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thesis of the historian that "suras up" the historian's
understanding. A thesis is not necessarily explicitly
referred to in a narrative, nor need the historian even be
conscious of it as such. It is a type of general, summa-
tive statement about the historian's subject which results
from the historian's individual approach and which can be
derived from his account if we choose to do so.
If it is understood that in many historical accounts
the historian presents his readers with a particular thesis
about his topic, the difficulties about objectivity ini¬
tially presented by individual determinants that apparently
have such an important place in interpretation should begin
to disappear. The historian's thesis is bound to relate
only to certain facts, to certain situations, events, and
individuals in the period or region or topic which is under
examination. In many cases where we may be concerned that
objectivity is compromised by the historian's selectivity,
for example, it is to be realized that we are looking at
the past, not (simply) "as it was", but in the light of
the historian's individual understanding. Within the
bounds of the historian's understanding there is no bar
to an inquiry being objective. Objectivity does not entail
that the historian presents an account that is all-
inclusive, even in a representative way; such an account
is not what we require of the historian at all. The
subject-matter of history is already defined in such a way
as to be extensively selective from all the potential
subject-matter the world provides. And within history we
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allow a historical account to be selective with regard to
period, area and discipline with no fears that objectivity
may be damaged by such selectivity. The historian's
individual understanding is one more way in which the
orientation of a historical account is determined; and
much of the subject-matter of history is in its very nature
especially amenable to the individual understanding.
The events of the past are not merely open to being seen
in different lights: they are profitably to be seen in
different lights. And they are profitably to be seen thus,
not in the sense of the lessons of history, nor in Meiland's
idea of "triangulation" where objectivity is achieved
through a sort of "balancing-out" of different accounts,
but through that deeper understanding of both the present
and the past which comes from seeing the same events in
different relations and from different points of view.
The historian's thesis, whether it is implicit or
explicit in his account, often presents us with a unique
understanding of a particular set of events. The set of
events the historian chooses will in itself be unique as a
set, and unique in its interpretation. The uniqueness of
each historical account -- a uniqueness given to it by the
individuality of its author -- does not exclude objectivity.
The historian's understanding of a set of historical events
is not a type of inferior "subjective" understanding that
may be compared with some superior "objective" understand¬
ing. The understanding of history has always to be medi¬
ated through the understanding of individuals or of a group
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of individuals. It could not be otherwise. An interpre¬
tation of events cannot be something that is factually
inherent in the events themselves. Of course, events
already are usually presented to the historian with some
interpretation, created at least by the understanding of
the contemporaries of those events; but the inadequacy of
a contemporary understanding of events has previously been
made clear. And, in pursuance of objectivity, the events
of the past cannot be taken in some "physical" way; on a
purely factual level, as purely physical occurrences, the
events of the world are quite meaningless historically,
for it is only the understanding of individuals that can
give them meaning.
The "real truth about the past", if this is meant to
refer not simply to factual description but to an inter¬
pretation that might somehow have the same status as that
description, or might be derived deductively from it, is
an impossibility. The understanding of the past is carried
out by individuals in their own terms. The relativists
are correct when they say that written history always
relates to the historian and his society; but they are
wrong when they say that it is only valid for that his¬
torian and society. As Frankel has observed:
{Wjhen historians of a later age write history in
terms of terminal consequences that are different from
those with which their predecessors were concerned,
they are not rewriting history, they are writing
another history. The old history can also be true, and
true not only for the earlier age in which it was
written but for the later age as well.42
42. Charles Frankel: "Explanation and interpretation in
history", in Theories of history (ed. Gardiner), 421.
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The interpretation and understanding of history must be
related to the individual's personal and present under¬
standing; they must be related to the way in which a man
is accustomed to understand his world. The relativist's
ideal of objectivity seems often to tend to\\rards some
transcending comprehension of historical events, above any
localizing limits of time or place. But a historical
account made by some omniscient and perfect being would
not be objective history, it would be a meaningless account,
since in transcending human understanding, it would come
to signify nothing for man.
When it is based on sound knowledge and factual
truth and is coherent in argument, the individual's inter¬
pretation of history is all that there can be in the way
of interpretation. Collaborative work does not eliminate
the individual and provide us with a better interpretation;
it is in history nothing more than the work of a group of
individuals. There can be no other historical interpre¬
tation of the past that is at any rate valid for man than
the interpretation that is specific to some time or place.
Objective history reaches its limits with factual truth
and factual explanation; and these are not its practical
limits alone, but its logical limits. When such factual
objectivity has been attained, it can be contained undi¬
minished within the individual historian's interpretive
account; and it is the interpretive account, the historical
narrative, which makes mere factual objectivity into his¬
tory proper. There can be no "real truth about the past"
35S
in a historical, account, for there is simply no "real
truth" of understanding in the past for the historian to
discover and give to us. As Raymond Aron states:
History cannot give a final, universally valid account
of societies, epochs and extinct civilizations, for the
very reason that they never had. a unique and universally
valid significance.43
The "real understanding" of any part of the world of man's
past is that personal understanding which mediates it most
effectively to us.
43. "Relativism in history", in The philosophy of history





1. The artistrv of the historical narrative
— _ ... .
... ,
The typical historical account is a story. Even if
it were admitted that the historian was othervri.se concerned
entirely with analysis, the synthetic aspect of the narra¬
tive itself, considered as entire, would still have to be
taken note of. The historian who writes a polished and
complete work of history thinks about that work as some¬
thing that possesses an essential unity and develops it
accordingly. Whatever the historian's views about expla¬
nation and understanding, his work will still require that
cohesion which results from his artistic conception of it.
If v/e accurately assess and describe what the historian
often does when v/e talk about his intuitive understanding
of a part of the past and his synthetic interpretation of
it in terms of a theme or thesis, then v/e shall see his
understanding of history reinforced through the artistic
integrity of the narrative as a whole and the way in which
that integrity is constituted. Indeed, it will be clear
that the final "historical statement" about the facts and
the historian's interpretation of them will ultimately
depend on the literary form of the account, for this is the
way in which the historian's thinking is made known to his
readers.
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The two predominant "literary" aspects of the
historian's work are his use of selection and arrangement,
that is, his artistic conception of his work, and his use
of language, chiefly his literary style. Of course, both
these aspects will be less or more important in any
particular work of history according as the work approxi¬
mates to the monograph of detailed research or to the
broad narrative with a wide sweep of events. The tightly-
knit article with its closely defined subject will give
less scope for a historian's use of his "non-historical"
(literary) abilities than the historical work which covers
a comparatively large and general topic. In this chapter
I shall be concerned almost exclusively with the broader
sort of historical work, the sort that is unquestionably a
developed narrative and, in the clearest sense, a story.
But the problems that I shall be discussing are bound to
be present in some degree in any historical work that
makes use of language and is presented with a formal
unity. Language that is used in an ordered, purposeful,
and non-specialized way -- and one significant quality of
general historical writing is that its language cannot be
specialized"*" — in order to render to an audience a
descriptive or explanatory account requires a cohesion
that is determined not only by the elements of its subject-
matter but by linguistic and, consequently, stylistic
1. The historian's lack of any specializing orientation
in his use of terms and language has been seen as a
defect to be remedied, especially by those who believe
that history is (or should be) one of the social
sciences. For an advocacy of the concept of specific
"historical terms", see Morton White's article "Histori¬
cal explanation", in Theories of history, ed. Patrick
Gardiner (New York, 1959).
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factors and the needs of expression and communication.
The language itself of history ensures that artistic and
literary considerations cannot be ignored. Little of what
I have to say, it should be noted, implies that the
historian is consciously a stylist; arrangement and style
possess a literary character in history even though many
historians may give little conscious attention to the
literary nature of history. Many first-rate historians,
nevertheless, and certainly the great English historians
of the past have been acutely aware of the relationship of
history and literature.
I have made the point previously that history is a
story. The purely narrative aspect of the complete
account, however, has not previously been given a proper
emphasis in this dissertation. Although the conclusions
he draws from the narrative aspect of history, and those
particularly regarding the function of historical expla¬
nation, are questionable, Gallie's comments about the
historical narrative in Philosophy and the historical
understanding are very perspicacious; they may be quoted
here as providing a very satisfactory statement of this
important feature of written history. About history as a
story Gallie writes that
narrative is the form which expresses what is basic to
and characteristic of historical understanding. Granted
that every genuine work of history is also a work of
reason, of judgment, of hypotheses, of explanation:
nevertheless every genuine work of history displays two
features which strongly support the claim that history
is a species of the genus Story. To appreciate, and in
a proper sense to use, a book or a chapter of history
means to read it through; to folloxir it through; to
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follow it in the light of its promised or adumbrated
outcome through a succession of contingencies, and not
simply to be interested in what resulted or could be
inferred as due to result from certain initial condi¬
tions. ... [Hjistory, like all stories and all imagina¬
tive literature, is as much a journey as an arrival, as
much an approach as a result. Again, every genuine
work of history is read in this way because its subject-
matter is felt to be worth following -- through contin¬
gencies, accidents, setbacks, and all the multifarious
details of its development. And. what does this mean
if not that its subject-matter is of compelling human
interest, that we must hear more and more fully and
accurately what these people really did and failed to
do, even if the story of their achievements and failures
has to be told in mainly abstract terms that are oddly
remote from the lost feelings ana gestures and. acts of
the actual participants?^
Gallie, of course, is talking of the lengthy and well-
developed narrative, but the shorter monograph and the very
much briefer article frequently share the properties of a
literary narrative with the longer book; and the same
literary considerations will be found to apply to them as
to the narrative of book-length.
In many important ways history resembles the more
straightforward type of imaginative literature; aspects of
the latter that are central to its character are also of
considerable significance in historical writing. It can
naturally never be forgotten that the happenings of the
past are not the creation of the historian in the way that
the events of a novel, for example, are the creation of
the novelist, and that, as a consequence of this, written
history lacks the idealization and stylization of purely
imaginative work. In short, truth is quite unequivocally
paramount in history. Nevertheless, as I intend to show
below, the primacy of truth in historical work does not
2. (London, 1964), 66-67-
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entail that only factual considerations are of consequence,
or that, given a close attention to fact, the literary
characteristics of the historical narrative will follow on
this and are therefore immutable.
Once it is granted that the historical narrative
(and especially the broader type of narrative) is clearly
and essentially a type of story, the inescapable conclusion
is that literary qualities as necessarily belong to the
finished work of history as they do to the novel or essay
by a self-professed literary author. The historian will
be judged not simply by the truth of his facts and the
coherence of his interpretation but by the manner in which
these are presented by him. With the scientist we are
interested in content alone: in the scientific account
what matters is those physical facts and theories which
the scientist is attempting to convey to us. Our only
literary demand is that the language of the account should
be clear and not present an obstacle to the communication
of a statement of true fact. If the scientist's style is
a happ3>- one, if he shows a certain literary aptitude, we
naturally appreciate this; nevertheless, in the end we
should have no hesitation in saying that the style was
immaterial to the subject and could scarcely be allowed to
have any bearing on our judgment of the scientist's
ability. With the historian, on the contrary, we are
interested in form as well as content, in presentation as
well as factual truth. Abilities of the historian that
might in a strict logical sense be considered as "non-
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historical" are relevant to history for the purposes of a
final judgment; how \\rell a historian tells his story has a
bearing on his analysis of the past in addition to what
story it is that he tells. Thus it is that the criticism
of a piece of written history as "dull" seems a worthwhile
and pertinent comment in a way that the criticism of a
scientific account as "dull" could never be. Such a crit¬
icism frequently implies that the. historian has failed to
create or communicate that synthetic understanding which
is necessary to a work of history, in this case by failing
to awaken or maintain the reader's interest. A historical
account that is more than a plain presentation of factual
truth and explanation is required of the historian. As
E. H. Carr has pointed out:
To praise a historian for his accuracy is like
praising an architect for using well-seasoned, timber
or properly mixed concrete in his building. It is a
necessary condition of his work, but not his essential
function.3
The historian has to present clearly and accurately an
account that is factually true, but it is not in factual
accuracy that is to be found the essence of the historical
narrative. The historian is required to create a synthe¬
sis, including accurate factual reporting, that has in¬
trinsic interest and value. We expect the historical
writer to use his knowledge of factual truth as a step
towards the creation of an integrated understanding of
events. And it is a literary style which contributes
greatly to the formulation and communication of this
3. What is history? (Harmondsworth, 196/+), 10-11.
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culminating stage beyond mere presentation of factual
truth.
Historians have been conscious of the literary side
of their activity. Although,! like many historians, he may
overstate the case for the consideration of history as a
form of literature, A. J. P. Taylor is an example of a his¬
torian who sees one of the historian's aims as a literary
one, maintaining that the historian must be concerned with
the literary qualities of his work:
Although history may claim to be a branch of science
or of politics or of sociology, it is primarily commu¬
nication, a form of literature. No historian is worth
his salt who has not felt some tinge of Hacaulay's am¬
bition -- to replace the latest novel on the lady's
dressing-table. ... The historian has to combine truth
and literary grace* he fails as a historian if he is
lacking in either.*
It is in the literary qualities of his work that the his¬
torian is enabled to bring his individuality fully to the
fore. It is in the matter of style and conception that the
individual historian finally creates a unique work of his¬
tory, and a work that is uniquely his own. And just as an
artistic statement, the work of art, is a statement of
something that is essentially and unquestionably Individ¬
ual in its conception and expression, so the historical
statement, the historical narrative, through its necessary
5
literary quality partakes of the individuality of art.
4. "History in England", in Rumours of wars (London,
1952), s.
5. To talk in this way of the artistic statement (and the
historical statement) being individual is not intended
to rule out the possibility of collaborative art. By
"individuality" I mean to say that work done by two or
three individuals, for example, is an expression of
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Individuality therefore becomes something that is not
merely possible in history but indeed inevitable in
finished historical work. The linguistic "vehicle" of
historical work ensures that the historian's individuality
will be communicated to his readers in that work, whether
or not he consciously wishes it to be. Thus it is evident
that the attempt to suppress individuality of expression
by a historian will itself be another expression, albeit a
perverted one, of individuality.
2. The relationship of fact and style
Before the nature of the literary elements in
history is considered, we should be well advised to
consider one important problem about the relation of
factual truth to literary style in the narrative. If
literary style, we may ask, as well as the factual truth
of an account is to count in history, which is better
historically, the dull but scrupulously careful and
truthful account, or the inaccurate but superb piece of
literature? It has to be admitted that no precise rules
can be laid down for the answering of such a question;
rules for the consideration of two works of history in an
evaluative comparison cannot be given some simple
quantitative formulation regarding either the importance
and extent of factual error or the relevance and quality
those two or three individuals, even through their
interaction as a group. By means of collaboration the
non-subjective does not become so important that
particular authorship is irrelevant.
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of literary characteristics. Each comparison of two ac¬
counts will be a unique comparison. It can be said, none¬
theless, that it should take into account considerations
like the following. The paramountcy of truth in history
must be understood to refer not only to an accurate truth
of fact but also to the depth and extent of interpretation
and understanding, as I suggested it might be defined to¬
wards the end of the previous chapter. The interpretation
of a historical period or topic will depend in large mea¬
sure, however, on the truths found in the analyses of the
descriptions and explanations of particular events. Thus,
to a marked extent, truth of fact will be necessarily in¬
corporated into a properly satisfactory interpretation.
Even so, a useful and penetrating picture of a historical
whole may be seriously inaccurate at some points with re¬
gard to details: it may become the sort of historical work
that is recommended reading but needs to be approached
with caution. Conversely, an account that is highly ac¬
curate factually may, as a whole, present an unbelievable
and discredited picture of its subject: it may be recom¬
mended as a secondary factual source with the warning that
the thesis the historian advances in it should be largely
disregarded. When, in-addition to the problems of com¬
parison presented by considerations like these, one must
take account of the literary qualities of the historian's
6. It should be remarked in passing that closely similar
criticisms may be made about many philosophical works,
both historical and. conceptual. Indeed, the importance
of style and conception for philosophy would be well
worth an independent, self-contained study.
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presentation, all that can be said is that to a question
like the one above there can be no answer, and every com¬
parative judgment will be an ad hoc judgment which will
take into account not only the different qualities of the
narrative but also the purpose to which the narrative is
to be put. Assessment of a piece of written history will
be based both on factors that are inherent in the narra¬
tive and on functional factors that are completely extrin-
7
sic to the factual, historical content of a work.
Perhaps the question itself as to which of the two
is better, the almost unreadable but accurate narrative or
the superbly written but inaccurate one, is misguided, in
so far as there cannot be a properly adequate basis for an
answer to it: it may well be impossible to weigh style
against accuracy in any meaningful way. A choice between
the two is not a necessary one for us to make: history
does not have to be either accurate or literary. It can
and deserves to be both. It would be better to understand
the question in a rhetorical way as serving to bring out
for us these two important qualities — of accuracy and of
style -- in many historical writings, and as emphasizing
how we must take both factors into consideration when we
judge a piece of narrative history. Certainly we may feel
7. It should not be thought that in saying this I am
contradicting what I wrote about the purpose of history
in chapter II. When I stated that the historian should
write history as if that activity were an end in itself
I was insisting that those intrusive theoretical pur¬
poses which are possible in historical work were to be
eschewed. Obviously, practical purposes must be borne
in mind by the historian, who will not seek to ignore
whether what he is writing is intended as a school
textbook or as a contribution to some learned journal.
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that regarding the question of style some writers go too
far: it is a feature of Roman historiography in general
that rhetorical considerations occupied too large a place
for a historical account to live up satisfactorily to our
modern conception of history; and more recently, a writer
like Lytton Strachey seems a good example of an individual
whose taste for effect was to the detriment of the history
he wrote. Style and accuracy must always be in balance.
A piece of writing becomes unsatisfactory as history both
when literary style is placed above factual truth and when
statements of factual truth are written down with little
or no regard at all paid to questions of style. The best
history is achieved in that account which communicates
accurate statements of fact in a penetrating interpreta¬
tion through properly stylistic language.
3. The historical synthesis
Owing to the interaction of different aspects of
historical work, the problems surrounding the literary and
artistic aspects of history, like so many other problems
concerning history, lead often to a renewed consideration
of other problems. Specifically, however, I shall be con¬
cerned here with more or less purely artistic or literary
questions: on the one hand, about the selection and ar¬
rangement of historical material and the layout and gen¬
eral artistic structure of the narrative; and, on the
other hand, about the language and style of the historian
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and their expressive connotations in his work. Both these
categories of problems have been considered before: selec¬
tion has been looked at with regard to historical explana¬
tion and understanding, and the connotations of language
figured prominently in the discussion about the place of
value-judgments in history. Here I want to look only at
the specifically artistic and literary aspects of these
features of history.
It is the literary qualities of history which deter¬
mine to a significant extent the importance, as it is ex¬
pressed and understood, of the more easily analysed and
separated constituents of a narrative; that is to say, the
artistic conception of the historian is the conception of
a whole, and it is into this whole that the factual ele¬
ments of history fit. I have suggested that in many in¬
stances the historian is concerned to advance a thesis in
his narrative. Since detailed hypotheses about a part of
the past (especially if they contain innovative ideas)
will be formulated only when the historian has an exten¬
sive acquaintance with his topic, this thesis will be sub¬
stantially derived from the facts of the historical past;
but the narrative account which implicitly or explicitly
expounds the thesis will be conceived in such a way that
the elements of the account that make or support the his¬
torian's point will be specially highlighted. And this
highlighting of certain factors, and, as a consequence,
the successful advancement of the historian's ideas, will
depend very much on literary artifice. The genuine
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historical content of the account will be reinforced by
the purely literary abilities of the historian; and a lack
of such abilities will tend to hinder seriously the accep¬
tance of an argument and, indeed, limit the historian's
stature in his own field.
In the construction of the literary account, selec¬
tion and arrangement will share many features of their use
in historical writing with their use in purely imaginative
writing such as the novel. The dominant feature of the
account for critical judgment will be its ability to con¬
vince; and written history, like the novel, vrill be most
convincing when the account presents the reader with a
description of events that conveys to him an appearance of
their inner necessity. To a considerable extent, in fact,
the historian is to be found using an approach to his
topic that is similar to the approach which a writer like
a novelist uses to his own subject. Nov;, when the his¬
torian is compared to the novelist, it is of course impor¬
tant that fact and fiction are not confused. Yet, as has
been the case with some writers on the subject, the empha¬
sizing of the distinction betx^een fact and fiction must
not be considered enough for it to be asserted that there
is nothing more to be said about the relationship between
the historical narrative and the novel. That in the his¬
torical account great stress is laid on the importance of
factual truth, while particular factual truth has nothing
whatever to do with the novel, does not entail that the
two types of writing have nothing significant in common
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and that any comparison of the two can be immediately
ruled invalid. When we consider aspects of the historical
narrative such as the importance of artistic insight, the
arrangement of material, and the aesthetic balance to be
created and maintained between different substantive con¬
stituents of the account, the distinction between fact and
fiction is not one of major importance. Although the his¬
torian, so to speak, finds his "plot" already made for
him, and so quite obviously must "stick to the facts", the
novelist too works under certain constraints. It is true
that the novelist is free to create his own story, and the
character, events, and situations of that story; but, once
they have been created in relatively broad outline, cha¬
racters and events can only develop in certain strictly
defined ways. Writers make this clear when they talk of a
story "writing itself" or of characters "developing in
their own way"; the development of any story has an inner
necessity of its own, and it is this necessity, as it is
fulfilled by the author, that renders a story convincing.
The quality of being able to follow and develop this ar¬
tistic necessity successfully is one that distinguishes a
good novelist from a bad one. It is the novelist's task
to understand the necessity that is inherent in his ovm
plot, and to explain the "how" and the "why" of his charac¬
ters, events, and situations adequately to his readers.
The artistic necessity of the story is created by
the need for verisimilitude: despite the fact that a novel
is entirely an imaginative creation of its author, if it
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claims to be dealing with ordinary people in an actually
possible situation it must still be "true to life". In
short, the novelist is circumscribed by the rules of life;
the need to discern these rules, and the insight that
comes with, and indeed leads to, the ability to discern
them is the same for the historian as for the novelist.
Only the application of the novelist's insight differs to
a certain and, of course, important extent. Indeed, as
the good historian and the good novelist are alike in the
way in which they have a deep perception of human beha¬
viour and are able to intuit its motivations and conse¬
quences correctly, so the bad historian and the bad novelist,
faced with the characters and events they are to describe
and explain, fail to examine them with sufficient know¬
ledge or insight; they cannot develop or understand them
with sufficient depth, and thus they give to their readers
an account, whether it is fact or fiction, which is at
once quite unconvincing and lacking in interest.
In discussing "artistic insight", the concept of in¬
tuition has been brought to notice once again. It is im¬
portant to realize that intuition has a significant
"artistic" aspect in so far as it is connected with the
insight of the artist. It is the historian's individual
artistic insight and his individual intuitive grasp of
past events that lead to the uniqueness of each historical
narrative, a uniqueness that is determined by, among other
things, the historian's personality and embodies the inter¬
action of that personality with the material of history.
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Intuition is not a concept of which the content is
characterized by passivity. Intuition is not simply a way
of understanding things; it has also an active content
which leads to creation. It is through intuition and the
grasp it gives him of the whole that the historian is en¬
abled to conceive the structure and arrangement, and the
broad lines of selection, to be used for his narrative.
That ability which leads him to comprehend the real com¬
plexity of the past with some sort of order superimposed,
also leads him to conceive as a whole an ordered and com¬
plex account of those past events. The broad lines of the
selection and arrangement of the historical narrative are
conceived in much the same way as the novelist conceives
the lines of the selection and arrangement of the elements
of his own work.
The wealth of material about the past available
gives the historian a real freedom of choice regarding his
subject-matter, and an ability to choose a subject in the
treatment of which he will be able to express himself sat¬
isfactorily. It must be stressed, of course, that this is
not always a conscious activity; but it can be readily
understood that history is not a discipline in which the
historian is frequently compelled to deal with a subject
to which he is not amenable. He is therefore under much
less constraint with respect to his subject both in its
broad outline and in its details than seems commonly to be
supposed. He is not compelled to report more or less dis¬
passionately on such-and-such specified events. What he
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writes about and the aspects he chooses to write about he
selects himself, and this selection is the result of an
extensive freedom of choice. Naturally, once his subject
has been selected, he will be working under some constrain
but since he has chosen freely something for which he pre¬
sumably has a certain talent and liking, he can hardly
feel it subjectively as constraint. The finished histori¬
cal synthesis of the narrative will be something which
results from the historian's choice of a subject that ac¬
cords with his own abilities and tastes. Thus, through
this accord it will be both a satisfactory expression of
the historian's individuality and a satisfactory statement
about past events.
The finished narrative of history — whether it is a
lengthy book or a brief article — thus represents the cul
mination of a very special type of synthesis. It is not
either a sheer account of plain fact on which the characte
of the narrator never impinges nor a statement of opinion
by a historical critic untroubled about his partiality and
bias. It is a fusion of a factual account and a personal
point of view through, ideally, a deep and balanced inter¬
pretation. From the extensive material of history the
historian is able to choose and develop a factual account
(but always holding to truth) according to his inclina¬
tions; and it is the freedom of choice made evident here
which provides the first basis for the expression of the
historian's point of view and the first step in the inter¬
pretation of historical events toxrards a new historical
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synthesis. It is in the successful synthesis of fact and
opinion -- a synthesis which is ideally detrimental to
neither -- that the true character of history lies.
4. The literary contribution to historical understanding
The selection and arrangement of the content of the
narrative is determined not only by the "factual" necessity
to present a statement of the truth but by the "artistic"
necessity to present the truth in the best way possible
and as most satisfactorily supportive of the historian's
interpretation of the true facts. The selection and ar¬
rangement of details will be at least partly determined by
the historian's intuitive conception of the whole but will
be consequential on past actuality. Thus, a certain factual
necessity underlies the selection and arrangement of his¬
torical material within the narrative, but no such necessity
can be found in connection with that other important literary
aspect of history — the historian's choice of language and
style.
The importance of language and style in history can
too easily be ignored. Indeed, arguments that concentrate
on making history a full-fledged social science make very
little reference to the positive function of literary qual¬
ities in history. Of course such arguments could not do
so, for they must lay great stress on the achievement in
history of a "scientific" objectivity that seeks to do away
with the individuality of the author of an account and to
377
eliminate as far as possible language that is non-factual
or not value-neutral. Nevertheless, the subject-matter of
history is such that it lends itself readily to an indi¬
viduality of style, a personal choice of language, and
other seemingly non-factual (and supposedly non-informa¬
tive) literary qualities. Far from being the superfluous
result of a rather regrettable habit of many historians
(who even in their more self-consciously "scholarly" work
hope often to be read and understood by at least a few
educated laymen) and, consequently, a feature that is
hopefully eliminable from historical work, literary style
in history constitutes a considerable aid to historical
understanding. (The incidental point may be made that it
also lends an attraction to history, so that a reversion
to a factual dullness would seem gratuitously perverse.)
We may now look at three important ways in which
literary qualities themselves contribute to a better and
deeper historical understanding than mere "factuality"
could do. The first way in which they do this is through
what may generally be called their "setting of the mood".
The mood of a narrative gives us an important clue to the
historian's outlook, to his general attitude to the events
he is narrating, to the sort of interpretation and under¬
standing he has of them, and perhaps it also warns us to
be on our guard against any possibly unfair bias in his
account. In the following passage the description imme¬
diately engages our sympathy for Charles I.
When King Charles came home from Scorland in the au¬
tumn of 1641, London was bright with hangings and the
3 7S
fountains ran wine. The November day was overcast and
the highway beyond Moorgate was ankle deep in mud, but
planks had been laid down to prevent the Royal coach
from sticking and to save the shoes of the eminent
citizens who had come to welcome their sovereign on his
return from Scotland. The Queen and her children met
him at Theobalds, and Charles reached the city limits
at ten in the morning of November 25th with his wife,
his three eldest children, his nephew and the Duchess
of Richmond in one cheerful coach load.8
Our sympathy is engaged not through a direct approach but
through the quintessentially literary technique of drawing
a very skilful vignette of what is almost a happy family
reunion. In a broader way, by opening her book in this
novelistic style, Miss Wedgwood carefully sets the mood of
her history and prepares us for those attitudes that she
will typically take up throughout her narrative. And cor¬
respondingly, a historian may adopt a hostile position and
hope to create an unfavourable reaction in his reader by
the use of, for example, sarcastic or ironic language.
Again, consistent use of such a style implicitly suggests
the general scheme of the historian's judgments.
The second way in which literary qualities may give
a deeper historical understanding is through the greater
power that is possessed by a stylistic illustration of
some limited generalization in contrast with that possessed
by a mere cold enumeration of instances. The artful con¬
trasts of the following passage make clear to us in an
excellent way the general condition of the majority of the
people in the seventeenth century.
In Covent Garden a filthy and noisy market was held
close to the dwellings of the great. Fruit women
8. C. V. Wedgwood: The Kind's War 1611-1647 (London,
195S), 17.
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screamed, carters fought, cabbage stalks and rotten
apples accumulated in heaps at the thresholds of the
Countess of Berkshire and of the Bishop of Durham.
The centre of Lincoln's Inn Fields was an open space
where the rabble congregated every evening, within a
few yards of Cardigan House and Winchester House, to
hear mountebanks harangue, to see bears dance, and to
set dogs at oxen. Rubbish was shot in every part of
the area. Horses were exercised there. The beggars
were as noisy and importunate as in the worst governed
cities of the Continent. A Lincoln's Inn mumper was a
proverb. The whole fraternity knew the arms and live¬
ries of every charitably disposed grandee in the neigh¬
bourhood, and, as soon as his lordship's coach and six
appeared, came hopping and crawling in crowds to per¬
secute him. ...
Saint James's Square was a receptacle for all the
offal and cinders, for all dead cats and dead dogs of
Westminster. At one time a cudgel player kept the
ring there. At another time an impudent squatter set¬
tled himself there, and built a shed for rubbish under
the windows of the gilded saloons in which the first
magnates of the realm, Norfolk, Ormond, Kent, and Pem¬
broke, gave banquets and balls. ...
When such was the state of the Region inhabited by
the most luxurious portion of society, we may easily
believe that the great body of the population suffered
what would now be considered as insupportable griev¬
ances. The pavement was detestable: all foreigners
cried shame upon it. The drainage was so bad that in
rainy weather the gutters soon became torrents. Seve¬
ral facetious poets have commemorated the fury with
which these black rivulets roared down Snow Hill and
Ludgate Hill, bearing to Fleet Ditch a vast tribute of
animal and vegetable filth from the stalls of butchers
and greengrocers.9
The third way in which literary style may be signif¬
icant in x-rritten history is through its ability to commu¬
nicate the values and attitudes of the historian. Thus,
an individual's action may be described as horrifying, or
wicked, or cynical, in terms of value-judgments to which I
have drawn attention in a previous chapter; or, it may be
described in more oblique terms, but with the same effect.
Indeed, in connection with the literary aspect of some
9. Lord Macaulay: History of England, in The evolution
of British historiography, ed. J. R. Hale (London, 1967),
229-30.
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historical narrative, it is the obliquely communicated
value-judgment with which we should be concerned: communi¬
cation in this fashion rests on the whole tenor of a pas¬
sage, rather than on any explicit valuational language or
on valuational charges implicit in chiefly factual words.
The oblique expression of a judgment or opinion, when it
is thoroughly successful, is an exceptional literary
talent. Of course, any passage of this kind is almost
certain to contain explicit value-judgments. Neverthe¬
less, in the following passage, it can be felt that in
conveying the disapproval of the historian the effect of
the whole is greater than the effect of the actual words
alone that the historian has chosen.
What followed was a grim page in the annals of Russian
literature: Stalin's personal style became, as it were,
Russia's national style. Not only was it a daring deed
for any publicist or essayist to compose a paragraph or
two including no direct quotation from Stalin. The
writer took great care that his own sentences should, in
style and vocabulary, resemble as closely as possible
the quoted text. An indescribably dull uniformity
spread over the Russian press and most periodicals.
Even the spoken language became "Stalinized" to a fan¬
tastic extent, at least when people talked on ideology
and politics. It was as if a whole nation had succumbed
to a ventriloquial obsession.10
The most important feature of literary style is, how¬
ever, its capacity of fusing many logically different
constituents of history; that is to say, the successful
historian is able through his style to deal with several
quite different logical functions at the same time. The
following passage provides a good example of this inte¬
grating function of style.
10. Isaac Deutscher: Stalin: a political biography
(Harmondsworth, 1966) 363.
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The city, with a population estimated roughly at
half a million, was a densely packed community (broken
here and there by the gardens attached to large houses),
situated mainly on the north bank of the Thames, and
was still officially bounded by its ancient gates:
Ludgate and Newgate on the west; Aldersgate, Cripple-
gate, Moorgate, and Bishopsgate on the north; and
Aldgate on the east. Outside of Southwark there was
little population south of London Bridge, for Bermond-
sey, Newington Butts, and Lambeth were villages, while
Peckham and Vauxhall were rural resorts. To the north
of the old city were the fields round Islington, with
their cow-sheds and outhouses; to the east, the Mile
End Road became a country lane immediately beyond
Whitechapel; to the west, one might walk past gardens
as far as Westminster; and farther north, the suburbs
did not extend beyond the modern Trafalgar Square and
Charing Cross Road. By destroying most of the medieval
city, the Great Fire made possible the creation of a
new and larger London, with wider streets and spacious
squares, such as Bloomsbury and Leicester Squares, and
that of Covent Garden (with its porticoes); another
breathing space was left in Lincoln's Inn Fields.
Already fashion was moving westward, and before the end
of the century the aristocratic district of St. James's
had come into existence, with its town houses of the
nobility. Several bishops, including those of Ely,
Gloucester, Lichfield, and Lincoln, still retained
official lodgings in the metropolis; at Lambeth and
Fulham the archbishop of Canterbury and the bishop of
London had their respective head-quarters.H
Although this passage is essentially a very basic sort of
historical description, and indeed quite typical of the
type of account we may imagine when we think of a "des¬
criptive historical narrative", it contains several other
features of written history that have been, as one might
say, absorbed into the description. There is an example
of explanation in the sentence that tells how the Great
Fire made possible the creation of a new London; of a
limited generalization about the westward movement of
fashion; of language that carries implicit values, such
as "densely packed", "spacious", "breathing space". Thus,
11. David Ogg: England in the reign of Charles II (Oxford,
1934), 94-95.
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even "ordinary" description carries within it strictly
non-descriptive features of history; but the pure descrip¬
tion itself shows how important literary ability is in
writing history, not simply in the arrangement and order
of the description, but in the choice of details that will
reinforce the general, comprehensive picture. To empha¬
size the countrylike aspect of the environs of London, Ogg
talks of the Tfields round Islington, with their cow-sheds
and outhouses', where other details chosen might be less
immediately evocative of the country; similarly, to talk
of the Mile End Road becoming a 'country lane' is an ex¬
ceptionally effective way of stressing a rural atmosphere,
because of the stark contrast it suggests with the present-
day Mile End Road -- again, other examples of "country
lanes" would be less effective illustrations of the nature
of London's surroundings in the seventeenth century because
the contrast with conditions today would be much less
powerful.
To meet the possible criticism that I have selected
examples of historical passages by well-known writers who
are likely to be consciously more literary than some of
their colleagues I have also selected several excerpts
from papers and articles in historical journals which will
show how style and individuality is present, and signifi¬
cantly so, in lesser works of history. These are presumably
not intended to a great extent to have overly literary as¬
pirations, yet language is often used in a way that is
literary rather than "scientific".
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The "Irish question" is a convenient term for a con¬
catenation of problems which distressed English poli¬
ticians, \'.liig and Tory, Liberal and Conservative,
throughout the nineteenth century. Whether it appeared
primarily as a constitutional, religious, or economic
problem at a particular time, the response to it by
English governments invariably involved a delicate
balance of coercion and conciliation, the former often
vitiating the effectiveness of the latter. ^
It is worth noting how a literary phrase like 'a concate¬
nation of problems' well conveys the writer's opinion of
them as problems loosely but inseparably linked together
for the English. The idea of a balance between coercion
and conciliation is additionally conveyed in the stylistic
balance of the phrase 'the former often vitiating the
effectiveness of the latter'; and the irony present in
policies that negated each other is emphatically brought
out in the juxtaposition of phrases.
Much of the argument about a political reaction turns
not upon what we know of the eighteenth century, but
upon what we know of the seventeenth. The eighteenth-
century evidence which gave rise to the idea is not
open to question; what is in doubt is the singularity
of that evidence.13
Factually, all the historian needs to say (as he does
later) is that in order to understand the reign of Louis
XVI we need to go back in history to understand the reign
of Louis XIV. The slightly paradoxical element in this
point is effectively stressed, through an excellent use of
literary artifice, in the style and language of these
opening sentences.
12. A. D. Kriegel: "The Irish policy of Lord Grey's
government", English Historical Review, 86 (1971), 22.
13. William Doyle: "Was there an aristocratic reaction
in pre-revolutionary France?", Past and Present, 57
(1972), 99.
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It is also to be remarked how a deliberate striving
for effect is not out of place in an "ordinary" historical
article:
The crisis of 1929 overtook a country which had not
yet recovered from the terrible shock of the first war
and where the secular demographic trend pointed to a
declining and ageing population. It was at the last
moment, in July 1939, that a sudden awakening, a
realization of what this meant, found expression in
the Family Code. It was the eve of the French
collapse.14
As the conclusion of any literary piece the last sentence
would have a quite dramatic effect; but in a work of
written history it is in no way unhistorical because of
this. Indeed, it has the important function of serving to
remind us very effectively of the historical context of
the events narrated in the article and their significance.
Finally -- to give one more example -- unlike any
other "scientific" discipline, the use of the rhetorical
question is a commonly-accepted device for the historian,
even in the "standard" type of historical paper; and it
provides a useful way in which the historian may make his
point as he recounts events.
The paternal pretensions of the Grown, even its
benevolent despotism, encouraged people to think that
whatever happened in the economy was the Crown's doing.
Is it possible that the Parlements were expressing the
discontent of a public suffering from the effects of
economic events which they felt but did not understand
and therefore blamed on the Crown? Is it possible
that the economic crisis of 1770, like a great national
headache, aggravated the quarrels between the royal
government and the Parlements and had them at each
other's throats? More investigation is needed to test
14. Alfred Sauvy: "The economic crisis of the 1930s in
France", Journal of Contemporary History, 4*4 (1969),
35.
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this hypothesis; but it is a hypothesis strongly recom¬
mended by the circumstances.15
Nowj it is true to say that part of the effective¬
ness of written history lies in the literary qualities of
the historical account such as those which are hinted at
in the comments above. The historian conveys facts not
simply through bald factual statements (of a "scientific"
"type, perhaps) but also through careful manipulation of
detail (which, in itself, may be largely non-essential).
In consequence, literary ability and a choice of style
are qualities which do more than help a historian to
communicate well: they will, in fact, determine part of
the actual content of what is communicated.
The intrinsic importance of style in history can be
even more clearly seen when it is considered how the
literary abilities of a historian may be abused. Whatever
his similarities with the novelist in some respects, it is
clear that in respect of one central consideration the
historian must deal with his material quite differently.
The novelist may, if he wishes, put himself entirely at
the service of art, however that term "art" may be under¬
stood. He may hold that style is everything for him, and
make it an overriding consideration in all his work; if
he succeeds in what he tries to do, he will not be crit¬
icized on the ground that some other element of his novel
should have been put first. No features of the novel
itself, that is to say, can claim to have an intrinsic
15. J. F. Bosher: "The French crisis of 1770", History,
57 (1972), 30.
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right to be preferred above other features. Of course,
claims on behalf of the features of an individual novel
may be made by certain schools of thought with reference
to principles such as that of "art for art's sake" or of
"the social commitment of the artist". The historian,
however, cannot set his own terms in this way; he has
always to put factual truth first, and he cannot believe
that his work is inviolable in its style and conception
even though, perhaps, important new facts should come to
light. And, less consciously, although a competent style
is important, the historian must be very careful not to let
his literary style "run away with him". The writer of
history must always place his task as a historian before
his task as an artist whenever these two (logical) roles
may seem to be coming into conflict.
In a similar way the great historian's ability to
use his literary qualities most effectively to bring out
the truth and demonstrate an interpretation of the past
will also enable him to use those qualities most effectively
to hide the truth and gloss over what he has not understood
or wishes to suppress. The literary devices used to
enhance the truth can also be used to make distorted facts
acceptable to an audience. More ordinarily, the literarily
capable historian can efficiently dis,guise the gaps in his
knowledge or comprehension of the past.
Historians have developed a myriad of literary devices
for gliding over what they do not adequately know or un¬
derstand. With more schematic history, the gaps yawn
embarrassingly wide: in narrative prose, they can be
artfully concealed.1"
16. "The sense of the past" (unsigned), Times Literary
Supplement, 2&Ly2 (1956).
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To conceal in this literary fashion, however, is to mis¬
lead; and however creditable his literary abilities, the
historian must not permit himself to use them to mislead
his readers about historical truth. The function of lit¬
erary style and language in history must always be a posi¬
tive one; the historian must make use of his abilities as
a writer as an adjunct to his purely historical capabil¬
ities, to help him express his thought more completely and
communicate it more forcefully.
5. Individuality in the conception of a work
The central importance of artistic concepts for his¬
tory is to be found in the creative synthesis of the whole.
The writer of the finished historical narrative wants his
work to be read not only as academic history by his col¬
leagues but also as literature by a significant number of
members of the lay public. This is rightly the case, for
history uses ordinary language and ordinary concepts and
talks to a great extent about occurrences of everyday life
or about those "great happenings" of the past which imme¬
diately affected everyday life. By its very nature his¬
tory is not abstruse; it does not, as the scientists do,
deal with events that are often directly remote from ordi¬
nary living. And since it has no need of special language,
the historical account will usually be conceived by the
historian in such a way- that he may make use of ordinary
language to the greatest effect. The literary use of
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ordinary language involves, as well as style, a dependence
of the formulation of the whole at least in part on the
creative process of the writer. As Miss Wedgwood writes:
The creative process of the artist in history is
obvious 'enough in that kind of history which is
generally called literary history -- that is in
history which is frankly designed to be read as
literature. Literary history is concerned, and
legitimately concerned, with conveying the writer's
view of events to the reader with the greatest
intensity. Many historians in the last two centuries
have shown that history of this kind can also contain
scholarship of great value. Several major works which
were conceived and undertaken as works of literature
and designed to appeal to the educated public as a
xvhole were also works of significant and sometimes
pioneer research. ...
All histories conceived as literature have this in
common; that they are written about subjects of general
interest. They deal with people and principles which
are generally understood, with incidents interesting
and dramatic in themselves. But there are many
subjects which have to be studied and which ought to
be studied, but which no historian could or should
wish to turn into literary history. ... [TJhese things
are of the greatest importance in the study of history,
but very few of them can be adequately or even honestly
treated in an essential literary manner. Writing about
them is none the less an art, and a very different
one; and some works in these highly unliterary
subjects are most certainly literature.17
The literary and artistic conception of historical writing
is a feature not only of the overtly literary history but
even of more specialized and more limited historical
works, of works that would not be instantly judged as
"literature". For the most part the historian must make
use of ordinary language and must consequently express
himself well; for the most part he will be obliged to
write a continuous piece of prose intended to be either
descriptive or explanatory as a whole (and which, whatever
17- "Art, truth and history", in Truth and opinion
(London, i960 ), $5-36.
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the primary intent, is sure to mix description and expla¬
nation). He will therefore need to have an adequate con¬
ception of the literary side of his task.
The synthesizing conception of a course of events to
be written about will be peculiar to each historian. It
is the creation and conception of a single unified narra¬
tive that demands and makes ineliminable the individuality
of the historian. The personality of the historian is
all-important in that it is, as Professor Walsh has said,
akin to the respect 'in which the.personality of the nov¬
elist is vital: no one else has quite the same grasp and
lg
the same vision of the events to be narrated'. History
both by reason of the nature of its subject-matter and its
medium and by reason of the working approach which it re¬
quires must inevitably contain a part of its author's in¬
dividuality.
Because of the presence of literary style and concep¬
tion a piece of written history can be subjected to a type
of aesthetic or stylistic as well as merely factual criti¬
cism. And it will be found (as I have already suggested
in the previous section) that criticism of an aesthetic or
literary nature will elucidate the factual content of the
narrative. The historian, in his partly literary under¬
taking, will not merely look at the facts to be recounted,
and make simple, baldly explicit statements about them: he
may suggest what happened through ellipsis, or the use of
IB. "The limits of scientific history", in Philosophical
analysis and historv, ed. William H. Dray (New York,
1966), 70.
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sarcasm or irony, or by allowing some facts to remain
implicit in his statements about others. Of course, some
of the devices of novelists are not open to historians,
for the latter may not deliberately mystify the reader, or
leave certain things completely unsaid, or present a pic¬
ture that is purposely partial or distorted, as, for exam¬
ple, a story that is wholly seen through the eyes of one
of the characters alone. Consequently, some of the ques¬
tions that might be asked by a person applying literary
principles to history would be helpful with regard both to
the factual and to the interpretive content of the narra¬
tive, although these questions would receive answers vThich
would sometimes be on a more elementary level coming from
a historical narrative than those corning from a modern
novel, since history must in some ways be artistically
limited by the necessity for factual truth. So it is that
with regard to a historical account one can legitimately
ask such questions as: What does the writer mean? Why are
these two statements of fact placed in juxtaposition?
What is the historian's attitude to this particular his¬
torical personage? The problems raised by such questions
will not seldom be examined in much the same way in con¬
nection with a piece of history as with a piece of fiction
or other self-conscious work of literature; and solutions
and answers will also be of the same nature. Whereas with
respect to a novel the answers will have a significance
intrinsic only to the fictional narrative in question (and
additionally, in some cases, to the author's biography and
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his social context), they will, with respect to history,
provide important additions to our factual knowledge of
the past and a deeper understanding of it, since we shall
find ourselves developing a fuller appreciation of the
historian's own individual understanding. And such answers,
as is often evident in the presuppositions of the original
questions, may well directly have their foundation in our
grasp of the way in which an individual historian carries
out his work.
The individuality of a historian is finally made
clear through a comprehension of his conception of history
as this is expressed in his written account. Our compre¬
hension will approach completeness only as we criticize
history in an aesthetic and literary fashion as well as in
a "scientific" and factual way. In history we must under¬
stand not only what is said but the way in which it is
said. Or, in other words, we must understand the form of
the narrative as well as its content.
6. The historian and his public
In what I have said in this chapter I have hoped to
show that the need to present history as a continuous ac¬
count in ordinary language leads to the historian's expres¬
sion of his individuality in a historical work. So the
question might fairly be asked: Need history be presented
in the form in which it is usually presented at the moment?
If such a question resulted from a belief that it is alone
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the narrative form of history which necessarily entails an
expression of the historian's individuality, it would be
misguided. I have already demonstrated, I hope, that both
values and understanding in history are closely linked with
the personality of the historian. Nevertheless, the ques¬
tion might be asked by someone who felt that at least one
"cause for offence" could be eliminated, that the removal
of literary style and artistic conception from history
could be at least one step towards the transformation of
history into a purely factual science. Could history cease
to be thought of as partaking at least of some of the
qualities of literature?
To think that history could somehow cease to be lit¬
erary at all is to mistake not only the subject of much of
history but also some of the value of history, and to fail
to realize completely for whom the historian is writing.
With many other disciplines it is the case that the exis¬
tence of a lay readership is a largely incidental state of
affairs. With history, however, historians do not aim
merely at writing for other historians: they are seriously
determined that an important part of their audience should
consist of members of the public who have a genuine interest
in history (as many of us do) but who are not historians.
And this is often a consequential consideration for them
as they carry out their work. Their interest in a lay rea¬
dership becomes very evident when we bear in mind that some
of the output of many historians is directed primarily to
the public rather than to their academic colleagues. And
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what is very much more interesting here is that a great
deal of this output cannot fairly be categorized as
"popularization" in the slightly pejorative sense which
that term has acquired in connection with works in some
other disciplines, for "less academic" histories can also
be studied profitably in many cases by professional his¬
torians. But even with much of their specialized work
historians (and their publishers too) expect that some
members of the lay public will be interested and that the
work will be intelligible to those who are. As Louis 0.
Mink has written:
Historians generally assume that they have a
potentially universal audience, especially for the
"comprehensive syntheses" at which they aim. With
special exceptions, such as economic history and
history of science, written history has not ordinarily
supposed special information or training on the part
of its readers. Of course, historians write for one
another in the sense that they seek to meet professional
standards of competence; but few historians have
abandoned the hope of educating a general audience
directly in the knowledge produced by their inquiries
rather than of serving the lot of us indirectly by
applying the results of their labors -- as does,
say, a biologist or an econometrician.19
A programme of deliberate eradication of literary
features in history would therefore seem perversely
counter-productive. On its own it \rould produce no useful
change regarding the content of the historical account;
with other contentious factors still present, it would not
resolve any supposed problems of objectivity, or general¬
ization, or explanatory effectiveness. Such a programme
could do harm to history by causing it to lose some of
19. "The autonomy of historical understanding", ibid.,
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that intelligibility that is provided by the artistic fac¬
tors present in a historical narrative and manifested in
its conception and arrangement; and it would also cause
the loss of the greater part of an important audience,
that audience which does not consist of professional his¬
torians and which is attracted to history, first by its
subject-matter, but also, significantly, by the literary
form of its presentation, and which would be immediately
repelled or discouraged by history that was needlessly
"dull". The literary and artistic, aspects of history are
a consequence of its universality, in subject-matter and
treatment, but they have been greatly beneficial for the
widespread study and influence of history. When individ¬
uals today are leading lives that are becoming increasing¬
ly specialized and have effectively lost touch with man's
development and progress as a whole, the universal appeal
of history that results from the attraction of its lite¬
rary and artistic qualities is something to be encouraged




1. Objectivity in history
A treatment of the literary or artistic aspect of
history makes clear that point at which the individuality
of the historian is most evident in a historical account.
It is through its literary features that a historical
account is made complete not only in the determination of
the form of presentation which a statement of factual
knowledge and interpretation is to take but also in the
provision to the historian of an ability to make an essen¬
tial personal contribution to that statement. Individu¬
ality has a primary place in history because part of the
very core of the idea of artistic conception and literary
style is intimately bound up with the expression by an
artist or an author of himself in his individuality.
Given that the individuality of the historian is to be
found at such a central point in historiography, what re¬
mains to be said about the possibility of objectivity in
history?
Objectivity itself has never been clearly defined
with one simple meaning. Obviously neither history nor
the physical sciences can achieve the objectivity of a
discipline like mathematics or logic, which, following the
Cartesian criterion of objectivity, may deduce their
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conclusions from self-evident axioms or unfold them from
essences or definitions.1 Objectivity for history must
mean first that the historian attempts to discover and
relate the factual truth about the past. Historians
clearly do succeed in establishing factual truths that are
accepted not only by their own coterie but by historians
in general. A very large body of historical "facts" is
established and accepted. In some matters, naturally,
disagreement exists; and it may seem to figure largely in
history, but only because historians, like many other
people, tend to discuss the things about which they
disagree rather than those about which they agree. In any
case, disagreement will frequently be found to arise, much
as it does in the sciences, not through subjective factors
but through problems which are connected with the evidence
and which are amenable to objective treatment. Similarly,
the abandonment of past historical conclusions, where
these are factual ones, is no evidence of an innate lack
of objectivity in history (even if only in the work of the
past) to any greater extent than it is in the sciences
where old theories and conclusions are continually being
overturned.
Mere factual objectivity need raise no problems in
history at the lowest levels. It is in connection with
explanation that problems of objectivity begin to be
raised, and they become very evident in the wider context
1. Conceptions of objectivity are usefully listed and
penetratingly discussed with respect to history by
J. A. Passmore in "The objectivity of history", Philosophy
33 (1956).
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of interpretation. But demands for objectivity of inter¬
pretation along with objectivity of fact result from the
elementary confusion of written history with history-as-
actuality. Interpretation is determined by certain prin¬
ciples, but it is not determined by the same principles
as the discovery and simple recounting of facts. Factual
objectivity need not be compromised in theory by either
valuational judgments (such as moral and aesthetic ones)
or evaluative judgments (of significance, importance, or
relevance, for example). Factual statements are inferred
from the evidence, and they may be criticized according to
the evidence available. Where it is believed that an
interpretation has distorted or falsified the facts, ap¬
peal, again, may be made to the evidence. Only where fac¬
tual hypotheses are in dispute, where the evidence to
support a well-grounded conclusion is insufficient, will
the acceptance or rejection of a particular interpretation
be the basis of the acceptance or rejection of those hypo¬
theses respecting facts of the past. But the frequency of
such questionable factual hypotheses is much less than the
problems they raise would seem to suggest. That factual
statements may be established or refuted according to evi¬
dential inference which follows generally accepted methodo¬
logical principles is the basis of objectivity in history.
The conclusions of historians, however, are not only
factual but also interpretive. It must be readily admitted
that interpretations of history manifestly and unequivo¬
cally differ one from another although they are frequently
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based on the same established and accepted facts. Since
the interpretation and understanding of historical events
is, with their factual, supportive statements, central to
many historical accounts, an interpretive statement cannot
merely be dismissed as, for example, an aside by the his¬
torian to his readers. Yet, with no generally accepted
interpretive principles, how are we to decide between
conflicting interpretations? How are we to refute the
relativist who complains that history fails to be objec¬
tive because there are no rational grounds for finally
preferring one historical reconstruction to another?
Objectivity would seem to demand that there be a way of
deciding between conflicting hypotheses of interpretation
as well as between hypotheses of fact and factual infer¬
ences from historical evidence.
True historical interpretation, however, if it is
considered entirely in itself, is not objective; and, what
is more, it could not be objective. The very nature of
interpretation in history logically precludes some type of
objectivity that would be the equivalent of the objectivity
that characterizes the concept of historical "fact". And
there is no different type of supposedly objective inter¬
pretation that could be substituted for it, which would
nevertheless allow the discipline of history to retain its
present character. There are no ways of deciding between
different interpretations of the same historical events
as to which is the correct one in an absolute sense; but
there are ways of choosing between interpretations and
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deciding which is the most satisfactory one. The most
satisfactory historical explanation will not be the same
for every individual, or every society, or every genera¬
tion: what makes an interpretation satisfactory, and in
what way it is satisfactory, will make clear the nature
and purpose of historical interpretation and the reason
that objectivity, with regard to interpretation itself, is
not to be considered as -- unfortunately -- excluded or
unattainable but as an inapplicable notion.
Interpretations do not have their existence in the
past facts alone: they always relate to a particular prob¬
lem, or a particular ideology or intellectual position, or
even a particular lesson (among other possibilities). The
relativist's point in this regard is quite correct; the
relativist unfortunately sees the fusion of fact and in¬
terpretation in the historical account and believes that,
because of this fusion, either factual content as well as
interpretive content is always relative and thus subject
to change, or, interpretation should have the same objec¬
tive basis there in the events as factual propositions
have. An interpretation is satisfactory according to the
degree in which the facts can be understood to support it,
and according to the extent to which the interpretation
solves the historian's problem, proves the historian's
thesis, or is accommodated to the historian's intellectual
position. Great histories of the past are accepted and
2. With regard to interpretation and any discussion of
it, it is assumed that the facts underlying the inter¬
pretation are soundly established and not distorted in
any way.
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useful, not because their interpretation and understanding
of their subjects somehow transcend the relativity of
their writers' contexts, but because these contexts to
which they were related are competently understood along
with the histories themselves and indeed almost as an
integral part of those histories. In these connections
with the historian and his problems, the historical
narrative shows that it is not simply an account of past
and completed events but a living work which links the past
with the present.
Historical interpretation cannot be objective because
history is not merely a copy of the past. In history the
historian is attempting to convey information and to
communicate with his audience. A theory of history which
holds that the historian "copies" the past is open to the
same sort of criticism as the copy theory of art. For
aesthetics Goodman offers us a succinct criticism of this
theory:
The copy theory of representation, then, is stopped at
the start by inability to specify what is to be copied.
Not an object the way it is, nor all the ways it is, nor
the way it looks to the mindless eye. Moreover, -
. something is wrong with the very notion of copying any
of the ways an object is, any aspect of it. For an
aspect is not just the object-from-a-given-distance-and-
angle-and-in-a-given-light; it is the object as we look
upon or conceive it, a version or construal of the
object. In representing an object, we do not copy such
a construal or interpretation -- we achieve it.3
In the representational aspect of his relation to the past
and his evidence about it the historian considerably
resembles the artist. In working on a historical account
3. Nelson Goodman: Languages of art (London, 1969), 9.
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the historian achieves an understanding of the past. The
historian does not merely try to present some sort of
inventory of past events: he selects and interprets, ex¬
plains, highlights details, makes linkages, attempting for
much of the time to give some worthwhile understanding of
the whole. Interpretation is not something that is super¬
imposed on the facts; nor is it something that is in the
past to be recorded and related by the historian. The
historian achieves his understanding of the past as he
tells its story and through his telling of it. This un¬
derstanding properly is created by, and belongs essen¬
tially to, the individual, and it is a concept for which
the question of objectivity is inapplicable.
Historical objectivity is therefore a feature that
is present in the historical account, rather than a charac¬
teristic of the account. It is incorrect, that is to say,
to think of a piece of narrative history as something that
can be objective without qualification. Rather, if we are
concerned about objectivity, or the possible lack of it,
on the part of a particular historian, we must engage in
the activity of analysis with respect to a particular
account, so that we may ascertain whether objectivity is
present where we believe it should be. Objectivity is a
characteristic of a particular stage of the historian's
researches and of a particular stage in the historian's
reasoning about his evidence. At a certain point, however,
in his synthesizing work'-- and many shorter or more basic
written accounts may never reach this point, so that it
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is not incorrect to talk of their objectivity as a whole --
the historian has moved beyond the requirements of objec¬
tivity; that he has done so should become evident when we
reflect how difficult it is to see what kind of objectivity
it might be that would characterize the finished historical
narrative as a whole which presents us with an individual
understanding of events. What we ask of the finished nar¬
rative -- and this presents us with the furthest limit of
historical objectivity -- is that the historian be account¬
able to his evidence, that whatever else he may bring to
bear on his work to enhance what he eventually presents to
his public, it is brought to his work to serve that
evidence.
2. Individuality and the point of studying; history
An interpretation of past events and an understanding
of them are created by the historian in the very activity
of constructing and writing his account. In this intimate
connection between the historian and his account is found
the importance of individuality in history; the conception
of a full-scale and finished historical work cannot fail
to include its partaking of the historian's personality.
This does not mean that the historian is necessarily con¬
scious of his personal presence in his work, or that he
approves of it, or even that he would accept it if it were
brought to his attention; nevertheless, his individuality
is necessarily to be found there. Individuality cannot be
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excluded by claiming that the historical account is only
socially determined and not personally or individually
determined, that a historical interpretation is the conse¬
quence of a society's way of looking at things rather than
the individual's. Interpretation has an important social
basis, but in some cases its broad scheme, and in all
cases its finer details, its nuances and its subtleties,
are given to it by the individual historian. It is neces¬
sary to sum up precisely how individuality affects the
historical account and its interpretation of the past, and
how it can be compatible with objectivity.
Above all, individuality is bestowed on accounts of
the past by what may be called the historian's general
philosophy of life. This "philosophy of life" will deter¬
mine at least the broad outlines of the historian's view
of the present and of the past. Because the historian
does not want to see nothing more than what happened in
the past alone, but rather wants to understand how it hap¬
pened and why it happened and to suggest to himself and to
others what it all may have meant (and may still mean),
there are always alternatives of interpretation open in
history just as there are in everyday life. The historian
sees the past as a real past; and so, as in his everyday
dealings, he will believe or disbelieve declarations and
promises, trust or distrust intentions and motives, accept
or reject reasons and explanations; he will see actions as
psychologically determined or freely chosen, and events as
decided by men or by fate or by chance; he will in history
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as in life be optimistic or pessimistic, credulous or cyn¬
ical, practical or idealistic. The historian's philosophy
of life will be manifested in the values implicit or ex¬
plicit in his account, in what is deemed to be significant
within a topic, in the explanations -- rational and
causal -- offered and considered satisfactory; it will be
shown in the mood and colouring of the account, in the
style and tenor of the language, and indeed in the very
topic chosen and the thesis that underlies it. Although
in its broad outlines this "philosophy of life" will
usually be a product of the historian's society, in its
details it will ultimately be individually determined,
just as the outlooks on the world even of individuals who
may be considered to be socially close are often similar
but rarely identical.
V/hen such importance is granted to the historian's
individuality, it might be thought that any objective ele¬
ments in history would be totally overwhelmed, if indeed
objectivity of any sort could still be held to be possible.
But in so far as historical interpretation is truly indi¬
vidual, fact is not interpretation; and objectivity is a
property of fact and not of interpretation in history.
Objectivity can be a property of interpretation only when
interpretation is fixed according to certain principles,
as it is in science. There cannot be a standard scheme of
interpretation in history because of the nature of histori¬
cal subject-matter itself and the aims and purposes of
historical study. Objectivity in history is limited to
405
the factual content of the narrative but it need not in
any way be overlaid and obscured by interpretation.
In the ideal historical account factual objectivity
can still be present. And a meaningful interpretation of
the subject-matter of history requires principles which
are not fixed but which are a product of the same individ¬
uality, characteristic of human nature, that also produced
the events of the past. This interpretation ideally does
not obscure the facts. It may be agreed with or disputed,
but the facts interpreted can still be followed and, if
necessary, identified in some plausibly "bare" state.
That "bare facts" can be identified and separated, that an
objective "substratum" of fact can be followed, cannot be
disputed, even though the separation of fact from out of
the account may effectively destroy the account as "history".
Otherwise the possibility of historical objectivity could
never be realized. But the real task is to identify where
history can be objective, how it can be objective, and how
its objective factual content is not to be compromised.
The inapplicability to history of a cold, scientific
type of objectivity becomes clear when we reflect on what
the aims of historical study are and why it is that we
study history. We study history not as a discipline that
is entirely apart from us but as one that is able to give
us a knowledge of part of ourselves: indeed, in so far as
history is a possession unique to mankind, it i_s a part of
us. And that they bear a real significance for us is true
even of the remotest parts of the past, for while these
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clearly may have no direct relevance for us, they are
inevitably relevant to a part of the past which does, as
we might say, belong to us as our own.
History, if we take care to profit from our study
of it, gives us knowledge of ourselves and our society.
And here is the reason that history is not to be tampered
with, here we may understand immediately why it is that the
historian is to approach the past in its own right, and
to study it as if for its own sake, for it is the attain¬
ment of the purest knowledge of ourselves that we should
hold most dear, and in our acquisition of that knowledge
that we should be most on our guard against deception.
If through history we gain knowledge of ourselves
and our society, must we learn to use history as a source
of instruction and profit? Does history teach us lessons?
Is history some sort of tool that proves useful to us in
the present? To ask such questions is to misunderstand
fundamentally the nature of history and its place in the
life of man. We learn lessons from, or through, a disci¬
pline which is generalized and formalized, in a body of
knowledge which has been abstracted and is already apart
from the empirical content of the experience to x»/hich it
owes its origin. History is not abstracted from experience;
it is part of experience. We learn from experience, al¬
though our experience does not generally "teach us lessons";




In this thesis I have intended to put forward a view
of one way- in which historical studies can be satisfacto¬
rily carried out and historical accounts written. That is
to say, a historical account with a single cohesive con¬
ception in continuous prose written by a single historian
from an individual point of view is able to give us a
fully satisfactory account of the past. More, I have been
trying to argue that this is the fundamental way in which
we should approach the historical past. Of course, it is
not the only way in which we may -- quite legitimately --
look at the past. And indeed it is difficult to know how
one might set about prescribing the one absolutely pre¬
eminent way in which the human past is to be treated. One
can only say that the human past should be dealt with in
terms proper to humanity; and perhaps it is this -- the
diversity of human nature and knowledge -- that is the
source of the diversity of man's views of his past and his
approach to the study of it.
If it is true that history can properly be approached
in different ways, there is one major philosophical comment
still to be made. It does not seem that "history" should
be thought of as a concept that can be made precise in a
single, unitary definition. "History", we must say, is
one further example of an open-textured concept, with
instances of which wre are now familiar in philosophy. And
if it is the case that no single definition can be given
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completely of "written history", it is also the case that
no single "element" or "feature" can be held to be neces¬
sarily or essentially a part of it, except that it may be
said — in.the end, one feels, a little lamely — that its
subject is man's past. We cannot fairly say that written
history ceases to be history because it is not a descrip¬
tive account, or because it is not cast in narrative form,
or because it does not evaluate or explain. It is conse¬
quently impossible to prescribe finally how the historical
past is to be examined and treated. For sound academic
history, certainly, one may rule out, for example, an
unhindered exhibition of prejudice or an inhibited use of
a biased judgment. There is still, all the same, no sin¬
gle definitive and established methodology or content for
"history". History is the story of man's past, but it is
I




In saying that history tells us about the life of
man in society, it may not be clear how history is ade¬
quately to be differentiated from some forms of anthro¬
pology. I have shown in this dissertation how history is
concerned writh the particular, but anthropology too often
deals with particular societies and particular cultures.
In order, therefore, to separate history from anthropology
we must concentrate on the distinction between the real
and the abstract.
Anthropology, it has been claimed, is the most com¬
prehensive of the academic disciplines dealing with man¬
kind. Although its subject-matter often overlaps with the
subject-matter of other disciplines, the core of anthro¬
pological interest is to be found in the description and
explanation of similarities and differences between ethnic
groups; thus, one of its aims is, through its investigation
of features common to different cultures, to bring out the
basic overall characteristics of human nature. Overlap¬
ping to a degree with history we find such studies as
those of cultural anthropology, which attempts to discover
behavioural characteristics, and to describe the processes
of stability, change, and development in different human
1. See chap. II, sect. 2.
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societies; social anthropology, which aims at understand¬
ing and explaining the diversity of human behaviour by a
comparative study, over a wide range of societies, of
social relationships and processes, and at providing un¬
derstanding by precisely defining and describing beha¬
vioural connections within societies; and — a most recent
formation — political anthropology, which aims at formu¬
lating general statements and hypotheses about the nature
and conditions of political processes and their relations
to other social phenomena, dealing with such concepts as
change, faction, and party, and which includes comparative
politics, the study of the forms of political organization
together with their properties, variations, and modes of
change.
In the brief summaries of some of those studies
which seem to overlap with history it is important to
notice the constant occurrence of abstractions, and the
pride of place that is given to abstract concepts. Indeed,
in anthropology descriptive accounts serve to illustrate
certain abstract schemes of relationships and behavioural
connections, or to act as source-material from which such
schemes can be derived. Cultural anthropology, for exam¬
ple, is concerned only initially with the externals of any
cultural features, and is mainly interested in an analysis
of the role of those features in the sociocultural system
of which they form a part. What matters in anthropology
is in the end not the people who are talked about, but the
relationships believed to be behind or underlying their
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lives — not the real and concrete, but the abstract.
What matters is not the individual but his place in a
certain "scheme", and the manner in which that individual
and his relationships are to be defined and connected with
other individuals and other relationships. The true
subject-matter of anthropology is abstracted and schema¬
tized behaviour and a stylized network of functions and
relationships. And even such a world of abstractions is
not to be considered in its own setting in the way that
a historical individual is; by means of his abstractions
the anthropologist attempts to consider particular prob¬
lems within a framework that embraces the human species
as a whole.
Although many branches of anthropology deal with
the particular, which, as the concrete particular, is
otherwise the subject of history, they deal with it from
an entirely different point of view, and with entirely
different aims in mind. If they aim at describing the
particular, it is a particular that is not real but,
rather, abstracted and conceptualized, or one that at
least, it is hoped, will prove itself a basis for some
abstract scheme. Beyond the description of the particular
in any branch of anthropology lies an analysis in terms of
behaviour, relationship, and function, even though that
analysis must sometimes remain temporarily unaccomplished
in the present. History, however, wishes in the end to
deal only with what is Individual and particular in its
own right. For history the so-called "feature" or
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"characteristic", as it exists in its concrete reality, is
the main object of interest. Written history is an account
of individual facts, of real events and actions; and
although much may be said about the facts of history by
the historian, it is primarily to the real existence of
events and actions and individuals in their ovm right that




Historians make frequent and unquestioning use of
holistic concepts such as "England". Indeed, such concepts
are to be counted among the central concepts of history,
and a narrative which seemed to be deliberately excluding
them in its consideration of subject-matter in which they
would normally be found would present us with a strange
sort of historical account. Yet, however soundly estab¬
lished an entity like England may be for historians, such
entities still present a problem that is widely discussed
by philosophers. The question whether such entities are
reducible to simpler elements, whether they are a kind of
methodological shorthand, is not strictly central to my
own argument in this thesis. Any serious discussion of it
would have to examine in detail the very complicated
question of the opposition of individualism and holism.
It should be sufficient to say that all historians make
extensive use of holistic entities, that it would be
impossible on pragmatic grounds alone for them to do
otherwise, and that, given the way we think and speak, the
use of holistic entities would seem to be necessary for
historical understanding. History can only be understood
if entities like England are admitted as basic, together,
1. See chap. VIII, sect. 2.
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of course, with statements that use them, such as "England
declared war on Germany".
It should be accepted that such entities as "England"
or "Germany" are not real in the way that tables and chairs
and individuals are real; but neither are they reducible to
such "real" entities. "England" is a social concept — and
here the word "social" is to be understood in a very wide
sense as referring to man's life in society in general.
The social is not reducible to the physical; the holistic
is not reducible to the individual. The holistic takes its
meaning from the social order, and to reduce it entirely
to the individual is to abolish the social context from
which it takes its meaning. Partial reductions are always
possible, for in their case part of the social (holistic)
context is retained, and this continues to supply a proper
meaning; but it is a mistake to think that because all
kinds of partial reductions are possible, full reductions
must be possible at least in principle. The individual
devoid of a holistic setting is no more than a physical
(and psychological) individual; the social has been
abolished.
A further argument in support of holism is that it
is not at all clear how some partial reductions could ever
be satisfactorily completed. If a statement like "England
declared war on Germany" is analysed, perhaps, into some¬
thing like "The British Ambassador in Berlin on the
authority of the Prime Minister and King delivered a note
containing an ultimatum to the German Foreign Chancellery,
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etc. . .." it can only be pointed out that no satisfactory
reduction has taken place here: the Prime Minister, for
example, is not meant here simply as an individual but as
the Prime Minister of England. In this context, who the
particular individual was who happened to be Prime Minister
at the time is not significant (except in so far, naturally,
as his individual personality affected his official
behaviour). What the "Prime Minister of England" signifies
is only to be understood in other institutional (holistic)
terms, and thus it is not completely reducible. So far in
the example above, there has been no reduction at all, for
to reduce an action of England to the behaviour of a person
acting on the authority of the Prime Minister of England
leaves the concept of "England" still present in the so-
2
called reduction.
Neither reduction in terms of contemporary individuals
nor reduction in terms of the history of a concept can ever
eradicate holistic terms satisfactorily, that is, in such
a way that the genuine social meaning of a holistic term
is left intact. Nor should it be forgotten -- whatever
the logical possibilities presented by analysis may be --
that holistic terms are a genuine part of our way of think¬
ing, and even of the thought of those who deny, for
example, that a concept like "their country" can have any
power over them on the ground that it is meaningless, for
the argument that supports their denial is not seldom
2. Cf. Maurice Mandelbaum: "Societal facts", in Theories
of history (New York, 1959), where an illustration
involving banking is used.
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constructed in such a way that it succeeds in using the
concept quite meaningfully.
To point out that entities like England (in its
historical sense) are not real does not entail that they
are to be seen as subjective concepts or abstractions.
It means that they are not physically real or of the same
order as physical objects or real individual persons.
They are irreducibly simple concepts, or reducible to
simple concepts of the same order; they have their meaning
as part of the social order, and not as part of the
physical order. They are analysable, that is to say, in
terms of man's ordering of his social life, and in terms
of concepts like offices, powers, duties, and so forth.
To point out that a declaration of war is the act of some
individual is to make an inappropriate, and so erroneous,
reduction — it is the act of some individual in a
socially, and holisticallv, defined capacity, and the act
will often be defined in terms of a capacity which has its
being in the selfsame holistic concept which was the
original object of reduction. The act of the individual,
as "Prime Minister", for example, must be defined in terms
of an office which ultimately is an office having a meaning
and significance dependent on the concept of "England".
And the concept of "England" has an existence that is part
of the social order, in this case, because the holder of
the office will find that the concept is one of the prin¬
cipal determinants of his actions. The resulting state¬
ments of a possible reduction (if we assume for a moment
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that a reduction is possible in theory) might well not be
accepted as determinants of action by him because they
would not possess the same connotations as the original
holistic concept. Reduction seems to be talked of only in
terms that suggest the denotation alone of a concept is to
be retained, or rather, clarified and simplified. Yet it
is the connotation of a concept, and especially of a
holistic concept, which is often more significant for the
individual, at least in motivating thought and action.
And it is doubtful that even the whole denotation of a
concept -- when this is understood to include the social
as well as the physical denotation would be retained
after the hoped-for successful reduction.
"England", therefore, is an abstraction in terms of
the physical order, but it has an effect in the physical
order and defines the physical lives of individuals
because it is a reality of the social order. The statement
"England declared war on Germany" defines what is in effect
a very simple change in the social order of the world.
An attempted reduction of that statement to a statement
about concrete individuals is both very complicated and,
in the end, questionably successful, for reduced statements
would only seem to be intelligible when their holistic
counterpart is given as a translation or exegetical aid,
or when we are already acquainted with the holistic
original; in addition, it does not effect a genuine
reduction because it destroys the meaning of the original
statement, which can only be understood in social (holistic)
Aid
terms and not in individual terms. It may make sense very
often to reduce some of the holistic to the individual
level, but, on the other hand, since a movement from the
complex to the simple must surely be classed as a reduc¬
tion (for some purposes), it can make sense to reduce
some complex individual statements to simple social
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